











Title of Dissertation:   RHETORICAL WORK IN SOFT POWER   
     DIPLOMACY:  THE U.S.-INDIA 123   
     AGREEMENT AND A RELATIONSHIP   
     TRANSFORMED   
 
     M. Karen Walker, Doctor of Philosophy, 2014 
 
 
Dissertation Directed by  Professor James F. Klumpp 
     Department of Communication 
      
 
 My dissertation broadens and deepens our understanding of soft power diplomacy 
as a creation of constitutive rhetoric.  I perform a rhetorical critique of discourses 
generated during three years’ debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, a watershed 
moment in bilateral relations.  In Chapter 1, I introduce the frames of reference that 
guided my research, set my project within the literature stream, and lay foundations for 
my argument.  
 In Chapter 2, I explore how soft power discourse facilitated India’s diplomatic 
move from outside to inside the nonproliferation regime.  I introduce identification and 
courtship as constructs to explain soft power attraction, presenting narratives of 
exceptionalism, deliverance and kinship that emerged from discourse.  In Chapter 3, I 
explain the bilateral movement from estranged to engaged as deepened identification and 
consubstantiation, the achievement of a permanent union.  I trace the development of 
“democracy,” “pluralism,” and “creativity” as terms of ideological commitment and 
 
 
mutual obligation.  I also present two additional narratives, the sojourner narrative, which 
reconstituted the Indian Diaspora’s political identity, and the convergence narrative, 
which constituted the United States and India as bilateral partners and transformed the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement from an idea about nuclear cooperation into the embodiment 
of a resilient, enduring, and comprehensive partnership. Each narrative drew in 
substances of identification that reduced recalcitrance, changed perspectives, overcame 
estrangement, and motivated concerted action.   
 Chapter 4 outlines benefits of my research for rhetoricians, soft power 
proponents, and diplomacy specialists.  For rhetoricians, I enrich our limited study of 
diplomatic discourse and generate insight into dramatistic theory and criticism.  For soft 
power theorists, my project as a whole gives explanatory force to soft power as a creation 
of constitutive rhetoric.  The consequent reinterpretation of the telos, processes, and 
resources of soft power makes soft power attraction more transparent.  For the diplomatic 
corps, I encourage new ways of conceptualizing and talking about diplomatic aims and 
achievements.  Chapter 4 thus frames longer-term objectives to further develop the 
rhetoric of diplomacy, to undertake theory-building in soft power diplomacy, and to 










RHETORICAL WORK IN SOFT POWER DIPLOMACY: 










Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 


















 Professor James F. Klumpp, Chair 
 Professor Robert N. Gaines 
 Professor Dale Hample 
 Professor R. Gordon Kelly 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter I Soft Power’s Value to the Rhetoric of Diplomacy ……………………… 1 
 
The Aims of Rhetorical Inquiry in Soft Power Diplomacy …………………………….. 3 
 
 Grounding My Research in Professional Experience ………………………....... 4 
 Situating My Project in Rhetorical Theory and Criticism ……………………… 6 
 Differentiating Rhetoric’s Persuasive and Constitutive Modes ………………...  8 
 
Literature Review ……………………………………………………………………… 17 
 
 Foreign Policy Rhetoric ………………………………………………………... 18 
  Rhetoric-as-Persuasion ………………………………………………… 18  
  Rhetoric-as-Constitutive ……………………………………………….  25 
 Soft Power ……………………………………………………………………..  32 
  Nye’s Project and Its Evolution ……………………………………….. 33 
  Reading Nye Holistically ……………………………………………… 36 
  The New Public Diplomacy …………………………………………… 40 
  Critical Studies in Soft Power Diplomacy …………………………….. 41 
 Joining Rhetoric and Soft Power ……………………………………………… 44 
 
Elaborating Soft Power with Rhetorical Sensitivity ………………………………….. 45 
  
 The Nature and Projection of National Values ……………………………….. 45 
 New Actors’ Exercise of Voice and Agency …………………………………. 47 
 The Framing of Issues on the International Agenda ………………………….. 49 
 
Soft Power’s Rhetorical Force ………………………………………………………... 51 
  
 A Partner Country in Bilateral Dialogue ……………………………………... 51 
 Civil Nuclear Cooperation …………………………………………………… 57 
 Gathering Discourses Concerning Civil Nuclear Cooperation ………………. 60 
Everything, Preferably All at Once …………………………………………………..  64 
 
Chapter I Notes ………………………………………………………………………. 66 
 
Chapter II:   Identification and India’s Move from Outside to Inside …………….. 77 
 





Recognizing Authenticity in Soft Power Diplomacy ………………………………..  81 
 
 The Call for Rhetorical Sensitivity ………………………………………….. 82 
 Separating Persuasive and Constitutive Forms of Rhetoric …………………  83 
 Soft Power as Constitutive Rhetoric ………………………………………… 85 
 Enacting Constitutive Rhetoric in Courtship ………………………………... 87 
 
Outside to Inside:  Changing India’s Place among Cooperating Nuclear States ……. 89 
 
 India’s Strategic Autonomy …………………………………………………. 89 
 Rhetorical Work:  Engaging as Equals ……………………………………… 93 
  Exceptionalism Narrative …………………………………………… 94 
  Deliverance Narrative ……………………………………………….100 
  Kinship Narrative ……………………………………………………110 
 
Augmenting Soft Power Theory and Practice through Identification ………………116 
 
Chapter II Notes …………………………………………………………………….120 
 
Chapter III: Rhetorical Enactments:  From Estranged to Engaged …………….. 125 
 
The Hard Power Cycle …………………………………………………………….. 127 
 
 Sanctions …………………………………………………………………... 128 
 Export Controls ……………………………………………………………. 131 
 Breaking Free ……………………………………………………………… 136 
 
Soft Power Diplomacy:  Rhetorical Strategies to Achieve Bilateral Unity ……….. 138 
 
 Unity of Ideals:  A Shared Commitment to Democracy …………………...139 
  Co-Constructing <Democracy> ……………………………………140 
  Introducing <Creativity> …………………………………………..145 
 Unity in Community:  A Sojourning ………………………………………152 
 Unity of Strategic Interests:  A Convergence …………………………….. 158 
 
A Relationship Transformed ……………………………………………………... 169 
 
Chapter III Notes …………………………………………………………………. 172 
 
Chapter IV Fulfilling Commitments ………………………………………….. 178 
 
Endorsing the Rhetoric of Diplomacy …………………………………………… 180 
 




 Deepening Our Knowledge of Dramatism ………………………………..185 
  Ideographic Criticism ……………………………………………..185 
  Narrative Criticism ………………………………………………..189 
  Burkean Criticism ………………………………………………...195 
 
Reinterpreting Soft Power ………………………………………………………  200 
 
 Soft Power as a Constitutive Force ……………………………………..  201 
 Telos of Soft Power ……………………………………………………..  204 
 Enhancing Diplomatic Tradecraft ………………………………………. 209 
  The Nature of Power ……………………………………………. 209 
 Lessons in Diplomacy …………………………………………………... 212 
  Democracy is Constructed and Enacted …………………........... 212 
  Moments of Transformation ……………………………………. 215 
  Decentering the Diplomat ………………………………………. 217 
 
Chapter IV Notes ……………………………………………………………….. 221 
   
References ……………………………………………………………………… 226 
 
 Rhetoric ………………………………………………………………… 226 
 India ……………………………………………………………………. 232 
 Soft Power and Related Themes ……………………………………….. 234 






Soft Power’s Value to the Rhetoric of Diplomacy 
 
During a visit with one of my nephews, then in middle school, he asked what I 
was writing about.  I told him that I was writing about how countries become friends.  A 
simple answer to a complex question.  More accurately, I am writing about how 
diplomatic discourse can create a permanent and durable bond of friendship between 
countries that were formerly strangers to one another.  More than a friendship of 
convenience, or a friendship based in “the enemy of my enemy,” diplomatic discourse 
possesses the capacity to transform two nation-states’ strained relationship into a durable 
and resilient partnership.   
Bilateral diplomacy achieved such a transformation between the United States and 
India.  The friendship between the two countries had waxed and waned since India’s 
founding, dependent on geopolitical circumstance, domestic politics, and the degree of 
personal affinity that existed between the heads of state.1  The sea change in bilateral 
relations took place during the administration of President George W. Bush, as the United 
States and India repositioned themselves from estranged to engaged democracies.  
Several factors contributed to this change, including India’s economic 
renaissance, joint security concerns in combating global terrorism, and the United States’ 
humanitarian response to the Indian Ocean tsunami.  Based solely on these factors, the 
bilateral relationship was dependent on the two countries’ mutual affinity and good will.  
A more permanent bond could not be set while India remained isolated from the 
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community of nation-states allowed to cooperate in the development of civilian nuclear 
energy and advanced science and technology endeavors.   
At the end of the Bush Administration, the United States and India signed a U.S.-
India “123 Agreement,” which refers to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.2  
The 123 Agreement, described as a watershed moment in U.S.-India relations, was a 
unique and novel element of the bilateral partnership.  The perception of South Asian 
affairs experts and the U.S.-India business community was that the future of the U.S.-
India partnership was allied with the Agreement and its implementation.  
After decades of sanctions and export controls failed to persuade India to sign the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the U.S.-India 123 Agreement—with its reciprocal 
commitments, joint obligations, and mutual benefits—ushered India into the community 
of cooperating nuclear states.  The conversation about the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, 
however, largely ignored the rhetorical work of soft power in India’s move from outside 
to inside the nuclear regime, or in the transformation of bilateral relations from estranged 
to engage.  Public diplomacy professionals recognized India as a country that possessed 
and wielded soft power.  But the bridge from soft power diplomacy measures of 
favorability to bilateral diplomacy measures of a successful negotiation had not been 
built.  
Building this bridge is one aim of my dissertation.  I conduct a rhetorical critique 
of discourses generated by the debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement to open a window 
on how soft power catalyzes and capitalizes on moments that portend a transformation in 
bilateral relations.  A second aim is to broaden and deepen the conversation on soft power 
diplomacy.  I demonstrate the suitability and benefit of adopting dramatism as a 
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theoretical underpinning for soft power processes of attraction, and assert a constitutive 
rather than persuasive role for rhetoric in the conduct of soft power diplomacy.   
 
The Aims of Rhetorical Inquiry in Soft Power Diplomacy 
The end of the Cold War reoriented and redefined the generation and purposes of 
the United States’ power. This moment innovated scholarship regarding new actors, new 
agendas, and new forms of influence on foreign affairs policy making and diplomatic 
tradecraft.  Soft power—the idea that nation-states gain influence through attraction 
rather than coercion—adapted traditional international relations theories and diplomatic 
tradecraft to this post-Cold War reality. With the premise that values, culture, and similar 
substances of soft power can be generated and possessed by communities and 
organizations beyond the nation-state, soft power theory accommodated new and 
nontraditional actors’ entry into international affairs.  No mere observers, new actors 
pushing nontraditional issues onto diplomatic agendas naturally followed.  
Soft power maintained the nation-state as locus for international influence and 
action, easing the theory’s entry into the foreign policy domain. Moreover, soft power 
proposed a new way to explain how nation-states attain and measure influence, for 
example by channeling new actors’ energies in ways beneficial to the nation-state, and by 
shaping diplomatic agendas to the nation-state’s comparative advantage. Soft power 
theory provided a rationale for pursuing international cooperation as a means to preserve 
national autonomy and protect strategic interests.   
For rhetoricians, the unfolding of the post-Cold War era, in tandem with a 
globalizing economy, expanded interest in the construction and expression of identity and 
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how people come together to form communities. The forming of community relies on the 
rhetorical work of values, norms, cultural memory, and lived experience—the materials 
with which people construct and express their identity.  Through discourse, people draw 
on these and other rhetorical resources3 and symbols to negotiate a symbolically oriented 
world and form social relations.  
 
Grounding My Research in Professional Experience 
 
I chose to work the nexus between soft power and rhetoric for my dissertation 
project because I am in a unique position to address challenges in diplomatic tradecraft 
through rhetorical theory and critique. I have experienced diplomacy’s adaptation to 
external realities that renewed and re-forged diplomatic alliances; the emergence of new 
and non-traditional influencers in international affairs; the evolution of the foreign affairs 
agenda from national security, to environmental security, to economic security, and 
ultimately human security; and the introduction of new technologies that broadened 
participation. My public service has given me unique insight into how this evolution has 
stretched and strengthened diplomacy’s institutional norms and purposes. 
As a public affairs specialist, foreign affairs officer, and academic, I have 
witnessed and, in modest measure helped shape, diplomacy programs in the post-Cold 
War environment. When the Berlin Wall fell, I was serving as a public affairs specialist 
at the U.S. Information Agency.  Ten years later, I was again working in Foggy Bottom 
as a foreign affairs officer, addressing transboundary environmental challenges, climate 
change, and infectious diseases. I next managed commercial diplomacy programs, 
including efforts to promote entrepreneurship in developing and emerging economies. 
After 9/11, I helped launch the Middle East Partnership Initiative, with the aim of 
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narrowing the “hope gap” in Arab countries. More recently, I served as a Franklin 
Fellow, managing a portfolio of democracy and governance grants for Iraq punctuated by 
that country’s March 2010 national elections.  In sum, I have managed soft power issues 
as an element of bilateral and regional diplomacy in Africa, the Middle East, and South 
Asia for the better part of two decades.  
As a doctoral student, I tested the value of applying rhetorical theory and methods 
to issues confronting the diplomatic corps.  In separate papers, I critiqued Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice’s transformational diplomacy initiative,4 discourses 
characterizing and enacting the Millennium Partnership Initiative,5 and discursive frames 
that warranted protection of Iraqi cultural heritage.6 Through these exercises, I discovered 
that I had a knack for explaining State Department operations to academics, and 
identifying problems in diplomacy best addressed from a rhetorical perspective.      
My dissertation research deepens and extends the cross-fertilization of diplomacy 
and rhetoric, providing an answer to the question of how soft power works not only in 
theory but also in diplomatic practice.  My previous efforts applied rhetorical theory and 
methods to a particular diplomatic initiative.  My dissertation introduces rhetorical theory 
and criticism to a diplomatic approach—the bilateral dialogue—with the aims of 
elaborating the rhetorical dimension of soft power’s influence and offering the 
convergence of principles and strategic interests as the natural telos of soft power 
diplomacy.       
My expectation is that future research will undertake comparable explorations of 
soft power in other bilateral and perhaps even regional dialogues. My ultimate aim is to 
enhance or expand diplomatic tradecraft and companion pedagogies to make discursive 
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techniques that are conducive to soft power accessible to the diplomatic corps beyond 
those working in the public diplomacy “cone,” the area of specialization where soft 
power is typically taught and practiced.  I would like to help foreign affairs and Foreign 
Service officers more easily recognize and shape the inflection points in bilateral 
diplomacy when discourse has the potential to transform nation-state relations.  My 
project thus reflects the dualism of my own identity as a scholar-practitioner, elaborating 
soft power’s rhetorical dimension, and plowing rhetorical theory and critique into 
diplomatic tradecraft.  
 
Situating My Project in Rhetorical Theory and Criticism 
 
Long before the fall of the Berlin Wall, rhetoricians were wrestling with the 
processes by which people construct identities and form communities. As early as 1934, 
George Herbert Mead’s Mind, Self, and Society challenged prevailing egoistic notions of 
identity.7  Mead sought to explain how individuals achieve a full expression of selfhood 
simultaneous with their interpretation, learning, and adapting to new experiences with 
others.  Mead thus framed two key questions of contemporary rhetorical theory:  how 
identity motivates and sustains social action, and how discourse constitutes a people into 
a rhetorical community, with reliance on both language and historical-social practice.8    
My dissertation project is situated in two areas of rhetorical theory and criticism 
cued by Mead’s inquiry into social interaction and community formation.  One area is the 
initiation and response to rhetorical gestures such as “hailing,” and rhetorical forms such 
as narrative that invite participation in discourse.  A second area is the construction of 
symbols that have power to unify people and direct concerted action.  These areas are 
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central to Kenneth Burke’s dramatism, which provides the theoretical underpinning for 
my rhetorical critique.  Moreover, dramatism explores how people explain their actions to 
themselves and to others, what the cultural and social influences in these explanations 
might be, and what language choice connotes with regard to the explanation and the act 
itself.  
Writing contemporaneously with Mead, Burke explored how symbols appeal, 
including the hail and response through which people form attachments based on the 
multitude of “selves” that individuals represent.9  Further, Burke theorized on the role of 
language as a strategic response to situations and encounters, both mundane and 
momentous.  Burke posited that language contains innate power to induce human 
cooperation, alighting on the use of words-as-symbols to form attitudes and catalyze 
action.  When people hold concepts, images, ideas, and attitudes in common, they act in 
concert if not in unison; the acting together makes them consubstantial.    
A core premise of my critique is that identity is strategic and positional.  This 
means that identity allows for both the existence of a stable core and a dynamically 
constituted process of becoming through historical memory, language, and culture.10  
Further, identities are politically and materially consequential.  This approach to identity 
is especially well suited to the elaboration of soft power diplomacy.  The shift in thinking 
of how nation-states gain and sustain influence, from coercion to attraction, relies on the 
capacity of individuals and groups to find something in common.  Soft power theory 
posits that this “something” is composed of soft power resources—culture, values, norms, 
and policies that are interpreted and enacted in similar ways.  Rhetoric explores how 
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language expands identity and identifications, thus increasing the possibility to 
experience the magnetism of soft power resources absent coercion.   
This understanding of identity emphasizes the rhetorical resources that individuals 
and groups draw into discourse to exercise voice and social agency.  In contrast to soft 
power theory’s reliance on influencers who pronounce, rhetorical theory attends to 
rhetorical actors’ voice.11  When rhetorical actors exercise their voice, they grapple with 
the problems and obligations inherent to community-building.  As an element of 
rhetorical critique, voice carries with it commitments to oneself and the community.  
Through voice, individuals and groups make themselves and their commitments present 
in the normative and emotional strains of discourse.  Voice embodies the rhetor in a way 
that is extra-corporeal.  Voice makes individuals and groups present in discourse, and 
through this presence, they are simultaneously rhetorical actors and a rhetorical resource 
for other participants’ narrative constructions.  
 
Differentiating Rhetoric’s Persuasive and Constitutive Modes 
 One may appreciate if not also assess soft power diplomacy through two 
rhetorical frameworks—the persuasive and the constitutive.  The framework of rhetoric-
as-persuasion fits most aptly with soft power theory and practice as originally introduced 
by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.   Realized power, Nye argued, was to be measured by the changed 
behavior of others, requiring the nation-state to gain the capacity to discern others’ 
preferences—what the target audience would find attractive—and projecting an image or 
setting an agenda to shape those preferences.12  Nye’s own phrases—changed behavior of 
others and a target audience—are drawn from the persuasive framework. 
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 My critique develops from an alternative framework, rhetoric-as-constitutive.  
This perspective, I will argue, offers a more satisfying explanation of soft power’s 
rhetorical force and better captures rhetoric’s impact on the diplomatic achievements of 
soft power.  In this section, I distinguish the persuasive and constitutive modes of 
rhetoric.  The two perspectives do not argue that the other is an invalid view of 
language’s powers over human understanding and action.  Rather, each paradigm stresses 
a different power of discourse and develops a distinct vocabulary emphasizing differing 
elements in describing the process of communication.   Because the two frameworks 
provide differing accounts they also provide different measures of successful 
communication.   
 The rhetoric-as-persuasion frame offered a robust terminology to characterize 
U.S.-Indian nuclear diplomacy from India’s founding and into the post-Cold War era.  
Prior to President Bush’s and Prime Minister Singh’s declaration to pursue full civilian 
nuclear cooperation, U.S. and international officials most often relied on coercive tactics 
such as sanctions and persuasive tactics such as carrot-and-stick bargaining to convince 
India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and change its domestic program of 
nuclear development.  When President Bill Clinton addressed the Indian Parliament in 
2000, he praised his host, called for greater cooperation, then turned to “four large 
challenges India and the United States must meet together—challenges that should define 
our partnership in the years ahead.”13  These challenges pointed toward changed 
behaviors for India to do, and for the United States to persuade India to do.  On nuclear 
issues, Clinton called upon India to foreswear nuclear weapon development, pointing to 
nations including Brazil and South Africa whom he considered as exemplars for India to 
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follow. After affirming that “only India can determine its own interests,” Clinton urged 
India to “join the Comprehensive Ban Treaty” (sic) and enter negotiations with its 
nuclear neighbor Pakistan.  His persuasive strategy cited American handling of nuclear 
matters with the Soviet Union as a model for India to follow.  India was the audience, 
Clinton was the speaker, and his purpose was to persuade India to act differently.  He 
drew on the past as he saw it to motivate the specified changes.  
 The rhetoric described in in this study, generated through public transnational 
debate on full civilian nuclear cooperation, captures how U.S. and Indian leaders 
reframed their approach to bilateral dialogue.   Rhetoric-as-constitutive highlights a 
diplomatic effort to build an enduring partnership by developing a common rhetoric, 
rather than a diplomatic strategy that seeks to persuade a “friend” to change its mind.  
This study will describe how the interaction surrounding the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
built a basis for action by “partners,” rather than “friends.” 
 Spurred by President Bush’s and Prime Minister Singh’s joint commitment, 
discourses generated by the debate on full civilian nuclear cooperation built and 
emphasized the health and longevity of the bilateral partnership.  Discourse established in 
tandem reasons for U.S.-Indian nuclear cooperation and a common core of beliefs and 
commitments, emphasizing actions that the two nations would take together vis-à-vis 
nonproliferation.  In the end, the rhetoric initiated the strategic partnership and 
transformed the bilateral relationship from estranged to engaged.  
 Rhetoric-as-persuasion conceptualizes the rhetorical process in terms of actors 
who possess a time-bound, other-directed intent for their discourse, to change the mind 
and/or actions of an audience who will react to the message.  The speaker assesses the 
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situation, discerns the predispositions of the audience, and formulates a corresponding 
messaging strategy to influence the audience.  Success is measured by the rhetor’s ability 
to “move the needle” of public opinion, to change the attitudes and behaviors of the 
audience, to be persuaded in the desired direction.   
 Rhetoric-as-constitutive conceptualizes the rhetorical process of cooperation and 
interaction beginning in sustained social intercourse. Rhetoric-as-constitutive emphasizes 
the power of rhetoric derived from the basic human urge for belongingness.  The power 
of discourse changes our being apart from to being a part of a community or party to an 
action.  The separation of speaker and audience that is at the center of the account of 
rhetoric-as-persuasion is deemphasized in favor of a focus on how relationships and 
communities of action build through discourse.   
 Kenneth Burke has said that “The key term for the old rhetoric was ‘persuasion’ 
and its stress was on deliberate design.  The key term for the ‘new’ rhetoric would be 
‘identification’.”14 This reorientation emphasizes that relationships among participants in 
discourse are dynamically developed or constituted in the context of a rhetorical act.  
Identification, Burke wrote, “is not in itself abnormal; nor can it be ‘scientifically’ 
eradicated.  One’s participation in a collective, social role cannot be obtained in any other 
way.  In fact, ‘identification’ is hardly other than a name for the function of sociality.”15  
When participants emerge from discursive exchange with a shared perspective and 
purpose and take concerted action, having transformed relationships to each other and the 
world they jointly inhabit, we may say that a constitutive process has occurred.   
 Identification achieves social cohesion through a transcendent move, by altering 
the grounds for action from the perspective of isolated individuals to the perspective of 
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communities built through shared experience and understanding.  Thus, the social 
function of rhetoric is combined in the perspective of rhetoric-as-constitutive with 
rhetoric’s function to interpret the meaning in the events that punctuate time and history.  
As rhetoric proceeds, narrative accounts of what has happened, is happening, or might 
happen in the future are rounded out.  Accounts promote a common explanation from a 
particular interpretative viewpoint that we can call “perspective.”   
 When an event confronts this process, discourse places explanations into 
productive tension, and multiple perspectives emerge.  Making a selection from a 
collection of accounts emphasizes how each differs and the divining lines between them.  
But when the common grounding of community has emerged, identification compensates 
for this division.  When I say that identification transcends differences, I infer a 
discursive and symbolic process through which fragments are merged to form the 
whole.16   
 These groundings, through which communities justify acting together, are what 
Burke called “substance.”17  Rhetoric-as-constitutive stresses the emerging substance of 
discourse, that which stands beneath or supports:  the groundwork, subject matter, 
argument, or starting point for rhetoric that Burke rolled up as context.18  Substance is at 
once momentarily fixed as rhetoric declares “the world as it is” (a stance), yet ultimately 
is malleable in its creation of “the world as it was or as it can be” (sub-stance).  Because 
of the potentiality for change from below and the outward expression of a stance, 
substance is shaped by discourse.  As those engaging in rhetoric-as-constitutive deepen 
their identification, converting ambiguity into substance extends connections and 
relationships contained within separate accounts to form the common sensations, 
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concepts, images, ideas, and attitudes that make those who constitute the community of 
rhetors consubstantial.19 This shared substance becomes the grounding for approaching 
the world as an acting-together. 20   Discourse enacts both the underlying context and its 
public manifestation in social interaction.   
 A term common to rhetoric-as-persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive is 
“strategy.”  To fully conceptualize substances of identification, interpretative frames, and 
perspective building within soft power relationships, my study will describe the choices 
of discursive strategy that constituted a structure for symbolic action.  The discourse 
generated from this structure formed, re-formed, and affirmed relationships as they 
evolved and ultimately thrived.  Once constituted in the rhetoric, the structure generated 
the rhetorical strategies with a shared attitude toward characterizing and evaluating 
toward what had or was about to transpire.21  The events that invited rhetoric were real, 
but so were the understandings of those situations.  The navigational strategies had public 
content.  Strategies gave meaning to situations by transforming the words with which 
understandings evolved into symbols that embodied or entailed public commitments.  As 
I discuss in my critique, discourse imbued the U.S.-India 123 Agreement with symbolic 
meaning, elevating it from the technical discussions on nuclear security and safeguards, 
creating a synecdochic relationship between the U.S.-India 123 Agreement and the 
bilateral partnership as a whole.    
 In sum, discourse that achieves belongingness in social relations, cohesion of 
perspective, and completeness of accounts exemplifies the rhetoric-as-constitutive move.  
I opened this section with the contrast between persuasive and constitutive approaches in 
bilateral diplomacy, the former characterizing bilateral diplomatic discourse prior to the 
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debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, and the latter characterizing discourse that led 
to the Agreement’s ratification.  And I indicated that rhetoric-as-persuasion and rhetoric-
as-constitutive place different emphases on human communication, and that a shift from 
the former to the latter as a mode of explanation would better reveal the rhetorical power 
unleashed in the discourse surrounding the Agreement.  I can further explain why the 
shift is appropriate by drawing upon a discrete set of heuristics to distinguish the 
persuasive and constitutive modes of rhetoric.  Three that proved helpful in my critique 
are the locus of intent, the treatment of time, and the span of control over narrative’s 
construction.   
 “Invention” is the name given to how rhetoric initiates an account of what has 
happened in the past, is happening in the present, or might happen in the future.  In the 
rhetoric-as-persuasive mode, invention occurs in the speaker’s mind.  The speaker 
systematically forms an intention vis-à-vis the audience, identifies the range of possible 
arguments given the situation and audience disposition, and mines the argument deemed 
most likely to achieve the desired effect on the audience.22  In short, invention is a unitary 
act of creating an appeal designed with a predetermined end in mind.  
 In the rhetoric-as-constitutive mode, invention is a social process in which 
participants engaged in discourse jointly and interactively construct an account.  The 
construction and social influence of world views—the central organizing arguments and 
metaphors that help explain how the world works and why things happen—play a subtle 
but significant role in motivating consensus and action.  The co-construction of accounts 
as well as the complex narratives that weave accounts together reduce the ambiguity and 
division at the outset into an understanding.  In the rhetoric-as-constitutive mode, the 
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supporting rationale and reasoning that guides belief and justifies action emerges from 
discourse.  Thus, invention emerges from rhetorical interaction focused on resolving 
ambiguities of understanding and identity. 
 The locus of invention has a correlative relationship with time, a second heuristic.  
The intentionality of rhetoric-as-persuasion implies that effectuating a change in the 
target audience’s attitudes or behavior is time-specific.  Rhetoric-as-persuasion is 
concerned with the conditions as they appear in the present, the discursive intervention, 
and the resulting change after the intervention.  Rhetoric-as-persuasion treats time as a 
directional, linear sequence of events and actions with change located at, and caused by, 
the moment of messaging.  Alternatively, rhetoric-as-constitutive, as a social process, 
accommodates the ebb and flow and natural pauses through which participants’ 
perceptions are challenged and their relationship strengthened.  As an intersubjective and 
dynamic process, rhetoric-as-constitutive reconstructs the meaning of past events, present 
actions, and future possibilities.  Time bends back on itself.  Messages in the present 
influence understandings of the past.  Future possibilities entail altered meaning of past 
events.  Indeed, the management of time itself becomes one of the characteristics through 
rhetoric can effect change. 
 The locus of invention and treatment of time correspond to a third heuristic that 
separates rhetoric-as-persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive:  whether narrative is 
channeled toward a preconceived destination or allowed to develop organically.  In the 
rhetoric-as-persuasive mode, invention arrives at an interpretation before the message is 
transmitted.  The context and range of action are framed in zero-sum, black-and-white 
terms.  In the rhetoric-as-constitutive mode, discourse accommodates growth, 
16 
 
encompassing a widening context that draws in more participants, each with his or her 
own perspective and narrative account.  In the rhetoric-as-constitutive mode, participants 
use language to navigate their way into and through a discursive exchange, and discourse 
itself is the current that carries the participants along.  A narrative that is open-ended and 
participatory diffuses in discourse, pulling in myriad experiences and substances of 
identification as it progresses. Identification springs from the connection between 
character and action, rather than the satisfaction of having achieved an explicitly defined 
outcome.23   
 As the discursive exchange progresses, participants slowly reduce ambiguity as 
they borrow from and build upon each other’s accounts.24  The borrowing and building 
constitutes bonds that weave those in the rhetorical exchange ever more tightly into the 
construction and commitments of the account. The ambiguity and social nature of 
rhetoric-as-constitutive enables participants to adjust perspectives, redefine 
circumstances, remake identities, and transform the relational or social context that 
invited or hailed them to join the discourse.  This transformative quality distinguishes 
most clearly rhetoric-as-constitutive from rhetoric-as persuasive discourse.    
 The mode I have called “rhetoric-as-constitutive” stresses rhetoric’s power to 
incorporate events into a developing diplomatic relationship between and among nations.  
It highlights the developmental evolution that characterizes soft power as a diplomatic 
theory, which calls for nation-states to adopt a cooperative rather than adversarial stance 
toward one another in confronting transboundary issues. The inclusiveness of soft power, 
especially with regard to new and non-traditional actors and their agendas, reorients and 
evens out the relationship between a speaker and his or her audience.  As a constitutive 
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process, soft power diplomacy engenders a sense of ownership or investment in a 
successful exchange, a giving and returning of material and symbolic resources available 
to all parties as co-arguers.25  Capturing the possibilities of this co-orientation emerging 
from diplomacy becomes easier when working with the rhetoric-as-constitutive frame, 
which is compatible with the attitudes and commitments of soft power and relational 
strategies of engagement  
 
Literature Review 
 My review of the literature adds value to the whole of my dissertation project, 
offering three major benefits.  First, the literature review introduces the frames of 
reference that have guided my research and rhetorical critique.  Second, reviewing the 
literature entails an assessment of my own point of entry, to ensure that I am building on 
sound foundations in rhetorical criticism and soft power.  Lastly, the review of the 
literature sets boundary lines that new scholarship must cross or extend in order to 
generate new knowledge. 
 Because my dissertation crisscrosses the rhetoric of foreign policy and soft power, 
the literature review delves into both areas.  I begin with the rhetoric of foreign policy, 
which receives more extensive treatment because it is my disciplinary home and because 
it is a long-standing and robust area of study.  I conclude with an expository review of the 
soft power literature to provide the reader with useful premises and vocabulary that 
ground subsequent sections of this chapter.  Since Joseph Nye’s introduction of soft 
power in 1990, much thought has been devoted to the subject in the foreign affairs trade 
press and in social media.  Critical and theoretical scholarship in soft power has 
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flourished only recently, and I discuss this development at the end of the literature 
review.   
 
Foreign Policy Rhetoric 
Soft power diplomacy as currently practiced relies on strategies and tactics 
designed to make the United States attractive in the eyes of foreign publics, with success 
of soft power diplomacy most often measured by foreign public opinion and behaviors 
toward the United States.  My dissertation poses an alternative view, that soft power 
diplomacy is a process of constitutive rhetoric.  Because the juxtaposition of rhetoric-as-
persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive factors prominently in my critique, I locate both 
modes in the extant literature in foreign policy rhetoric.  The ways in which argument 
acts upon endogenous and exogenous constraints on presidential influence is a consistent 
theme.  Argument remains central to both the persuasive and constitutive rhetorical 
forms.  How critics approach argument is a distinguishing factor between rhetoric-as-
persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive in a foreign policy context. 
 
Rhetoric-as-Persuasion 
Turning first to rhetoric-as-persuasion, rhetorical critics have attended to the role 
of public opinion as grounds for argument and a measure of an argument’s effectiveness.  
Other rhetorical critics have explained the force of argument by its structure, the key 
terms that synopsize an argument, and rational decision-making as an outcome of 
effective argument.  In the paragraphs that follow, I present a review of criticism that 
assesses how presidents and their surrogates incorporate and mediate public opinion to 
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gain public assent for foreign policy decisions.  I also present essays that seek to 
understand the rhetorical work of key terms such as détente that structure and warrant 
foreign policy argument.  Rounding out the review of rhetoric-as-persuasion, I discuss 
essays that have emphasized the ends or outcomes of foreign argument, including essays 
enunciating the rhetorical conditions favorable to rational decision-making.  
Presidents rely on domestic public opinion to justify their stance in foreign policy 
making and to defend their foreign policy actions.  In many cases, public opinion is at 
odds with the desired action, and thereby acts as a constraint on how presidents frame 
foreign policy.  Brandon Rottinghaus elaborated on the influence of public opinion on 
foreign policy frames adopted by Presidents Johnson, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush.  
Specifically, Rottinghaus conducted a comparative critique of presidential rhetoric with 
regard to President Johnson’s deepening the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam 
War, President Reagan’s signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
with the Soviet Union, and President George H.W. Bush's commitment of U.S. troops in 
the first Persian Gulf conflict.  
From this comparative case study, Rottinghaus defined and elaborated presidents’ 
“crafted talk” to mobilize domestic support.26  Crafted talk takes centrist opinion as a 
baseline and attempts to move preferences in a direction favorable to the Administration.  
This targeted approach subsumes unpopular facets of a policy within a frame constructed 
of the more popular elements of that policy.27  Rottinghaus concluded that presidents 
have a limited ability to anticipate which language choices will be most likely to persuade 
majority opinion to follow the administration’s lead in matters of foreign policy. 
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J. Michael Hogan and Leroy Dorsey explored similar framing efforts with regard 
to the nuclear freeze debate that took place in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982 
and 1983.  Hogan and Dorsey adopted the view that public opinion is socially 
constructed; their critique demonstrated how policy makers rhetorically mediate public 
opinion to their advantage.28  Hogan and Dorsey’s critique revealed that House Members’ 
construction of public opinion not only affirmed popular sentiment, but also allowed 
legislators to diffuse the strength of the Nuclear Freeze proponents’ objections to 
increased nuclear stockpiles.  Discourse subsumed the impetus for the Nuclear Freeze 
resolution within the more encompassing frame of arms control.29 
B. Wayne Howell’s critique of President Reagan’s advocacy for the Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) deconstructed the enthymeme at the heart of President Reagan’s 
discourse, and then demonstrated how public opinion warranted U.S. action as reasonable 
and necessary to protect the United States’ interests.  President Reagan’s rhetorical 
strategy portrayed the Soviet Union as untrustworthy:  the Soviet ideology sanctioned 
violations of the Helsinki (human rights) Accords; these violations were not isolated to a 
particular moment in time; and a country unwilling to protect basic human rights could 
not be trusted to abide by a treaty meant to preserve the peace.30  President Reagan’s 
rhetorical strategy used American public approval of the SDI to prod Soviet President 
Gorbachev toward liberalization and democratization, particularly in the area of human 
rights.31  If Russia were to implement reforms and improve its human rights record, these 
actions would undermine President Reagan’s argument for SDI, which the Soviet Union 
viewed as a threat to its interests. President Reagan’s rhetorical strategy thus allowed 
both leaders to achieve one of their primary aims in the bilateral relationship. 
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The critiques issued by Rottinghaus, Hogan and Dorsey, and Howell emphasized 
how public opinion places limits on presidential foreign policy making and public 
advocacy.  Although constrained, presidents and their surrogates have at their disposal 
framing and other argumentative strategies to make their arguments convincing and their 
policies palatable.  Other critics have explored the force of argument based on rhetorical 
choices of structure and language, including how ideology shapes these choices.   
David S. Birdsell examined the structure of argument in his critique of President 
Reagan’s October 27, 1983, nationally televised address in which the President 
responded to the bombing of the marine compound in Beirut, Lebanon, and explained the 
United States’ defense against Soviet designs on Grenada.  Birdsell’s Burkean analysis 
surfaced President Reagan’s motive to balance power and response.  In the case of 
Lebanon, the U.S. role was subordinate to the multinational community.  In the case of 
Grenada, the U.S. role was definitive, to check a malignant force and mischief in the 
Western hemisphere.32  The speech presented a “structural indictment of 
multilateralism”33 and a defense of a muscular foreign policy.  The United States stood as 
a vanguard against the Soviet Union, which was a malevolent force in Middle East 
geopolitics and a sponsor of Cuba’s transgressions against the free people of Grenada.  
The structure of the speech persuaded the American public of the rightness of the nation’s 
sacrifice and ongoing role as protector in a dangerous world.  
Presidents make deliberate choices in their language, privileging some terms 
above others to increase the persuasiveness of their public pronouncements.  David C. 
Klope’s critique of President Reagan’s Lebanon/Grenada address elucidated the function 
of myth and victimage as a persuasive strategy.  President Reagan named the Soviet 
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Union as the guilty party and reaffirmed the United States’ overseas presence as a force 
for good.34  Juxtaposing civilizational ideals with savage behavior, President Reagan 
created clusters of meaning driven by progress, freedom, mission, and national self-
interest.  The use of these terms in President Reagan’s narrative commanded public 
assent to his foreign policy decisions.35 
D. Ray Heisey compared rhetorical strategies adopted by President Reagan and 
President Mitterand to respond to the Beirut bombing and to justify U.S. and French 
interventions in Grenada and Chad, respectively.  Heisey found that President Reagan 
presented the image of a foreign aggressor to maintain the appearance of power as a 
deterrent.  President Mitterand privileged respect rather than power, maintaining France’s 
role as the balancer in international conflict.36  Both leaders demonstrated skill in reading 
their respective publics’ reaction to these events, tapping into perceptions of the United 
States’ and France’s historical roles in world affairs.  These roles, defined by past actions, 
established expectations that justified their present action in response to crisis.     
Some terms achieve an ultimate place of privilege, exercising the suasory force of 
foreign policy doctrine.  This was the conclusion of H.W. Brands’ diachronic study of 
détente. Brands’ study is premised on détente’s function as a foreign policy doctrine that 
bridged foreign policy to diplomatic action.  Brands described how President Nixon and 
his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger first avoided and then embraced the word 
as a signature of U.S. foreign policy.  Nixon and Kissinger successfully expanded the 
scope of détente from the divide between East and West Germany to encompass China 
and Russia.  By setting détente within its global context, Nixon and Kissinger could 
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accept the principles of détente, essentially fixing the term to fit their policy aims while 
satisfying world leaders’ desire for consistency and predictability.37        
In foreign policy argument, ideology conditions how presidents construct a 
vocabulary that they subsequently place within an enthymematic structure.  Ideology 
legitimizes a set of assumptions and preferred outcomes to the exclusion of alternative 
perspectives and courses of action.  Ideology functions rhetorically, constructing a set of 
beliefs to which all in society must subscribe but which cannot be demonstrated 
rationally to each individual concerned.  Acceptance of the group’s core precepts is 
achieved through a moral imperative.38  The role of ideology has sparked a vociferous 
and wide-ranging response from Robert P. Newman.  In his most recent work, Invincible 
Ignorance in American Foreign Policy:  The Triumph of Ideology over Evidence, 
Newman presented a number of examples supporting his claim that ideology skews the 
factual record and evidentiary force of argument.39 
I am partial to Philip Wander’s approach to ideology in foreign policy argument, 
which is less concerned with unmasking “truth” and more attentive to legitimacy of 
foreign policy making that takes place within and through the public sphere.  Wander’s 
seminal essay, “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy,”40 is best known for the 
presentation of two forms of foreign policy argument, which Wander termed prophetic 
dualism and technocratic realism.  Wander explicated the two forms of argument through 
the rhetoric of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, respectively.  Prophetic 
dualism presumed a world divided by conflict between good and evil, with no pre-
determined outcome.  Conflict would be resolved only through total victory of one side 
over the other, leaving no quarter for neutral parties or compromise.41  Technocratic 
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realism offered an alternative view that acknowledged keen competition between nation-
states but allowed room to negotiate issues of mutual interest.42  
 The taxonomy alone was insufficient.  Wander wrote that “a systematic 
examination of the rhetoric of American foreign policy will take into consideration a 
variety of audiences, the relative importance of any given audience within the context of 
domestic politics, and the ways in which official statements are or are not adapted to 
them.”43  Giving name to a policy entails a systematized clustering of vocabulary that 
may discount others’ social, political, or economic preferences,44 or that could frustrate 
the search for consensus.45  Wander identified these consequences and issued a call to 
action for rhetorical critics to assist in the creation of publics able to rise above parochial 
concerns.  Critics were asked to balance assessment of a rhetor’s technique with a 
corresponding judgment of purpose.46   
Wander presumed that foreign policy rhetoric was the privilege of presidents, an 
assumption appropriate to the time of his essay’s publication.  Moreover, U.S. presidents 
exercise this executive privilege within the confines of deliberative democracy and 
representative government.  Subsequent criticism maintained these assumptions when 
answering Wander’s call to action, to understand how presidents used language to 
marshal public support for consequential foreign policy decisions.  When speaking on 
foreign policy, presidents have the task of sustaining or adapting the public view toward 
world events while ensuring that their arguments resonate with the public’s interpretation 
of those events.   
Critics working within the tradition of rhetoric-as-persuasion have each addressed 
foreign policy argument.  The literature includes rhetorical-critical essays in which 
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authors identified the structures and vocabularies that make an argument resonate, 
decoupled public opinion from public will as backing for foreign policy argument, and 
explored expected notions of nation-state behavior to warrant foreign policy action.  
Regardless of the thrust, critique eventually came around to assessing effectiveness in 
deliberation, either as winning the argument or influencing the conditions that swayed 
decision-makers.  This critical stance has generated valuable insight for critics working to 
challenge prevailing foreign policy doctrine and to improve the health of the polity.  This 
contribution, however, presumes an adversarial relationship among foreign policy actors, 
or between foreign policy actors and the citizenry. To understand consensus-building as a 
facet of foreign policy rhetoric, an alternative stance, which I categorize as rhetoric-as-
constitutive, is required. 
 
Rhetoric-as-Constitutive 
Critics who have approached rhetoric-as-constitutive have explored the 
construction and influence of world views for achieving consensus on foreign policy, 
especially when external events or circumstances demand reification or revision of U.S. 
grand strategy.  When fully formed, world views provide substance and motivate action 
in international affairs.   
As previously noted, both rhetoric-as-persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive are 
well represented in rhetorical criticism of foreign policy.  Both traditions treat foreign 
policy argument as a central concern for critical reflection.  Critics working within the 
rhetoric-as-constitutive tradition have emphasized the co-construction of foreign policy 
arguments, minimizing assessment of a specific argument’s appeal and effectiveness.   
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Rhetorical critics following in the footsteps of John F. Cragan have charted the 
creation and diminution of world views as central organizing arguments that motivate 
foreign policy consensus and action. Cragan’s dissertation thesis, “The Cold War 
Rhetorical Vision, 1946-1972,” established a critical approach and vocabulary to make 
sense of U.S. foreign policy behavior over time.  Cragan employed fantasy theme 
analysis to public discourses about foreign policy from the conclusion of World War II 
through 1972, the beginning of the end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the advent of 
President Nixon’s rapprochement with China.  
Rhetorical visions “chain out” in public narratives, forming a community’s social 
reality in the process.47  Cragan discovered and documented three rhetorical visions that 
competed for influence as the United States made the transition from the “hot war” 
rhetoric of World War II to the rhetoric of the Cold War.  Cragan named these competing 
rhetorical visions “one world,” “power politics,” and “red fascism.”48  Each rhetorical 
vision synopsized a corresponding foreign policy drama that explained world events, 
characterized actors in global affairs, and assigned meaning to foreign policy actions.   
Cragan’s descriptions of the rhetorical visions and corresponding dramas 
grounded subsequent criticism, and are therefore worth recounting here. Individuals 
espousing the one world rhetorical vision promoted the ideal of nation-states cooperating 
openly and transparently, with the aim of removing the threat of nuclear annihilation.49  
Individuals participating in the power politics foreign policy drama believed that nation-
states operating competitively and interdependently in a global system of checks and 
balances could best preserve the global order and prevent aggression.50  Individuals 
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caught up in a red fascism foreign policy drama foresaw and guarded against 
totalitarianism in which Communism displaced Fascism as a villainy in world affairs.51   
Elements of each contributed to the solidification and longevity of the Cold War 
rhetorical vision and the policy of containment, a cornerstone of American grand strategy 
from the mid-1940s to the late 1980s.52  The strength of the rhetorical vision waxed and 
waned, however, and Cragan himself postulated that the Cold War rhetorical vision 
would be overcome by social and political tumult as well as a hot war in Vietnam.  When 
such events call a grand strategy into question, discourse either sustains motivation to 
continue the current course, or constructs an alternative world view to synthesize public 
belief and U.S. foreign policy doctrine.      
The power of discourse to re-constitute an existing world view, or to constitute a 
new world view, provided a focal point for rhetorical critics following in Cragan’s 
tradition.  One challenging event, explored by Thomas Hollihan, was President Carter’s 
desire for a new Panama Canal Treaty.  The debate called into question America’s 
colonial past, juxtaposed against the long-standing pillar of protecting U.S. interests 
within its own hemisphere.  The juxtaposition activated and propagated the Cold War and 
Power Politics foreign policy dramas. Owing to the north-south binational context and 
the history of the canal’s physical construction, an additional, anti-imperialist foreign 
policy drama emerged during the debate, which Hollihan called the New World Order 
drama.53  Whereas the treaty would place the Canal under Panamanian control, discourse 
reconstituted the Power Politics drama by incorporating the United States’ guaranteed 
access and the right to protect the waterway, should the need ever arise.  
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The Cold War rhetorical vision carried with it the fear that the great power 
competition between two nuclear armed nation-states could lead to annihilistic 
consequences.54  Accordingly, the American public was attuned to and wary of changes 
that could portend a first-strike attack.  In this context, President Reagan’s discourse on 
nuclear deterrence needed to allay public fears.  The President succeeded by creating 
consonance between his own world view and that of the American people.  President 
Reagan reconstituted the Cold War foreign policy vision for an era of technological 
innovation, a conclusion of G. Thomas Goodnight’s critique of the President’s rhetoric on 
nuclear deterrence.   
Goodnight conducted a close text analysis of three speeches that President Reagan 
delivered in his first term, which introduced “zero option,” “evil empire,” and “Star 
Wars” to the lexicon of U.S. foreign policy. The speeches established a particular 
ordering of four seemingly contradictory propositions:  science and technology inevitably 
produce more powerful and varied weaponry; nuclear weapons make an effective defense 
impossible; military power exists to deter a nuclear attack; and nuclear states sustain 
deterrence through their capacity to retaliate against an adversary’s first strike.55 Taken 
together, the three speeches recast science and technology as the force behind an 
impregnable system for national defense.56 
The Cold War foreign policy vision maintained public assent with the U.S. 
foreign policy doctrine of containment.  The consonance between American ideology and 
foreign policy doctrine received a jolt when President Nixon announced in 1971 his 
intent to visit China. Denise M. Bostdorff’s critique of President Nixon’s foreign policy 
rhetoric elucidated how events changed the President’s world view, and conversely, how 
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the President’s discourse carried within it discernable signposts of a rapprochement with 
China.    
The President’s rhetoric suggested a changing view toward China as early as 
1967.57  Nonetheless, the July, 1971 announcement broke the dominant frame that 
foreign affairs watchers and the public at large had relied upon to calculate the United 
States’ power position.58 Moreover, the Cold War rhetorical vision placed an emphasis on 
“war.”  Robert L. Ivie’s critique of justificatory war rhetoric tells us that presidents’ 
definitions of casus belli are reduced to a singular frame for action with moralistic and 
idealistic dimensions.59  President Nixon’s rapprochement with China effectuated a shift 
from prosecuting a Cold War to conducting Cold War diplomacy.  The shift from war to 
diplomacy allowed pragmatism to enter the conversation.  By making this shift, President 
Nixon reconstituted the Cold War vision with a more expansive approach to détente, 
harmonizing pragmatic and moral intentions in diplomatic discourse. 
In the examples above, discourse re-constituted the Cold War foreign policy 
vision, as Cold War presidents adapted the U.S. grand strategy set forth in the Truman 
Doctrine and containment to technological advances and a changing geopolitical context. 
At the end of the Cold War, discourse had a very different role, to construct a new 
foreign policy vision and energizing narratives that would support post-Cold War 
presidents’ ability to motivate public action.   
Mary E. Stuckey has argued that foreign policy dramas, which she calls 
orientational metaphors, are a rhetorical form that orders political reality.  Absent an 
orientational metaphor, people interpret foreign policy events as independent or anomic 
occurrences rather than as part of a pattern.60  Stuckey assessed President George H.W. 
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Bush’s and President Clinton’s respective attempts to use orientational metaphors to 
forge a post-Cold War foreign policy consensus.  In contrast to Hollihan’s determination 
of a clear “winner” among competing foreign policy dramas, Stuckey found that both 
Presidents attempted to construct hybrid strategies.  Grafting elements of the Cold War 
and New World Order metaphors together failed to forge a new foreign policy 
consensus.61  
Timothy M. Cole’s analysis of President George H.W. Bush and President 
Clinton elaborated Stuckey’s thesis.  The post-Cold War environment had altered public 
expectations regarding the United States’ summons to international leadership.62  Cole 
found that the terms presidents use when discussing foreign policy convey the criteria the 
public is intended to use to judge those policies. President George H. W. Bush attempted 
to stretch the Cold War orientational metaphor, with its polarizing vocabulary of good 
and evil, friend and foe, and brutal aggressors, to premise foreign policy on the belief that 
the world remained dangerous.  President Clinton premised national security on the belief 
that the world was safe, and that conflicts could be compartmentalized and managed.  
Neither approach succeeded in forging a national consensus on military intervention to 
shore up weak and failing states, or to intervene militarily to staunch humanitarian 
crises.63 
Taking a step back from the constitutive role of discourse, Bostdorff, Stuckey, 
and Cole make a larger point regarding the interplay of discourse and material conditions.  
That is, diplomatic discourse has the potential to transform the perspectives of nation-
states, including the interpretation of their actions and the global scene in which action 
takes place.  In this regard, Bostdorff’s, Stuckey’s, and Cole’s essays are written in the 
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same spirit as my own project, which likewise explored a changing, post-Cold War scene 
and the fresh perspectives with which two countries addressed one another.   
Considering the corpus of criticism, I observe that the rhetoric of foreign policy is 
influenced by presidential rhetoric and public address scholarship.  Working with more 
than a dozen essays, all but three concerned the rhetoric of American presidents from 
Eisenhower to Clinton; Hogan and Dorsey’s essay concerned the achievement of a 
president’s legislative agenda; and Brands’ essay attended to a president’s resistance and 
appropriation of a potent symbolic term of American foreign policy doctrine.  Cragan’s 
dissertation distinguishes itself by exploring the circulation of discourses that captured 
and held the public’s imagination. The energy driving rhetorical criticism in foreign 
policy comes from the desire to understand and add legitimacy to the relationship 
between a president and the people. 
This place of privilege loses exclusivity when pivoting from foreign policy to 
diplomacy.  Rhetorical criticism of diplomatic engagement necessarily entails a degree of 
intersubjectivity, to understand the effect of discourse on participants’ respective 
constituencies as well as diplomatic relations.  A rhetoric of diplomacy focuses a critical 
lens on dialogue, engagement, or negotiation involving two or more nation-states or other 
foreign policy actors. Martín Carcasson’s essay on the Oslo Accord exemplifies 
rhetorical critique of diplomatic engagement. Carcasson performed a narrative analysis of 
the discourses generated by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on the occasion of the 
September 13, 1993, signing ceremony of the Oslo Accord. Pulling both verbal and 
visual messages into his analysis, Carcasson discovered that the leaders’ discourse 
symbolically transformed long-standing animosities of conflict by reframing protagonists 
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and antagonists.  Within this alternative narrative, the Oslo Accord was a victory for 
peacemakers on both sides.64    
Carcasson unquestionably plies his craft within constitutive rhetoric.  The essay 
represents a search to understand rhetoric’s transformative power in diplomacy.  It also 
has the benefit of being accessible to practitioners of diplomacy who are charged with 
managing Near Eastern Affairs and carrying out U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  I 
therefore consider Carcasson’s essay as my entry point in the literature stream, and 
anticipate that my dissertation research will contribute to future scholarship conducted in 
the spirit of enhancing diplomatic tradecraft. 
 My review of the literature reaffirms that critique of soft power discourse will 
garner greater insight working within the rhetoric-as-constitutive vein.  The vocabulary 
that fits most naturally in my critique is borrowed from critics who have extended the 
rhetoric-as-constitutive line of inquiry.  Clearly, the debate on the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement was a public argument.  I treat those engaged in the debate as co-arguers.  
Their discourses constituted the underlying rationale and justificatory grounds for their 
positions and actions.  Frames of acceptance and rejection emerged from discourse.  
Differences agitated participants to engage in discourse; discourse that transcended 
differences achieved reconciliation and deepened identification.  
 
Soft Power 
 The other major literature governing my critique is about soft power.  In this 
section, I deliver an exposition on the seminal work of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and the cross-
over of soft power literature into studies concerned with the “new” public diplomacy and 
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nation-branding.  I also introduce more recent scholarship in critical and cultural studies 
of soft power, including an embrace of relational and engagement theories of public 
diplomacy.  Familiarity with the premises, vocabulary, and lineage of soft power is the 
primary benefit one will gain from this section, establishing a foundation for theoretical 
elaboration and rhetorical critique of soft power discourse.  The literature review offers a 
basis from which to elaborate soft power theory from a rhetorical perspective, and to 
share how rhetorical critics have contextualized (and problematized) soft power’s 
premises and assumptions using real-world events and issues.  
 The review of the literature on soft power must necessarily begin with the works 
of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., whose writings on soft power span more than two decades.  
Whereas soft power has gained greatest traction in the field of public diplomacy and 
related areas of national influence and persuasion, Nye’s project suggests a more 
fundamental concern about how foreign policy is made and implemented.  Accordingly, I 
share observations on Nye’s project from a full and fair reading of his collective works.  I 
conclude this section by introducing more current works that subject soft power to critical 
inquiry and theory-building. 
 
Nye’s Project and Its Evolution  
Soft power entered the lexicon of U.S. foreign policy in the immediate post-Cold 
War period, when Nye published Bound to Lead:  The Changing Nature of American 
Power.65  Nye had presented an essay-length argument in Political Science Quarterly, on 
“The Changing Nature of World Power,”66 and the Autumn 1990 issue of Foreign Policy, 
titled simply, “Soft Power.”67  On the occasion of Foreign Policy’s twentieth anniversary, 
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the foreign affairs community welcomed Nye’s historical perspective and prognostication 
regarding the changing nature and distribution of power resources in a unipolar moment. 
Soft power redefined not only the means but also the ends of national influence, 
measured by behavioral outcomes.  In his most recent book, The Future of Power, Nye 
delved further into persuasive strategies of relational power and power behavior.68  One 
strategy is the overt and transparent attempt to change another’s preferences, which Nye 
called inducement.  A second strategy is an indirect form of persuasion, to frame issues 
and set agendas that others must follow.  A third strategy, which lies closest to soft power 
attraction, attempts to shape others’ preferences such that their choices align with desired 
behaviors.  
Over time, soft power in practice has reached further into persuasion.  The 
correlation of soft power with public diplomacy and nation branding is one manifestation 
of this evolution.  Attention to soft power does make public diplomacy more integrative 
and purposive, including high-level coordination of the U.S. public diplomacy apparatus, 
enhanced foreign exchange programs, more effective public-private collaboration, rapid 
response capabilities to crisis situations, and programs of engagement with cascading 
benefits.69  
In diplomatic tradecraft, soft power has become a pragmatic approach that serves 
the needs of public diplomacy professionals concerned with foreign publics’ attitude 
change.  Nye defined public diplomacy as “an instrument that governments use to 
mobilize [soft power] resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other 
countries.”70  If the United States’ standing depends upon world opinion, then public 
diplomacy will increase the United States’ soft power.  Conversely, diversion of attention 
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and resources away from public diplomacy reduces the United States’ capacity to 
exercise influence.  
Nation branding is the newest variation on the soft power theme.  Commentary 
takes stock of a nation’s soft power, judging the extent to which soft power advances a 
country’s international ambition.  Examples are many and varied, and include security 
studies professor Amit Kumar Gupta’s effort to promote India as “an archetype of an 
ancient civilization” possessing untapped spiritual knowledge71; political science 
professor Lam Peng Er’s study of the Japanese government’s attempt to harness market 
and consumer affinity for manga and anime, both distinctively Japanese and possessing 
universal youth appeal, in an attempt to burnish a fresh international image72; and 
political science professor Sheng Ding’s exploration of China’s soft power strategies, 
including development assistance, to cultivate a favorable national image among peoples 
in Africa, East Asia and Latin America.73  
Whether pursuing a strategy of inducement, framing, or preference shaping, a 
leader may employ a combination of resources, including military action, economic 
influence, and the soft power resources of culture, values, norms, and policies.  
Regardless of how a national leader harnesses resources to strategy, the outcome is the 
same:  to convert potential power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as 
measured by the changed behavior of others.74  The emphasis on changing others’ 






Reading Nye Holistically 
Soft power has somewhat overtaken Nye’s foreign policy project, which is an 
expansive effort to find the most advantageous “set point” from which American foreign 
policy may be derived.  My holistic reading of Nye’s body of work suggests that the set 
point falls within four dialectics, each guided by an identified trend in global affairs and 
its consequences.  From these consequences one may derive a key premise or assertion 
regarding a nation-state’s capacity to generate soft power influence.   
These four dialectics are hegemony and transnational interdependence, national 
and strategic interests, unilateralism and multilateralism, and declinism and triumphalism.  
In each case, and indeed throughout his entire project, Nye has studiously avoided the 
extremes.  Preventing others from misreading signs and over-correcting is among Nye’s 
primary motives.   The search for a compromising, middle-of-the-road path, with a 
“both/and” vocabulary, has consistently characterized his scholarship and commentary.  
Nye described the tension between hegemony and transnational interdependence 
as the inclination to concentrate power in the midst of its organic and systemic 
diffusion.75   A trend driving the hegemony-interdependence dialectic is the increasing 
openness and inclusiveness of foreign policy processes to the participation of new, non-
traditional and private actors, including news media editors and cue-givers, corporations, 
non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and networks of 
scientific communities.76  By virtue of its plurality—itself a moderating force—this trend 
works against hegemony and reaches toward transnational interdependence.  
Nye wrote that “the issue is not whether state or non-state actors are more 
important—states usually are.  The point is that in modern times, more complex 
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coalitions affect outcomes.  With changing actors in world politics come changing 
goals—new dimensions of security—economic and ecological.”77  Nye inferred that as 
new actors exerted influence on bilateral and multi-lateral agendas, the scope of issues 
appropriate for diplomatic dialogue would expand in kind.  Nye called out ecological 
change, health epidemics, illicit trade, and terrorism as issues of transnational 
interdependence that require collective action and international cooperation.78   
Nye advocated balance between national and strategic interests, of which national 
interests are broad and inclusive and strategic interests are a subset.  Nye built his own 
claims on a schema developed by William Perry and Ash Carter that categorized threats 
into three lists.79  A List threats are existential, such as the threat of nuclear war that 
permeated foreign policy making during the Cold War era.  B List threats are imminent, 
and here Perry and Carter included North Korea and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  C List 
threats are important contingencies that indirectly affect but do not directly threaten U.S. 
interests, e.g., the Balkans, Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti.   
Nye observed that the C List has come to dominate the day’s foreign policy 
agenda.80  Nye attributed the inversion of existential and non-threats to the characteristics 
of new media operating in the information age. The 24/7 news cycle, with access to 
places previously unreachable by news crews, delivered dramatic visual portrayals of 
human conflict and suffering that offer a “here and now” reality in place of A-list 
abstractions. Issues that garner media attention tend to be peripheral threats, but mobilize 
shame81 and stoke public outrage and spontaneous responses that demand an official 
response.82  The narrow definition of U.S. national interest often alienates other 
countries.83   
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Acting on his assessment of how the foreign policy agenda is set and maintained, 
Nye reclaimed deliberative democracy as the proper mediator of broad and particularized 
interests: 
In a democracy, the national interest is simply what citizens, after proper 
deliberation, say it is. It is broader than vital strategic interests, though they are a 
crucial part.  It can include values such as human rights and democracy, 
particularly if the American public feels that those values are so important to our 
identity or sense of who we are that people are willing to pay a price to promote 
them.  Values are simply an intangible part of the national interest.  If the 
American people think that our long-term shared interests include certain values 
and their promotion abroad, then they become part of the national interest.  
Leaders and experts may point out the costs of indulging certain values, but if an 
informed public disagrees, experts cannot deny the legitimacy of their opinion.84 
 
This statement conveys a strong normative belief in the American system’s capacity to 
forge a productive relationship between public opinion and public policy.  The statement 
offers a forensic account of deliberation, but it is not the only way that Nye has espoused 
deliberative bodies as a locus of foreign policy making: 
We walk around with pictures of the future in our heads as a necessary condition 
of planning our actions.  At the national level, we need such pictures to guide 
policy and tell us how to use our unprecedented power.  There is, of course, no 
single future; there are multiple possible futures, and the quality of our foreign 
policy can make some more likely than others.  When systems involve complex 
interactions and feedbacks, small causes can have large effects.  And when people 
are involved, human reactions to the prediction itself may make it fail to come 
true.85 
 
This passage reveals in Nye’s own thought a struggle between a discursive response to 
world events filled with imagined possibilities, and a mechanistic system of checks and 
balances, which when well looked after, will produce the right response.  
The third dialectic mediates preferences between unilateralism and 
multilateralism. The growing interdependence of economic and military power, or more 
broadly, between geo-economics and geo-politics, navigates a position between these two 
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poles. Changing sources of power fuel this interdependence.  Technology, education, and 
economic growth have surpassed geography, population, and raw materials as indicators 
of a nation-state’s global status.86  As a consequence of this integration of economics and 
politics, power itself becomes less coercive and less tangible; the attempt to substitute 
one currency, such as economics, with another currency, such as the projection of force, 
becomes a riskier proposition.87   
Finally, in the debate between declinism and triumphalism, Nye staked out a clear 
position, stating flatly in Bound to Lead that the declinists were drawing the wrong 
lessons from historical analogies to great powers that overreached.88  Twenty years 
hence, Nye felt compelled to restate the argument, calling for a new framing of U.S. 
power that rejected the narrative of hegemonic decline.89  One should not read into Nye’s 
rejection of declinism support for its opposite.  Whereas Nye’s caution against 
triumphalism is comparatively muted, he saw the potential for both declinism and 
triumphalism to squander American influence:  declinism through over caution, and 
triumphalism through arrogance.90  
To buttress his argument against declinism, Nye’s thought leadership has spurred 
a fresh approach to evaluating power in a post-Cold War world.  As previously 
mentioned, Nye’s evaluative scheme replaced material inputs with behavioral 
outcomes.91  Consequently, contexts and strategies achieved a degree of co-dependence 
in the power conversion calculus, spoken of today as “smart power.” Strategies that relate 
means to ends, and those that combine hard and soft power resources successfully in 




The New Public Diplomacy 
 Nye’s writings on soft power articulated the trends and consequences that spurred 
a renaissance in public diplomacy theory and practice, often referred to as the new public 
diplomacy.  New public diplomacy aims to create partnerships and platforms, 
effectuating a shift from advocacy of a particular policy or cause to an ideas-based 
strategy that shapes an idea or argument that can be amplified and reconstructed by 
others.93  Further, and equally important as a defining characteristic, new public 
diplomacy makes optimal use of new media in cultural exchange and people-to-people 
diplomacy programs, as well as international broadcasting.94  
 Brian Hocking, writing on the new public diplomacy in 2005, identified five 
intersecting phenomena that closely aligned with Nye’s assessment of new actors, new 
issues, and new media:  the preoccupation with image in international politics and 
rebranding in the global marketplace; the “CNN effect” that changed how issues roused 
public attention; technology-driven innovation in how public diplomacy was practiced; 
the intensification of social networks that blurred the boundaries between domestic and 
foreign policy; and the possibility, if not necessity, of direct public involvement in 
diplomacy.95   
 The cumulative effect changed perceptions of what diplomacy was and could 
accomplish.  The image of diplomatic systems as hierarchical and neatly ordered gave 
way to a “network” model that better represented the circulatory nature of power. 96  The 
network model accommodated both relational and structural forms of power, the first 
form exercised by an actor who changes the values of another, and the second form 
exercised by social structures producing shared norms and values.97  The network model 
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places a premium on engagement strategies that reach into and activate interconnected 
communities, playing to the strengths of the public diplomacy professional.  R. S. 
Zaharna, Ali Fisher and Amelia Arsenault described this change as a “connective 
mindshift” that would make public diplomacy a core imperative of diplomacy writ 
large.98  
 By privileging engagement, public diplomacy specialists were better able to 
define themselves and their mission, distinguishing public diplomacy practice from 
propaganda and nation-branding.99  In such a complex, networked environment, public 
diplomacy could not achieve its goals “based only on how ‘we’ appear to ‘others,’ 
whether we have the reputation we deserve, or thinking (that) listening is about 
understanding how ‘they’ hear ‘us’.”100  New public diplomacy aims to marshal and 
direct social power.  It achieves this by creating partnerships and platforms for 
engagement, and by intertwining cultural exchange and broadcasting diplomacy to 
optimize opportunities offered by new media.101  
 
Critical Studies in Soft Power Diplomacy 
 Significant recent additions to the literature on soft power diplomacy have 
expanded the scope of inquiry from public diplomacy practice to comparative and critical 
studies of soft power.  These studies question the biases, ethics, and perceptions that 
affect how soft power is perceived, practiced, and evaluated.  Accordingly, these studies 
open possibilities for alternative ways to qualitatively assess soft power as a force for 
changing how countries and peoples interact with each other and how the international 
system itself is structured and managed.   
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 Chief among the biases is the tendency to judge other countries against criteria 
culturally attuned to the United States.  Comparative studies have sought to correct this 
bias by studying soft power in its indigenous Russian and European contexts.  James 
Sherr’s Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion:  Russia’s Influence Abroad challenged 
conventional wisdom about Russia’s soft power and its practice, taking into consideration 
public skepticism over universal values; Russia’s and Europe’s rival integration projects; 
the restoration of order in Russia and Russians’ opportunity to achieve prosperity; and 
soft power’s integral role in Russian foreign policy that seeks to expand Russia’s 
influence along its perimeter and to intensify allegiance within the former Soviet 
Union.102  To understand soft power in the Russian context, Sherr advocated adoption of 
a revised vocabulary that reduces the emphasis on values and increases the emphasis on 
identity narratives, and encourages the assessment of Russia’s soft power influence on 
Russia’s own terms.   
 In his Foreword to European Public Diplomacy:  Soft Power at Work, Nicholas 
Cull explored the formative role of European public diplomacy in the creation of the 
European Union.  Cull credited European officials for heeding public opinion at home 
and abroad, to craft sound policies that facilitate the flow of soft power.  Cull also noted 
the subsequent failure of public diplomacy:  the divide between Brussels and “the street” 
was an overt sign that EU members had fallen out of step with their respective 
populations.103  European Public Diplomacy opened a new area of study regarding an 
entity’s ability to exercise regional soft power, offering assessments of the extent to 
which Europe’s public diplomacy has formed a coherent image of the European Union, 
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and the interplay of member states who share many goals but also operate independently 
and in competition with each other.104  
 Studies that advance relational and collaborative strategies in public diplomacy 
have interrogated the underlying ethics of soft power.  Kathy Fitzpatrick is recognized as 
an early proponent of a relational approach as the conceptual core of public diplomacy, 
arguing in The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy that “public diplomacy’s fundamental 
purpose is to help a nation establish and maintain mutually beneficial relationships with 
strategic publics that can affect national interests.”105  Fitzpatrick asserted that the ethical 
shortcoming of soft power lies in the asymmetrical relationship between an entity that 
possesses and wields influence and an entity that is to be influenced.  Because of this 
imbalance, it is unlikely that the entity with influence would be open to change.  
Relational strategies of engagement stress that both parties engaged need to be conducive 
to changing their attitudes and behaviors in order to achieve mutual benefit.106  
Furthermore, the superordinate-subordinate position of influencer and influenced works 
against efforts to empower foreign publics’ voice in public diplomacy outcomes107 in an 
atmosphere that generates understanding and trust.108      
 The shift toward engagement requires reconceptualizing audience as a part of a 
functioning ecosystem of international communication, a point which Craig Hayden 
explored in in his ongoing effort to identify the arguments that justify, elaborate, and 
constitute public diplomacy,109 and to provide a theoretical understanding of how soft 
power is conceived and implemented.110  In The Rhetoric of Soft Power, Hayden 
examined how soft power is articulated in public diplomacy and strategic 
communications policies in the United States, China, Japan, and Venezuela. Hayden’s 
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analysis elucidated the comparative perceptions of what constitutes relations, the 
meaning of “public,” the connections between audiences and the media, and policy 
makers’ expectations for what soft power can achieve.111  More broadly, Hayden’s 
project questions what public diplomacy can reasonably achieve as a purveyor and 
creator of international influence, and what identifying oneself as a public diplomacy 
advocate and practitioner entails.  The result is a rhetoric of public diplomacy in the 
making, leading to wholly different forms of persuasive discourse to achieve U.S. foreign 
policy objectives.112  
 
Joining Rhetoric and Soft Power 
 In my review of the literature, I set out to accomplish three tasks.  First, I wanted 
to orient readers to the frames of reference that have guided my research and rhetorical 
critique.  Toward this end, I introduced scholarship in the rhetoric of foreign policy, 
including works that treated rhetoric-as-persuasion and rhetoric-as-constitutive.  I also 
presented an overview of Nye’s collective works and described the evolution and current 
direction of scholarship in soft power theory and practice.  Second, I have clarified my 
own entry point into the stream of literature.  I ally my own scholarship with the rhetoric-
as-constitutive approach to foreign policy rhetoric, and join colleagues’ critical inquiry of 
soft power as it is currently conceived and practiced.   
 Lastly, I am confident that my project will generate new knowledge.  It advances 
our understanding of how discourse functions in bilateral diplomacy, an area that remains 
relatively pristine in comparison to rhetorical critique of presidential discourse in 
response to crises and in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Furthermore, I offer a 
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fundamentally different approach to the study of soft power, elaborating the rhetorical 
dimension of soft power attraction through bilateral diplomacy.   
 
Elaborating Soft Power with Rhetorical Sensitivity113 
In this section, I bring the foregoing discussion on soft power theory down to 
earth, introducing additional works in rhetorical criticism that simultaneously 
problematize and elaborate core assumptions of soft power with real-world examples.  I 
focus on three aspects of soft power theory:  the nature and expression of national values; 
how international actors exercise voice and social agency; and how issues are framed.  
Placing these aspects at the center of a conversation on soft power and rhetoric allows me 
to demonstrate the value of rhetorical critique for understanding soft power’s influence as 
well as its limitations.  In addressing national values, voice and agency, and issue frames, 
rhetorical critics answer two fundamental questions:  what is the generative source of soft 
power, and how do international actors achieve consensus and move in unison?  For both 
of these questions, Nye provides an answer that is generally mechanistic and agent-
centric. Rhetorical critics respond to Nye by animating soft power and by making 
discourse (vice actors who speak) the focal point for understanding soft power attraction.     
 
The Nature and Projection of National Values 
Nye wrote that soft power attraction “tends to arise from such resources as culture 
and ideological attraction as well as rules and institutions of international regimes.”114  
The attractiveness of a nation’s culture and ideology, the establishment of international 
norms consistent with its own society, and institutions able to channel and limit others’ 
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activities in preferred directions115 are the leitmotiv of soft power.  Universal values such 
as democracy and respect for human rights are a soft power booster. Nye argued that 
“when a country’s culture includes universal values and interests that others share, it 
increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes.”116   
Nye’s writings convey a sense of automaticity in how governments and non-
governmental actors project national values onto the world stage.  Projection of national 
values in turn relies upon national leaders adept at framing values, policies, and actions as 
mutually reinforcing and consonant.  Resonance of messages among domestic and 
foreign audiences rests in an ideational or imagined experience, rather than lived, 
intersubjective experience. Moreover, Nye has treated soft power resources—culture, 
values, norms, policies, and institutions—as inert elements.  
A rhetorical perspective animates soft power substances in and through discourse.  
Mark P. Moore and J. Gaut Ragsdale captured the animation of values in their critique of 
President Clinton’s rhetoric on the North American Trade Agreement. 117  During the 
1996 Presidential Campaign, President Clinton—a NAFTA advocate—drew skillfully on 
the American Dream to promote his foreign policy vision.  He argued that the small town 
values to which he owed his success—opportunity, equality, and responsibility—were the 
very ideals and aspirations that guided the NAFTA negotiations.118 These same values, 
when applied to NAFTA, would restore the American dream.119 Moore and Ragsdale’s 
essay demonstrated how personal narrative and mythologized biography cued 
participants in discourse to adopt these values in their own efforts to make a livelihood.  
To appreciate the distinction between transmission and enactment, one need not 
look exclusively to post-Cold War presidents.  President Reagan’s speech at Moscow 
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State University,120 delivered on May 31, 1988, appealed to shared principles—freedom 
of thought, freedom of information and communication, and free enterprise.  President 
Reagan linked faith and freedom, using as rhetorical resources images and principles 
deeply rooted in Russian culture, including ties to land, family, and community.  The 
speech demonstrated that values such as freedom had the potential to constitute a 
domestic Russian rationale to pursue glasnost and perestroika.  President Reagan thus 
promoted freedom not only as an American ideal, but as a universal, human value with 
the power to constitute a transnational bond.  
If Nye gives us the substance of soft power, rhetoric answers the question of its 
change and sustenance. Culture, taken as a soft power resource, attracts not as a stimulus 
for imitation, but in the hybridity created when two or more cultures meet. Values, taken 
as a soft power resource, attract not merely through their transmission but also by their 
enactment.   
 
New Actors’ Exercise of Voice and Agency 
Nye drew on soft power to explain the growing influence of new and non-
traditional actors in diplomacy.  New and non-traditional actors do not necessarily 
possess the traditional resources of national power, such as resource-rich territory or a 
standing military.  Instead, they possess soft power resources such as values and 
institutions, and can match or even surpass nation-states’ technological prowess, 
knowledge, and economic wherewithal to attain global status.121   
New and non-traditional actors named in Nye’s writings include media editors 
and other cue-givers, private sector corporations, non-governmental organizations, 
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intergovernmental organizations, and networks of scientific communities.122   Nye 
assumed that these new actors would form coalitions that could generate soft power 
influence.123  Nye also correlated open participation with an expansive international 
affairs agenda, increasing the prominence of the economic and ecological dimensions of 
global security.124   
Nye is less well equipped to explain how new and non-traditional actors achieve 
consensus and move in unison.  Rhetoricians have filled in this gap by putting discourse 
at the center of diplomatic action.  Actors within the diplomatic arena use language to 
convert soft power into shared purposes and cooperative action.  Discursive forms such 
as narrative place actors and issues together in a rhetorically constructed moment that 
serves as a call to action.     
Ann LeMare’s essay on the Fair Trade Narrative exemplified individual actors’ 
capacity to frame global issues and politics as a call to action. 125 The Fair Trade 
Narrative broke the dominant frame of market access to describe global economic and 
environmental issues, and replaced it with a narrative of trade justice.126  A cultural 
circuit of identity, regulation, representation, production, and consumption reinforced the 
trade justice narrative, such that consumers’ purchases placed them in the narrative, 
partaking in a shared moral position.  
LeMare’s essay provides a real-world example of what William Kirkwood termed 
the rhetoric of possibility, that is, the role of rhetoric in creating possibilities of awareness 
and action.127  The Fair Trade Narrative constituted the socially aware consumer.  If 
consumerism is itself a type of performance, narrative accounts reduced the ambiguity of 
where and what the consumer purchased.128  Narrative created in consumers a frame of 
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mind that heightened awareness of their moral responsibility, constituting a bond between 
consumer and producer.129 
 
The Framing of Issues on the International Agenda 
Nye expressed concern that a call to action would be framed too narrowly, 
triggering an emotional response from specific groups of actors and advocates who had 
particularized interests in a foreign policy decision or diplomatic outcome.  When left 
unchecked by an American public that is indifferent and complacent about international 
affairs, Nye wrote, “the battlefields of foreign policy are left to those with special 
interests.”130  A rhetorical perspective offers an alternative to Nye’s “battlefields” 
analogy.   
Rhetors may select strategies that (re)frame an issue or a relationship in its 
broadest terms.  Synecdoche—the interaction of microcosm and macrocosm, or the 
particular and the universal131—is one strategy well suited to Nye’s preference for 
universal values and national interests broadly defined.  President Clinton’s policy toward 
Africa exemplified this form of synecdoche.  The “new partnership anecdote,” coined by 
Jason A. Edwards and Joseph M. Valenzano, III, 132 established a synecdochic 
relationship between particularized concerns about Africa and strategic partnership with 
African governments, bilaterally and collectively.  From the “new partnership” signature 
initiative with African nation-states, synecdoche progressed one additional order of 
magnitude, from African Affairs to global affairs.  
Edwards and Valenzano found that President Clinton’s “new partnership 
anecdote” was a template to describe the United States’ role as a world leader, to promote 
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democracy, and to reconsider the threat environment.  President Clinton’s advocacy of a 
new partnership with Africa launched a successful engagement strategy that contained 
within it the Administration’s orientation toward stability, prosperity, and security. When 
contextualized in African Affairs, the strategy resolved the tension among national, 
strategic, and parochial interests.  A rhetorical perspective on soft power thus explains 
how the distinctions between parochial and strategic interests can be reconciled 
productively.   
Nye’s writings infer that international agendas are built serially; new issues that 
arise are added to the list; issues that are resolved are subtracted.  By contrast, a rhetorical 
perspective expects an interplay of issues, with the potential for a transcendental issue or 
cause to emerge.  Such was the experience of participants in the “Battle of Seattle” who 
fused social, economic, technological, environmental, and political processes into a call 
to global citizenship.133  The narrative of global citizenry made the “Battle of Seattle” a 
transformative moment, not only for those physically present, but also for those who 
heard the call from afar and performed their own acts of global citizenship in their own 
country contexts. 
 The rhetorical-critical essays cited above demonstrate that discourse is the 
generative source of soft power.  Open-ended and participatory narratives converted 
national values into universally held precepts, called rhetorical communities into being, 
and framed the call to action to shape parochial interests as a microcosm of national 
interests.  The authors delved into the underlying processes of human communication that 
energize, direct, and sustain soft power’s circulation within and across communities.  
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When approached with rhetorical sensitivity, soft power discourse holds the potential to 
constitute new identities and transform relationships.    
 
Soft Power’s Rhetorical Force 
My perspective on rhetoric shapes my rhetorical critique, through which I 
elaborate the rhetorical work of soft power.  The rhetorical dimension of soft power can 
be discovered and understood only after grounding theory and testing methods in lived 
discourse. The selection of an exemplar in bilateral diplomacy is critical to this endeavor.  
In this section, I present the rationale guiding my decision to focus on the U.S.-India 
bilateral relationship.  In the section immediately after, I discuss the narrowing of my 
critique to a transformative moment in the bilateral relationship, during which U.S. and 
Indian interests converged in the pursuit of full civilian nuclear cooperation, leading to 
the formation of an enduring and resilient strategic partnership.    
 
A Partner Country in Bilateral Dialogue 
The selection of a paired relationship is a precursor to rhetorical critique. Given 
the complexity of how nation-states interact bilaterally, regionally, and multi-laterally, 
elucidating the movement of soft power throughout the community of nations cannot be 
achieved with one stroke.  From a soft power perspective, I wanted to better understand 
the rich and deep texture of soft power substances—values, norms, institutions, policies, 
plus language—that generate attraction. From a rhetorical perspective, a bilateral 
relationship—as opposed to regional or multilateral fora—offered greater likelihood of 
recognizing and studying soft power attraction as a rhetorical process.  
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My choice to isolate the U.S.-India bilateral relationship can be explained initially 
by personal and professional considerations.  From a personal perspective, I possess a 
general understanding of the U.S.-India relationship, gained through my tenure as a 
foreign affairs officer at the U.S. Department of State.  For example, I managed the 
private sector aspects of the U.S.-India knowledge trade initiative in the late 1990s, and 
more recently explored the feasibility of public-private partnerships with indigenous 
Indian organizations to achieve labor reform goals and generate sustainable livelihoods.  I 
have learned much about the influence of the Indian-American Diaspora community 
through my engagement with the U.S.-India Business Council and not-for-profit 
organizations including the American India Foundation.   
Pragmatically, India is a good choice because of the accessibility of discourses 
available in English, including public statements issued by the Government of India.  
Online access to English-language journals and studies published by indigenous Indian 
think tanks and research institutes, as well as major Indian papers that publish in English, 
eases collection of texts to analyze.  Further, Indian Government officials’ proficiency in 
English and their willingness to address U.S.-based audiences in English reduces anxiety 
about mistranslation.  
Personal and pragmatic considerations aside, the U.S.-India relationship is worthy 
of serious study through the lens of any discipline.  I base this opinion in the complexity, 
significance, and continuing evolution of the bilateral relationship from estrangement to 
engagement.  Shared values, mutual interests, reciprocal commitments, and a joint vision 
of how to deter geopolitical threats and meet transnational challenges underpins the U.S.-
India relationship.   
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My aim to elaborate the rhetorical dimension of soft power makes the U.S.-India 
relationship a compelling choice.  To yield insights, my critique should encounter 
discourses generated by advocates of two countries that possess a parity of soft power 
resources.  To this point, India harbors and wields soft power resources of its own.  These 
soft power resources include normative influence (e.g., a founding philosophy of 
nonviolence and consistent voice for global equality on behalf of the underprivileged); 
institutional influence within the G-77 and G-20 communities of nation-states, and more 
recently, as a potential additional permanent member of the U.N. Security Council; and 
cultural influence, including not only film but also cuisine, art, music and dance.134   
India’s soft power parity with the United States can be assessed both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  Turning first to the rare quantitative ranking of soft 
powers, the Institute for Government, a London-based independent charity whose 
mission is to make government more effective, listed India among the top-25 influencers 
in 2010135; India dropped a few notches to 27 in the 2011 report, and fell to 36 based on 
2012 data.136  Among the rapid-growth markets, India ranks second behind China, 
according to Ernst & Young’s Rapid-growth Market Soft Power Index, which is based on 
metrics that take into account a country’s global image (e.g., Olympics), global integrity 
(e.g., rule of law), and global integration (e.g., English fluency).  Whereas aspects of any 
given index will generate reasonable questions about methodology, a metric-based 
comparative analysis of soft power resources is more rigorous and defensible than public 
opinion alone, and validates the assumption that India is a de facto soft power. 
In the ongoing conversations about soft power, qualitative considerations more 
typically buttress statements regarding how much soft power a country possesses. 
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Hymans’ summary of soft power trends—Bollywood, Bangalore, the “Boy Next Door” 
and the Bomb”137—is a serviceable qualitative framework through which to consider 
India’s soft power prospects. The popularity of Bollywood is but one signifier of India’s 
cultural influence.  In addition to popular culture phenomena such as Bollywood films 
and Bollywood-inspired dance and music, India’s ancient history of civilizational and 
cultural links extend today throughout Asia, Europe, and the Middle East,138 providing a 
regenerative soft power resource independent of popular tastes.  The Indian Council for 
Cultural Relations, which manages 22 cultural centers in 19 countries, and the Indian 
Brand Equity Foundation, established as a public-private partnership to promote India as 
a modern and dynamic state through initiatives such as the “India Everywhere” 
campaign,139 ply both ancient and popular cultural resources.  
Bangalore symbolizes the consonance of American and Indian values with regard 
to entrepreneurship and prosperity.  Bangalore also stands for India’s capabilities to 
develop dual-use high-technology, to harness that know-how to international 
development initiatives that generate good will, and to solve transnational, soft-power 
problems such as mitigating climate change and combating pandemics.  The 
entrepreneurial success signified by Bangalore, and the companion center of finance in 
Mumbai, have added credibility to India’s role as a promoter of regional economic 
integration.  Whereas India formerly treated South Asia as a protectorate vital to its own 
national security, today, India emphasizes its attractiveness as an economic hub and 
development model for its neighbors’ emulation.140   
Bangalore and Mumbai together project India’s image as an investment-friendly, 
pro-market democracy.141  India has demonstrated its willingness to tap into its own 
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wealth to support other countries’ development goals.  From 2000-2010, India tripled its 
foreign assistance, disbursing more than $1.5 billion in foreign aid in 2011.142  
Furthermore, India has built capacity to manage its foreign aid, putting in place a 
bureaucratic infrastructure that elevated the country’s visibility in the global aid arena.  In 
2011, India created a new agency similar to the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, 
which was authorized to spend $11.3 billion over 5 years.143  
The “boy next door” refers to affinities created through people-to-people 
diplomacy and interaction with members of the Indian Diaspora in the United States.144 
Diasporans can be change agents both in India and in their adopted communities.  For 
example, Diasporans may convince the people in their country of residence that their 
home country’s preferences are valid and attractive.  Additionally, Diasporans may 
influence the foreign policy of their host government in favor of their home 
government.145  To be agents of change, the divisions of region, language, and caste are 
muted in the construction of an outward facing “Indian” identity that both personalizes 
and amplifies affirming myths, legends, and traditions.146  Diasporans may also influence 
how deeply and quickly their Indian and adopted home communities converge to 
generate cultural capital and catalyze collective action.147  In this mode of action, the 
Diaspora promotes the diversity of its members and constructs a hybrid identity.  The 
Diaspora embodies—literally and symbolically—India’s creative and cultural industry, 
its syncretic spirituality, and its civilizational ethos.148 
India’s possession of the Bomb acknowledges India’s role as a nuclear power 
within its regional sphere of influence, vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, and within the 
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international nonproliferation regime. Hymans’ direct reference to India’s nuclear power 
status implies interdependence between hard and soft power resources.  Absent a hard 
power foundation, soft power resources are too anemic to sustain global influence.149  
Because India possesses resources across the power spectrum, whether and when to 
exercise soft power, singly or in combination with hard power tactics, remains a dynamic 
calculus and India’s strategic choice. 
In the context of my dissertation, the Bomb has a more benign meaning that is 
consequential to India’s soft power calculus.  India’s independent mastery of the full 
nuclear fuel cycle was a scientific and technological achievement attributable to an 
intellectual culture deeply embedded in the Indian tradition.150  Indian rhetors would 
translate this particularized intellectual culture into a universal or civilizational culture, 
including autonomous universities, a democratic polity, and facility in the English 
language.151   
In sum, as a partner to bilateral dialogue and engagement, India has access to the 
full range of power resources when selecting strategies and tactics to manage that 
relationship.  India’s ancient and popular culture resources, accessible to international 
audiences and furthered by public and private people-to-people interaction, fuel India’s 
soft power influence.  India’s military successes and influence within its regional sphere 
of influence demonstrate India’s capacity, if not also the will, to wield hard power to 
protect its interests.  India’s centers for finance and high tech, extended through 
leadership in multilateral economic dialogue and amplified by Diasporans’ 
entrepreneurial success, allow the exercise of punitive, competitive, or cooperative 
tactics.   
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Civil Nuclear Cooperation  
The U.S.-India bilateral relationship is long-standing, and encompasses a range of 
security, economic, and socio-cultural issues.  The two countries’ interactions offer a 
panoply of decisive moments that offer insight into the rhetorical dimension of soft 
power.  In this section, I introduce the particular, transformative moment in the U.S.-
India bilateral relationship that generated discourses for my rhetorical critique of soft 
power’s rhetorical force.  
I begin with the general observation that the U.S.-India relationship has been 
marked by alternating periods of engagement and estrangement.  Nuclear diplomacy 
often punctuated the purposeful distancing and warming of relations.  Even as both 
countries enjoyed the latitude to forge new alliances in the post-Cold War moment, and 
cooperation blossomed in many formerly contentious areas, civilian nuclear cooperation 
remained elusive. Strategic dialogue plateaued on issues of high technology, energy 
cooperation, and scientific exchange.  India’s foreign policy doctrine and steadfast refusal 
to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, along with international sanctions and export 
controls, barred robust dialogue and technical exchange.   
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States lifted sanctions that had been 
imposed on India since 1998.  As the contours of the Global War on Terrorism took 
shape, foreign policy makers reassessed approaches to global security, including nuclear 
nonproliferation.  The possibility of non-state terrorist actors obtaining and using 
weapons of mass destruction created an opening to reframe nuclear nonproliferation.  
Nuclear rhetorics evolved from highly technical exchanges focused on compliance with 
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the Nonproliferation Treaty to inclusive and vernacular narratives focused on cooperation 
to keep nuclear weapons and materials in responsible hands.   
The United States and India pressed the opportunity to expand bilateral dialogue 
into areas previously verboten. The formation of the U.S.-India High Technology 
Cooperation Group in November 2002 increased dual use technology exports.  India 
consented to a U.S. export control attaché to monitor end-use of U.S. technology 
transfers in exchange for the United States removing the Indian Space Research 
Organization from the Entity List, repealing extra licensing and regulatory requirements 
for technology exports.  In 2004, the United States and India formally launched a 
strategic dialogue with reciprocal steps for civilian nuclear regulatory and safety issues, 
space cooperation, and expansion of high-tech commerce.  In July 2005, on the eve of a 
state visit by Prime Minister Singh, the Indian Parliament passed a bill titled “WMD and 
Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities)” that brought India’s export 
control regime in conformity with the United States and international export controls.152 
Having discovered common cause in the Global War on Terrorism, followed by 
the removal of several legal barriers to cooperation, President Bush and Indian Prime 
Minister Singh selected the Prime Minister’s July 2005 state visit as the moment to 
jointly commit to full civilian nuclear cooperation, which would culminate in the signing 
of a U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Agreement, or 123 Agreement.  The “123 Agreement” 
refers to Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act.   Section 123 requires the 
conclusion of a specific agreement for significant transfers of nuclear material, 
equipment, or components from the United States to another nation.  Beyond commercial 
interests, the 123 Agreement allows cooperation in other areas, including technical 
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exchanges, scientific research, and nuclear safeguards.  It is generally understood that a 
country that is party to a bilateral 123 Agreement will adhere to U.S.-mandated (and by 
extension, international) nuclear nonproliferation norms.153 
The joint commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation broke the previous 
decades’ hard power cycle of coercion and punitive sanctions, and cleared a path to 
realize an enduring strategic partnership.  U.S. and Indian officials staked their respective 
national interests in cooperative action taken together.  The fulfillment of this 
commitment, achieved through the rhetoric of soft power diplomacy, transformed the 
bilateral relationship from estrangement to permanent and comprehensive engagement.  
Rhetoric effectuated this transformation by creating a convergence of world views and 
sustaining concerted action.   
The joint statement issued during Prime Minister Singh’s visit sparked a 
legislative and public debate that would continue through the 123 Agreement’s October 
2008 ratification by both governments. The debate played out in the U.S. Congress, the 
Indian Parliament, multilateral organizations, and the transnational public sphere, 
contextualizing nuclear nonproliferation in democratic norms and bilateral interests writ 
large.  The debate framed, contested, and reconstructed national interests and 
international cooperation between partners, by virtue of the attitudes and intentions 
expressed, and the consequence of those attitudes and intentions on how and what one 






Gathering Discourses Concerning Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
The systematic collection of discourses is a prerequisite to rhetorical critique.  
Recounting the steps taken to create the discursive archive allows peers to form their own 
judgments regarding the soundness of my critique, and gives scholars a platform from 
which to pursue and discuss related questions.  My aim here is to make transparent to 
readers the process I used to develop a holistic understanding of the debate, and from 
which I mined dialogue and discursive exchanges in which the tenor of soft power’s 
rhetorical force can be heard. 
The discourses generated by the debate are publicly available through open 
sources. For general news coverage and broadcast transcripts, I mined texts through 
LexisNexis. Searches occasionally provided day book announcements of events hosted 
by public policy organizations and think tanks, surfacing the availability of transcripts 
and summaries from sponsoring organizations’ websites.  I also searched the online 
archives of the Times of India, to supplement news coverage captured in the LexisNexis 
search.  
Layering in official documents and statements, I searched through the Department 
of State online archive of daily press briefings, news releases and transcripts, and the 
Government of India’s online archives of the Ministry of External Affairs.  I also 
contacted the Embassy of India to acquire transcripts of officials’ remarks and 
congressional testimony. The online archives of India Abroad, a long-standing weekly 
newspaper for the Indian Diaspora community in the United States, proved to be an 
invaluable source for first-person texts, through news coverage and interviews with 
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officials of the U.S. Government and Government of India, Members of Congress, public 
policy specialists, and advocates of U.S.-India commercial ties.   
Adding another layer of Congressional records, I searched for transcripts of 
Congressional hearings and reports, combining LexisNexis and GPO sources of 
information.  I found supplementary texts by searching back issues of Foreign Affairs, 
Foreign Policy, Nonproliferation Review, and the Economic and Political Weekly (of 
India), and by searching web sites of advocacy organizations such as the U.S.-India 
Business Council and the Arms Control Association.   
Placing the artifacts in their chronological sequence, I have confidence that my 
critique emanates from discourses that reflect the ebb-and-flow of negotiations.  The 
debate played out in three phases, beginning with a U.S. Congressional debate on 
legislation authorizing the Bush Administration to engage in bilateral negotiation of a 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement.  Prime Minister Singh’s state visit in July 2005, during which 
he and President Bush signed a joint statement to pursue full nuclear cooperation, and 
President Bush’s reciprocal visit to India in March 2006, punctuated the first phase of 
debate. Numerous Congressional hearings and public events hosted by agreement 
supporters and nonproliferation advocates occurred during this time as well. The first 
phase closed on December 18, 2006, when President Bush signed into law the Henry J. 
Hyde U.S. and India Peaceful Atomic Energy Promotion Act of 2006.  The law approved 
an exception to U.S. law to allow shipments of civilian nuclear fuel to India, and to allow 
US companies to engage in nuclear trade with India.   
The second phase accelerated in March 2007 and carried through July 2008, 
during which time U.S. and Indian negotiators hammered out the specifics of a U.S.-India 
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123 Agreement.  Following three rounds of negotiations, including intensified 
engagement in March and April 2007, the two governments initialed the draft text of the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement on July 20, 2007.  More than a year would pass before further 
progress could be made, owing in large measure to domestic opposition in India led by 
the Communist Party of India-Marxist and other Parties of the Left.  Prime Minister 
Singh’s survival of a July 2008 no-confidence vote, in which the Prime Minister staked 
his Government on Parliament’s passage of the draft text, placed the capstone on this 
second phase of negotiation. 
The third and final phase of the debate occurred between August and October of 
2008, during which time the U.S.-India 123 Agreement progressed toward ratification.  
Following the Indian Parliament’s action, diplomacy shifted to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), which approved an India-specific safeguards agreement, and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which approved India-specific exemptions from U.S. 
and NSG nuclear trade restrictions on states that do not allow full-scope international 
safeguards.  With actions by the IAEA and NSG complete, the Bush Administration took 
the final steps for U.S. ratification of the 123 Agreement, obtaining Congressional 
approval of the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy.  President Bush signed legislation enacting the 123 Agreement on 
October 8, 2008. 
Taken as a whole, the discourses collected capture the varying pace and 
inflections in the debate’s progression toward a final resolution in the ratification of the 
123 Agreement.  A related consideration is whether the artifacts collected can be 
characterized as soft power.  Were the discourses dominated by bargaining tactics, 
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threats, or coercive appeals, I could not honestly claim that the 123 Agreement was a 
product of soft power diplomacy.  Thankfully, the archive contains a preponderance of 
artifacts that reference soft power substances such as culture, values, norms, policies and 
institutions, and transnational soft-power issues that demand bilateral or multi-national 
cooperation.   
The discourses demonstrate the usefulness of rhetoric in constructing meaning, 
identifications, and community.  The interplay of influence among competing voices 
comes through in the texts.  These voices include not only heads of state and their senior 
representatives, but also economic and trade organizations on both continents, public 
intellectuals and policy experts, elected officials in the U.S. Congress, and the U.S.-based 
Indian Diaspora community.   
Prior to the debate on civil nuclear cooperation, the Diaspora community’s public 
advocacy flowed from and sustained its place of privilege within the knowledge 
economy.155  Organized efforts attended to economic, trade and taxation issues; issues 
affecting particular occupations such as health and medicine; and immigration and visa 
issues that impacted study in the United States.  The debate on full civilian nuclear 
cooperation expanded the “political” to include international development, environmental 
conservation, and Indian domestic security policies.156  The means of exerting influence 
likewise multiplied, including investment, repatriation of skills and technology, and 
corporatized philanthropy and charitable works.157 
During the debate on civil nuclear cooperation, the Indian Diaspora drew cultural 
and social resources into their argument that India was ready to serve the world.158  No 
longer mere accompaniment, geopolitical visions and discourses interlaced transnational 
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commerce to boost Diaspora community pride and influence.159  The Diasporans’ 
narrative displayed a wide spectrum of experience160 to promote India’s role as a “stable 
democracy in an unstable world.”161  
 Each of the voices present in the debate attempted the rhetorical task of re-
definition.  Proponents created an expansive frame for civil nuclear cooperation, 
redefining national and mutual interests.  Commercial advocates sought to redefine the 
energy sector, harnessing a low-emissions high technology to a traditional industrial 
sector.  Policy experts, whether speaking from the geopolitical or nonproliferation 
domain, had the task of redefining responsible conduct of the nation-state within the 
long-standing context of the nonproliferation regime.  The Indian Diaspora community 
redefined itself.  
 
Everything, Preferably All at Once 
In the foregoing pages, I presented a number of commitments that my rhetorical 
critique promises to fulfill.  The promise upon which all others depend is to elaborate the 
rhetorical dimension of soft power in the context of bilateral strategic dialogue.  India’s 
soft power standing and advocates’ reliance on soft power approaches provided the 
impetus to elicit from discourses the transformation that took place during the debate on 
the U.S.-India 123 Agreement.  My critique surfaces and then distills the rhetorical work 
of soft power in catalyzing and sustaining that transformation.  
My critique promises to nurture the seeds of interdisciplinary scholarship.  
Drawing on rhetorical theory to underpin soft power, I explain soft power’s processes of 
attraction and its sustenance over time, and identify dialogue that represents soft power in 
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the making.  I elaborate rhetors’ use of language to effectuate a convergence of world 
views, purposes, and interests and to undertake concerted action.  And I highlight those 
moments in which discourse created synergy between strategic and parochial interests, 
and opened ideologically charged terms to new interpretations and meanings. 
By fulfilling these theoretical and critical aims, I will have succeeded in staking 
new ground for the rhetoric of diplomacy.  I am conscious of the call for rhetorical critics 
to balance judgment of rhetors’ techniques and purposes, and to use and create new tools 
for consensus building and rational decision-making.  As an academic and former foreign 
affairs officer, I expect to put these tools in the hands of practitioners, deepening the 
skills of public diplomacy officers and broadening soft power’s scope to encompass a 
multitude of diplomatic objectives and areas of expertise.  If successful, the expansion of 
soft power diplomacy will establish a robust platform for further research in the rhetoric 
of diplomacy, thus initiating a virtuous circle to expand our knowledge of diplomacy and 
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Identification and India’s Move from Outside to Inside the Nuclear Regime  
 
When I surveyed the developments and elements of the U.S.-India Dialogue, one 
aspect the bilateral relationship stood out.  The two countries had signed a bilateral 
agreement—the U.S.-India 123 Agreement introduced in Chapter 1—that Americans and 
Indians alike credited with transforming their bilateral relationship.  From a diplomatic 
perspective, I wanted to know how U.S. and Indian officials adopted a soft power 
approach to overcome their long-standing impasse on civilian nuclear cooperation.  As a 
rhetorical critic, I wanted to understand how discourses  constituted the U.S.-India 
partnership, and therefore explored rhetors’ public narratives sparked by President Bush’s 
and Prime Minister Singh’s joint commitment. 
I believe that bilateral transformation, in its essence, is a rhetorical process, by 
which I mean to emphasize the potential of soft power discourse to constitute identities 
and social relations.  This disciplinary bias sets me apart from scholars and practitioners 
of public diplomacy who are employing theories of persuasion and strategies reliant on 
persuasive appeals.  Each has its merits. Combined efforts can improve diplomatic 
tradecraft with evidence-based insight into which mode of communication is preferred to 
achieve foreign policy and international security objectives in a given scenario.  But first 
we need to create some daylight between persuasive and constitutive approaches, if only 
to see each more clearly. 
 I also need to give probative force to my claim that the rhetorical work of soft 
power is to transform relations. This defense will allow practitioners of diplomacy to 
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translate my research into tradecraft that can be learned and applied.  In short, I need to 
name the processes of transformation that are rooted in rhetorical theory and serviceable 
in a diplomatic context.  In this chapter, I introduce “courtship” as a fitting metaphor for 
the early stages of bilateral transformation.  Courtship is a useful construct through which 
to explore transformation because it has meaning in both academic and “real-world” 
contexts.  It is part of the vocabulary that scholars and practitioners can use without 
further translation.   
 
Seizing a Watershed Moment 
Estrangement is more than an abstract state of affairs.  Estrangement places limits 
on what the diplomatic corps can say and do.  It also has ripple effects across the broader 
spectrum of governmental, private sector, philanthropic, academic, and people-to-people 
relations. That said, estrangement does not entail a full stop in relations and bilateral 
activity.  One might aptly describe estrangement as an attitude of wariness and mistrust.   
Actors seeking to foment bilateral ties necessarily adapt their discourse to the 
current state of affairs.  During periods of estrangement, the result is vacillation, as 
bilateral partners constantly seek to protect their position or press their advantage. During 
periods of engagement, by contrast, actors may be more willing to make the first move 
with confidence that their partner will reciprocate.  
 The successful negotiation of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement was a transformative 
moment in the bilateral relationship.  The word “transformation,” invoked by a number of 
U.S. and Indian proponents, cues us to the performance of soft power’s rhetorical work. 
Kneading through a couple statements from South Asian affairs expert and Agreement 
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proponent Ashley Tellis, we can appreciate how debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
opened the possibility of putting bilateral relations on a permanent path toward 
engagement, and the rhetorical capital attached to “transformation.”  
 Tellis spoke of bilateral transformation both indirectly and denotatively in 
Congressional testimony and public interviews. As legislative debate commenced in 
November 2005, Tellis asked Members of the House International Relations Committee: 
Could we have crafted an agreement with India minus the nuclear cooperation 
element and still have the relationship deepen? We tried doing this for 10 years in 
the early nineties and we failed.  We failed because we reached a point in the 
relationship where we had done pretty much everything that is easy to do, and the 
one outstanding issue that was left there was whether we treat India as a partner or 
as a target under the nonproliferation regimes, and by 2001 we had reached the 
point in the relationship where we could not navigate around the problem.1  
 
The 123 Agreement would set the bilateral relationship on a more durable path because it 
tested U.S. policies and thus imposed a burden on the United States.  The Agreement 
promised a new type of partnership, born of reciprocity for mutual gain.  Both sides 
would have to open themselves to the possibility of change and attendant risks. 
 Tellis buttressed his claim that the 123 Agreement was a singular opportunity to 
establish a durable partnership when speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in April 2006: 
Thanks to the tight bipolarity of the Cold War, U.S.-India relations during the 
entire epoch were characterized by alternation:  in almost every decade, troughs 
of estrangement invariably followed peaks of strong cooperation.  The 
transformation of US-India relations, as desired by the President and which enjoys 
bipartisan support in Congress, cannot be inherently schizophrenic if it is to be 
successful enough to advance common American and Indian interests in this new 
century.2 
 
The pattern of estrangement and cooperation to which Tellis alluded no doubt 
conditioned the goals of bilateral diplomacy.  The turn from estranged to engaged and 
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back again was near certain; what might trigger a turn, and when the turn would occur, 
was less predictable.  Caught in this pattern, the diplomatic corps looked for quick wins 
when times were good.  Transformation depended on a greater degree of confidence that 
both sides could forego short-term “wins,” especially at the other’s expense, in favor of 
long-term gains. 
For Tellis, the U.S.-India 123 Agreement represented a “grand summum bonum,” 
(i.e., highest good), possible only through sustained collaboration.3  The summum bonum 
would be judged by deeds:  preventing Asia’s domination by a single, aggressive power; 
eliminating threats from state sponsors of terrorism and halting the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction; promoting democracy and economic prosperity; and protecting the 
global commons, preserving energy security, and safeguarding the global environment.4  
Such comprehensive and forward-looking aims depended upon a permanent state of 
normalcy that the U.S.-India 123 Agreement would provide.   
In an April 2007 interview with India Abroad, the leading weekly paper published 
for Indian Diasporans in the United States, Tellis staked both the reputation of national 
leaders and the future of the bilateral relationship on negotiators’ success in crafting 
language that would gain both countries’ assent:  
From the U.S. perspective, this is a cutting of the Gordian knot of nuclear 
disagreement—the one thing that held the relationship back for 30 years.  So this 
is a very high-stakes gamble the President and the Prime Minister have 
undertaken.  In my view, this is the ultimate reason why it cannot fail, why it must 
not fail, because both leaders have staked a lot in trying to do something really 
important—something that implicates issues of credibility, issues of commitment, 
and finally issues of confidence for the future of the relationship.  So, for both 




Tellis again emphasized joint action.  The fate of the relationship and the fate of the 
Agreement were linked. The United States and India took a mutual risk and held a joint 
stake in the outcome. 
 Tellis was not the only individual who spoke of a transformative moment.  I chose 
Tellis’s remarks because he conveyed most clearly what transformation implied for the 
conduct of bilateral relations.  Transformation is not an abstract ideal.  Through Tellis, I 
sense what those involved in planning Prime Minister Singh’s July 2005 state visit 
intuited.  The joint statement issued at the conclusion of the visit presented the right 
diplomatic setting and moment to build a durable, strategic partnership, with the 
Agreement as its keystone.   
 
Recognizing Authenticity in Soft Power Diplomacy 
During periods of estrangement, discourse tacks toward persuasive appeals, as 
diplomatic actors seek quick wins that maintain and hold the status quo, if not an 
advantageous position.  During periods of engagement, by contrast, diplomatic actors 
may be more willing to risk making the first move, with confidence that their prospective 
partner will reciprocate. Periods of engagement therefore call for an open-ended form of 
rhetoric. The trick, however, is to generate a discourse that is both participatory and 
sustainable.  
The rhetorical act of courtship is performed through discourses that are open-
ended, allowing rhetors to place themselves and their purposes in a co-constructed 
narrative.  Courtship plays out in the hail-and-response between prospective partners.  
When rhetors perform the act of courtship, they gain confidence in each other and 
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progress toward a permanent union. The openness of courtship fits the circulatory nature 
of soft power. Whereas persuasive appeals are calculated and interjected in discourse, the 
co-construction of narrative comes about in a give-and-take exchange of words and deeds 
that gives soft power diplomacy a ring of authenticity.         
 
The Call for Rhetorical Sensitivity6  
Tellis’s description of the transformation of bilateral relations presents a paradox. 
On the one hand, Tellis described the 123 Agreement and its benefits as a matter of fact; 
the transformation was no longer propositional, but concrete reality.  The Agreement 
stood as an a priori example of the progress that could be achieved if the United States 
and India stopped the cycle of unilateral action and coercive measures to enforce 
cooperation under the Nonproliferation Treaty.  On the other hand, we hear an imploring 
tone and ascertain the tenuousness of negotiations.  Arrival at mutually agreeable terms 
was not at all assured, and the two countries could have reverted easily to their prior 
oscillation between estrangement and engagement. 
This paradox between being and becoming centers my rhetorical critique through 
which I explore this question:  How did the U.S.-India 123 Agreement evolve from an 
idea about nuclear cooperation into discourses that embodied and propelled forward a 
resilient and comprehensive bilateral partnership?  As a practitioner of diplomatic 
tradecraft, I would like the answer to be more than an accidental event born of unique 
circumstance.  I look for assurance that transformation is purposeful and replicable, even 
when accounting for varied cultural and historical contexts.  As a rhetorical critic, I assert 
that transformation of a bilateral relationship is possible within and through diplomatic 
83 
 
discourse.  Moreover, transformation can be understood, learned, and exercised by 
participants in diplomacy to effectuate positive change in bilateral relationships. 
Throughout my critique, I make a distinction between persuasive and constitutive 
approaches, and find the latter more sustainable.  Tellis’s statements—carried out in 
public venues and thus accessible to all participants and observers to the debate—are 
notable for eschewing gain- and loss-framed appeals to gain India’s consent with U.S.-
established conditionalities.  The quid pro quo bargaining of a typical negotiation and 
enticements offered in exchange for India’s ceding of its autonomy are absent from the 
narrative.  Tellis’s discourse is doing something different than persuasion.  Tellis’s 
narrative begins rather than ends with U.S.-Indian mutuality, reciprocity, and shared 
commitments; it thus sets a scene that calls for joint action.  It is invitational,7 and thus 
hopeful.  It imbues a sense of confidence in India’s role as a willing partner who need not 
be coerced or co-opted.   
 
Separating Persuasive and Constitutive Forms of Rhetoric  
Rhetorical theorist and critic Wayne Brockriede offered insight into how we judge 
the quality of argument, describing three attitudinal stances that distinguish persuasive 
and constitutive forms of rhetoric.  Coercion, or conquering one’s opponent by force of 
argument, and seduction, winning over one’s opponent through charm (or deceit), are 
persuasive forms of rhetoric that imply a social hierarchy.  One participant, seeking to 
win the argument, limits the co-arguer’s freedom to assent.  Coercion and seduction are 
unilateral poses in which power is held, and held over, the co-arguer.  
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The manner in which Brockriede described coercion and seduction as means of 
persuasion is akin to Nye’s co-optation as the telos of soft power.  Coercion, seduction, 
and co-optation are forms of persuasion. In the persuasive mode, rhetors frame values, 
norms, culture, and other soft power resources as logical, emotive, or epideictic appeals.  
Rhetors select the words most likely to earn the audience’s good will, giving voice to 
some opinions in order to move the audience to change one opinion in particular.8  
Rhetoric as persuasion seeks to refine the material of discourse, and the stylistic devices 
with which that material is presented, to gain the audience’s trust and agreement.  If the 
target audience’s opinion is swayed, and behavioral outcomes achieved, then it is 
presumed that the rhetor successfully converted soft power resources into influence.   
A third attitudinal pose, according to Brockriede, is to love. For arguers as lovers, 
the exchange is level rather than hierarchical; the exchange is bilateral rather than 
unilateral; the relationship rests in parity rather than zero-sum winning and losing; and 
acts are characterized not by gain but by self-risk and sacrifice.  Paraphrasing Brockriede, 
when we participate in discourse, we express our humanness.  This expression binds 
together the influences we hold over ourselves, the social influences of our co-arguers, 
and the relationship between the two.9  When we participate in discourse, we open 
ourselves to the possibility of changing our held notions of who we are, our perceptions 
of others, and our orientation to the world we inhabit. 
Brockriede’s description of this third pose fits how Tellis described the 
transformation of the bilateral relationship.  Both convey the sense of openness, 
possibility, and risk in the diplomatic exchange.  The discourse that transformed the 
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bilateral relationship not only eschewed coercion and hard bargaining.  It constituted a 
bilateral relationship in the co-construction of values, world views, and purposes.  
 
Soft Power as Constitutive Rhetoric   
Taking exception to how soft power is widely understood and practiced, I believe 
that soft power is a constitutive rather than persuasive process. Values, norms, and 
culture are symbols that come to possess power within and through discourse.10  These 
symbols do rhetorical work.  More specifically, these terms do the rhetorical work of 
identification.  Identification is the driving force for constitutive rhetoric.  It invites 
openness to self-transformation as well as the transformation of those whom we engage, 
to collaborate in the construction of the argument and its conclusion.11  Collaboration 
engenders a sense of ownership or investment in a successful exchange, a giving and 
returning of material and symbolic resources available to all parties as co-arguers.12  The 
constitutive form creates meaning for a situation or scene in which we place ourselves 
and our co-arguers. 
Parties estranged are parties divided, but with the potential for belonging together.  
Paraphrasing William Rueckert, division and unification are symbiotic; division is a 
potential for a belonging together.13  Belongingness remains latent so long as the parties 
are satisfied with their own and each other’s positions and relations.  However, when a 
member “inside” and a member “outside” recognize in each other shared qualities, 




Whether we are using the vocabulary of soft power (i.e., attraction) or rhetoric 
(i.e., identification), the common aim is to dissolve recalcitrance.  Whereas soft power 
attraction dissolves recalcitrance through co-optation, identification dissolves 
recalcitrance through the adoption of a new perspective.  Perspective is the interpretive 
frame through which we assign value to relationships and explain our actions and the 
actions of others. A change in perspective has the potential to relieve our sense of being 
estranged from one another.  As recalcitrance dissolves, discourse transforms individual 
interests into shared commitments.14  Co-optation is a unilateral and thus lesser means of 
sustaining soft power’s attraction.  Shared commitments give both parties a stake in 
maintaining cooperation over the long term, casting soft power attraction as an 
affirmational and regenerative force.   
The process of identification compensates for division through rhetorical acts that 
reach toward unification.15  In more straightforward terms, identification explains how 
participants in discourse gain a sense of belongingness and unity that catalyzes concerted 
action.  Unfortunately, renaming soft power attraction as identification doesn’t get us 
very far.  In this chapter and the next I attend to two processes of identification, more 
appropriately described as the rhetorical acts of courtship and consubstantiation.  In brief, 
courtship deepens familiarity, intimacy, and trust, but it remains ephemeral. When 
successful, courtship leads to a union.  The rhetorical act of consubstantiation, the subject 






Enacting Constitutive Rhetoric in Courtship   
This chapter describes how two nation-states participating in bilateral exchange 
overcame their sense of estrangement.  In the words of Indian Foreign Secretary Saran, 
“after years of India and the United States being told that they are talking past each other 
or talking at each other, I think finally we have come to a point that we are talking with 
each other.”16  
Burke would describe this exchange as courtship. Burke defined courtship as the 
use of suasive devices for the transcending of social estrangement.17  Courtship responds 
to the discontent and agitation of individuals who recognize in each other similar 
qualities, but whose attempt at union is materially, socially, or symbolically frustrated.  In 
social (or diplomatic) relations, these differences are expressed by placing groups (of 
nation-states) in different classes. In the hail and response of courtship, rhetors dissolve 
their class distinctions of “this kind” and “that kind,” to become the “same kind.”18 
Courtship is apropos of discourses surrounding the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
because this rhetorical act overcame the estrangement of differing classes and social 
hierarchies.19  The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty imposed such a social hierarchy.  It 
divided nation-states into bad actors outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime and good 
actors inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime.   
Courtship is also a familiar way in which to describe the interplay of diplomatic 
protocol and public discourse, a pattern in which one party hails the other and awaits a 
response that will narrow differences and bring the two into a closer alliance. The 
discourses I critiqued exhibited such a pattern.  The pattern was especially noticeable 
during reciprocal visits of the two heads of state, accompanied by joint press events and 
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state dinners with the exchange of toasts. The public nature of the debate allowed for the 
hail and response of courtship to continue, albeit at a more languid pace.   
Courtship and consubstantiation are constitutive processes in which the quality of 
the act is shaped by language choices made by participants to discourse.  Choices may 
differ at various moments, but have a cumulative effect on how we interpret the rhetorical 
act in its entirety. These language choices reveal the rhetor’s orientation in general, his or 
her perspective on the particular situation or moment at hand, and the desired change in 
social relations achieved through discursive exchange.  
In this chapter and the next, I tease out of discourse the language choices that 
grounded the rhetorical acts of courtship and consubstantiation.  Examples of the choices 
made by U.S. and Indian rhetors included national pride, kinship, shared values, a shared 
journey and destiny, and converging interests. In the persuasive mode, these choices 
would be interjected into discourse as appeals, selected to reinforce or maximize the 
desired change in interlocutors’ attitudes or behaviors.  In the constitutive mode, these 
choices ground the rhetorical acts of courtship and consubstantiation.   
Courtship and consubstantiation deepen identification and hold open moments of 
unification, enabling discourse to transform the context, social order, and nature of the 
relationship binding participants in the discourse.  When understood as a product of 
constitutive rhetoric, soft power diplomacy is accessible, contextual, and integrative.  
Those who participate in soft power diplomacy co-construct narratives that possess a 
quality of authenticity, which gives partners confidence that a permanent union is both 




Outside to Inside:  Changing India’s Place among Cooperating Nuclear States 
The foregoing discussion of constitutive rhetoric and courtship is more 
meaningful when placed into context.  My project grounds these constructs in a critique 
of discourses generated by public debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement.  Within this 
context, the United States and India began their courtship separated into two classes of 
nation-states:  those outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and those inside the 
regime.  Nation-states staked their position based on whether they had signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty.   
My purpose here is not to judge India’s refusal to sign the Nonproliferation 
Treaty.  My argument is that rhetoric-as-persuasion fights against or supplants other 
countries’ reasons for their actions.  In the rhetoric-as-persuasive mode of discourse, 
good reasons are extant; the rhetor assesses his or her audience and picks those reasons 
most likely to resonate and convince.  Constitutive rhetoric, by contrast, accepts the 
reasons as “good” and bases rhetorical action in those good reasons.  Following the 
rhetoric-as-constitutive path, reasons emerge from discourse, transforming the grounds 
upon which to judge action. Whereas rhetoric-as-persuasion requires acceptance by the 
auditors only, rhetoric-as-constitutive opens both parties engaged in discourse to critical 
evaluation; judgment applies equally to oneself and to the other.   
 
India’s Strategic Autonomy 
Indian strategic autonomy became the “good reason” that gave India pride of 
place outside the nuclear nonproliferation regime, remade in discourse as India’s choice 
to enjoin its interests with those of the United States.  Whereas the previous 
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understanding of strategic autonomy would have defined such a move as a dependency 
that weakened India, the narratives emerging from discourse promoted the belief that 
India’s participation in cooperative agreements and frameworks would make the world 
more stable and peaceful, thereby reducing external threats and the corollary impetus for 
a heightened posture of national defense.  Soft power discourse created political and 
strategic space in which to constitute a new bilateral relationship, and as such, answers in 
part the question of how India managed its rapprochement with the United States without 
losing its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy.20 
In its most basic formulation, strategic autonomy is India’s commitment to 
international freedom of action.21  In its full complexity, strategic autonomy is a culture 
of security that emerged after the advent of nuclear weapons, shaped by India’s historical 
context, technological capability, economic resources, and ethical norms relating to 
nuclear weapons.22  For example, strategic autonomy justified India’s nuclear deterrent 
against China.  After India’s loss in the 1962 Sino-Indian war over a disputed territorial 
boundary, and the Chinese government’s first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, Indian 
proponents of nuclear weapons development argued that their government needed to 
ensure national security, that national security should be a fiscal priority, and that 
deterrence against China should be a cornerstone of India’s security policy. 23 The Indian 
media, public, and political parties aligned in the belief that India’s capability to make 
and detonate a nuclear weapon would enable India to engage in diplomacy from a 
position of strength.24   
This sequence of events conditioned India’s refusal to sign the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, resulting in India’s isolation from nation-states engaged in 
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nuclear cooperation, trade, and development for peaceful purposes.  As a matter of 
diplomatic law, the Treaty recognized as nuclear weapons states only those countries that 
had exploded a nuclear device prior to January 1, 1967.25  If India were to join the 
community of cooperating nuclear states, it would have to divest itself from nuclear 
development for strategic defense and agree to nuclear safeguards.    
Strategic autonomy was more than a defensive posture, however.  It also 
represented India’s pride in its national achievements and affirmed the country’s ability 
to go it alone.  Schaffer attributes strategic autonomy to Indian exceptionalism, based in 
India’s ancient civilization and its success in forging from its extraordinarily diverse 
peoples a nation recognized by its democratic traditions.26   
We hear this sense of pride in Prime Minister Singh’s statement to the Indian 
parliament upon his return from his July 2005 state visit during which he and President 
Bush announced their intent to pursue full civilian nuclear cooperation.  Addressing 
Indian parliamentarians required Prime Minister Singh to express this intent in terms 
acceptable to India’s political class: 
Our nuclear programme in many ways, is unique.  It encompasses the complete 
range of activities that characterize an advanced nuclear power including 
generation of electricity, advanced research and development and our strategic 
programme.  Our scientists have done excellent work and we are progressing well 
in this programme as per the original vision outlined by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 
and Dr. Homi Bhabha.  We will build on this precious heritage.  We have ensured 
the principal of nondiscrimination.27 
 
The declarative on non-discrimination spoke to India’s rationale for refusing to sign the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Indians viewed the Treaty as an unequal arrangement 
between nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” that failed to guarantee their security against 
the threat of a nuclear attack.28   
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In one interpretation of the Treaty’s effect, India was penalized for prioritizing 
peaceful purposes and delaying nuclear weapons testing.  As a nuclear weapons state that 
lacked formal recognition, India turned mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle into a national 
errand. India continued its course in isolation—in the wilderness—with international 
assistance limited to India’s generation of electricity and related development needs.   
Prime Minister Singh honored those who led India’s journey through this 
wilderness:  Prime Minister Nehru’s vision and Atomic Energy Chairman Homi 
Bhabha’s ability to turn that vision into reality.  Repeating this theme in a subsequent 
statement to Parliament, Prime Minister Singh said that “the nation is justly proud of the 
tremendous work of our nuclear scientists and the Department of Atomic Energy in 
mastering all the key aspects of the full nuclear fuel cycle—the product of their genius 
and perseverance—will not be frittered away.”29  Prime Minister Nehru and Dr. Bhabha 
had together endowed the Indian people with a moral inheritance that rested in Prime 
Minister Singh’s hands.  Because the bilateral agreement would welcome India into the 
community of nuclear states as an equal, Prime Minister Singh had discharged his debt to 
the Nehru-Bhabha legacy and justified the sacrifice they made in pursuing nuclear 
development in isolation.       
Strategic autonomy eschewed arguments and justifications based on the 
preferences of world powers.30  Doctrinal arguments against the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement— that it would circumscribe Indian foreign policy making31 and make India 
prey to America’s carrot-and-stick treatment32—possessed a tenor of fear.  This subtext 
promoted a zero-sum view of global power and influence in which any movement 
oriented toward the United States would be a loss for India.  The hard power tactics and 
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rhetoric of persuasion that had characterized nuclear diplomacy through the 1990s served 
to justify this sense of fear.   
Soft power diplomacy and the constitutive form of rhetoric ascribed to India its 
desired and claimed position of privilege.  India would enter into a reciprocal agreement 
on nuclear safeguards of its own accord, preserving the country’s options to pursue 
nuclear capabilities as it deemed necessary to protect its interests. The United States 
would have to trust India to define its interests in consonance with American interests, 
and the interests of the international community as a whole. 
 
Rhetorical Work:  Engaging as Equals 
Once I realized that a narrative invoking strategic autonomy constituted new 
grounds for nuclear cooperation, three questions emerged to guide my critique.  First, I 
asked how discourse reduced India’s recalcitrance.  My critique demonstrates how the 
hail and response of courtship “leveled up” India and the United States, so that both 
would see the other as a worthy partner.  Exceptionalist rhetoric accommodated India’s 
strategic autonomy while bolstering India as an attractive partner worthy of U.S. 
attention.  As an equal, India possessed freedom of movement and the will and means to 
act.  
Second, I asked how discourse allowed participants to rhetorically perform the 
outside-to-inside movement with regard to the nuclear nonproliferation regime that the 
123 Agreement would achieve, while deferring to India’s strategic autonomy.  My 
critique reveals the construction of what I call the “deliverance narrative,” which 
reframed India’s exclusion and isolation as a mistake of history that could be corrected.  
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Third, I asked how discourse reconciled India’s desire for belongingness without 
sacrificing its autonomy. Through my critique, I discovered that the construction of a 
kinship narrative, including the rhetorical construction of binational familial ties, 
accomplished this reconciliation.  
 
Exceptionalism Narrative   
The move from outside to inside was more than a legalistic redefinition.  The 
division also implied a normative judgment:  those inside the nonproliferation regime 
were responsible members of the community of nations; those outside were either 
undeserving or had not earned the privilege of membership.  As the rhetoric of the U.S.-
India 123 Agreement developed, U.S.  and Indian rhetors co-constructed a narrative of 
exceptionalism that created a new set of grounds in which to judge India, based on the 
character and accomplishments of the nation and its people.  The exceptionalism 
narrative emerged in the hail and response of courtship, as U.S. and Indian rhetors 
exchanged words on what it meant to be exceptional and the expectations that this status 
conferred.  The exceptionalism narrative laid groundwork for cooperation without 
reducing Indian pride in what it had achieved on its own.  
As the negotiation began, India’s position outside the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime conditioned its response to international community efforts to gain its compliance 
and cooperation.  India perceived events and diplomatic overtures through its outsider 
position.  Similarly, India’s nuclear rhetoric responded to what the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty symbolized.  Position was both definitional and attitudinal.  
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Narratives that incorporate position in this way have the potential to deepen 
identification through shared geometric substance. Substance is a touchstone in Burke’s 
ontology, the notion that language simulates “what is really there.”33  Substance is central 
to the ways in which language and essence play out in everyday judgments.  It is the core 
meaning of an object, a person, or an idea that language can reshape, recast, reclaim, and 
represent.  In practice, “language used substantially” attributes motive, assigns value, and 
confers identity.34   
As Burke explained, geometric substances of identification privilege external 
factors that shape and reflect the quality of one’s character, that is, the material 
possessions, achievements, and connections that make one’s personal characteristics 
count.35  The geometric substance of identification melds the duality of a physical or 
geographic place, with its natural and man-made features, and its symbolic meaning 
rooted in lived experience.36  The characteristics that guide the construction of place carry 
through to the characteristics of the people from that place.   
Discourses wrapped around geometric substance work from the construction of 
place to change relationships of placement within the social hierarchy.  An 
exceptionalism narrative co-constructed by American and Indian rhetors established a 
consonance of place and people to transform India’s position from outside to inside the 
community of responsible nuclear weapons states.   The exceptionalism narrative infused 
the hail and response of courtship, celebrating both nations’ character and 
accomplishments as models of democracy.  
Rhetors drew on two traditions of exceptionalist rhetoric:  the exemplarist and the 
interventionist.37  The exemplarist tradition defines a nation-state’s status as a role model 
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for social and political achievement for others’ emulation.  This tradition possesses 
inward-facing energy, to perfect the model that other nation-states will be compelled to 
adopt. The interventionist tradition adds the duty to project that model through active 
economic, political, cultural, and social engagement with the world.  Whether 
exceptionalism is exemplar or interventionist is less important than the synchronicity of 
expression.  
The willingness of a nation-state to gravitate from one tradition to another, so as 
to align itself with another nation-state, witnesses the attraction of soft power.  The 
underlying communicative process is a change in orientation that promotes stronger 
identifications between the two nation-states.  In the case of the United States and India, 
the exceptionalism narrative engendered a joint obligation to make their achievements 
visible, enviable, and replicable—to move together into the world.   
The open question was whether discourse would convert the exemplarist narrative 
into the interventionist impulse.  State Department South Asia expert Daniel Markey 
framed a desired shift from exemplarist to interventionist traditions:  
India has long preferred to promote democracy by its own example, rather than 
through more active international policies and programs.  We hope to see an even 
greater convergence in U.S. and Indian views about the natural connections 
between democratic governance, human rights protection, development, security, 
and peace.  We believe that India has a great deal of relevant experience in the 
many aspects of democratic governance that should be shared with the world.38 
  
Indian rhetors’ expansion of their vocabulary supported identification through a shared 
understanding of global needs, threats, and remedies.  The modification of the rhetoric of 
exceptionalism from being a “model” to being an “actor” required a corollary shift from a 
passive to an active vocabulary, from “the United States and India are” to “the United 
States and India will.”   
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Both interventionist and exemplarist strains of exceptionalism emerged in the 
discourses of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh during the Prime Minister’s July 
2005 state visit.   The tension between the two strands animated the call and response of 
the two leaders’ public statements. The interventionist appeal is contained in President 
Bush’s portion of a joint news statement on the outcomes of the two leaders’ discussions: 
India and the United States share a commitment to freedom and a belief that 
democracy provides the best path to a more hopeful future for all people.  We also 
believe that the spread of liberty is the best alternative to hatred and violence.  
Because of our shared values, the relationship between our two countries has 
never been stronger.  We’re working together to make our nations more secure, 
deliver a better life to our citizens, and advance the cause of peace and freedom 
throughout the world. 39    
 
Through this statement, President Bush established a natural progression from internal 
perfection—“our nations”; “our citizens”—to external projection “throughout the world.” 
Also key, however, was that President Bush displaced the binary away from the 
nonproliferation regime and toward global security, setting the two countries’ shared 
values of liberty, freedom, and democracy against a common foe. The new binary placed 
the United States and India on the same side.  “Works” reinforced this new binary, 
between those who were active and those who were apathetic.  The United States and 
India, pursuing the path of democracy in their respective spheres of influence, and in their 
own way, were nonetheless “working together” to achieve the broader aim of displacing 
hatred and violence with peace and freedom.  
The President’s use of the word “path” left the means of democracy promotion 
open-ended.  On the one hand, the statement raised the expectation that India would join 
the United States in clearing safe passage through a dangerous world.  On the other hand, 
a path may be made through natural forces, to be discovered or ventured.  The ambiguity 
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made both the interventionist and exemplarist expressions of exceptionalism available to 
Prime Minister Singh, who responded in the exemplarist mode:      
As democracies, we must work together to create a world in which democracies 
can flourish.  India’s democracy has been fashioned around India’s civilisational 
ethos which celebrates diversity.  The field of civil nuclear energy is a vital area 
for cooperation between our two countries.  As a consequence of our collective 
efforts, our relationship in this sector is being transformed.40  
 
“Create” was an adroit choice, a companion term for President Bush’s “spread of 
liberty,” a joint connotation of natural and unrehearsed movement toward concerted 
action.  Prime Minister Singh’s use of “create” maintained a degree of ambiguity, should 
President Bush settle into the interventionist mode.  Situated within the interventionist 
tradition, to create is an ultimate act, wound up with will and purpose. Interpreted within 
the exemplarist tradition, to create is to invite others to gaze upon and emulate one’s good 
works, a template for others’ action.  Contextualized within the exemplarist tradition, the 
grammar describes democracy promotion as an organic process that adapts to its 
environment without human intervention.  
The ambiguity and potentiality of “create” was one of two ways that Prime 
Minister Singh blended pragmatism and principle.  The United States and India must 
work together not only because of mutual desire for India’s economic growth, but 
because they are both democracies.  The Prime Minister issued an imperative; a failure to 
act together would be a failure for democracy itself.  Pragmatic outcomes were secondary 
to shaping a world consonant with their two countries’ democratic values.   
During the courtship period, “create” achieved its strongest resonance within an 
exemplarist vocabulary.  In the month following the Prime Minister’s state visit, U.S. 
Ambassador to India David Mulford responded in kind to Prime Minister Singh, while 
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also incorporating India’s strategic autonomy as a long-standing principle critical to 
successful negotiation of the 123 Agreement: 
It is my firm belief that India can be a development model for the world by 
demonstrating the ability of a multi-ethnic democracy to deliver sustained growth 
and prosperity to its people. These developments in no way compromise India’s 
sovereignty or independence.  Therefore these are agreements between two equal, 
important partners, who look to the future and understand what some of their 
shared values and objectives must be.41 
 
Ambassador Mulford’s exemplarist frame reinforced India’s striving for internal 
perfection, with the instrumental capacity to deliver sustained growth and prosperity to its 
people.  The grammar of Ambassador Mulford’s statement suggested a conservative 
reading of India’s potential influence, placing universal values—pluralism and 
democracy—in service to the achievement of a comparatively bounded and definitive 
end—to be a development model for the world.  The development model harkened 
India’s long-standing place of privilege and influence.  Building on the exceptionalism 
narrative in all its facets, Ambassador Mumford’s statement promoted India’s economic 
and political leadership.     
These exchanges remind us that values are a resource for soft power, but not 
exclusively so.  Situated in an alternative rhetorical frame, the same values stated 
above—democracy, liberty—could warrant direct action in the interventionist strain of 
exceptionalism argued through the rhetoric of persuasion.  As the hail and response of 
courtship progressed, reciprocal statements signaled that both the United States and India 
could be models for democracy.  In carrying out their responsibilities to uphold their 
models of democracy, they performed an act of identification.   
The exemplarist tradition of exceptionalist rhetoric served proponents well.  
Through the hail and response of courtship, America and India identified with each 
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other’s political, economic, and technological accomplishments.  In partnership, their 
accomplishments made the two countries worthy of each other’s emulation.  This 
narrative gave India and the United States shared and elevated status as responsible 
leaders who uphold and defend international norms.  Through this construction, India 
entered the dialogue on its own terms, its commitment to reciprocity preserved in the 
doctrine of strategic autonomy.  
My critique confirms that the exemplarist tradition of Indian exceptionalism is 
among the rhetorical tracings that influenced the debate.  The key take-away is that 
neither the interventionist nor the exemplarist tradition is better suited to soft power.  
Rather, it is that the nation-state “attracted to” and the nation-state “attracted by” are 
more likely to merge their interests if they adopt a synchronous approach to achieving 
their foreign policy aims. In the more specific case of U.S.-India civilian nuclear 
cooperation, the exceptionalism narrative shifted the criterion for belongingness from a 
nation-state’s position defining correct actions to a nation-state’s actions determining its 
correct position and membership. 
 
Deliverance Narrative    
The exceptionalism narrative redefined India’s position vis-à-vis the 
nonproliferation regime and the United States, overcoming the two nations’ 
estrangement.  But once “inside” the circle of cooperating nuclear states, India would 
continue to exercise its independence to determine its future course and select its allies 
accordingly.  Furthermore, in making the move from outside to inside, the exceptionalism 
narrative was one-sided, placing the onus on India to step forward.   
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A companion narrative would be needed to complete the movement from outside 
to inside.  This companion narrative, which I call the “deliverance” narrative, reframed 
India’s exclusion from the nonproliferation regime as a mistaken action that could be 
corrected, allowing the United States to explain its own break from the past without 
losing stature.  The outside-to-inside narrative characterized India’s placement as an 
injustice—a mistake of history—and offered India’s deliverance from isolation as a 
corrective.  The deliverance narrative focused less on India’s position and more on 
India’s record of upholding nonproliferation norms.   
The deliverance narrative was problematic, however.  Its early construction 
featured agent-centric accounts, in which the United States took on the responsibility of 
bringing India out of its isolation and into the mainstream.  Inherent in this formulation 
was the division of power and class that had kept the United States and India estranged.  
As the deliverance narrative evolved, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Nicholas Burns and Prime Minister Singh participated in an exchange of discourses that 
shifted from an agent-centric account to make the U.S.-India 123 Agreement itself the 
locus of action.   
This change in perspective would allow India to make the move from outside to 
inside the nonproliferation regime without having to depend on a deliverer.  This 
evolution in how accounts were framed might have evened the power relationship 
between the two nations, but Under Secretary Burns’s performance in this particular act 
of courtship was flawed.  He could not totally surrender the U.S. advantage in guiding the 
bilateral relationship.    
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 In the rhetorical act of courtship, we hear tension in the repartee between Under 
Secretary Burns and Prime Minister Singh.  This tension arises from the locus of action—
whether India would be delivered out of isolation by the United States, by its own action, 
or by an external force acting upon both parties. We hear this tension in an editorial 
penned by Amitabh Mattoo, among India’s leading academics on international relations 
and disarmament, in the Indian foreign policy trade publication Economic and Political 
Weekly: 
Neither an old ally, Russia, nor a new enthusiast, France, would be able to exert 
enough pressure to be able to suitably modify NSG guidelines to give India 
access.  Only the U.S. has the weight and influence to be able to adjust the nuclear 
regime to be able to accommodate India. A modus vivendi with the United States 
is seen as not just desirable, but a necessity if India is to translate its aspirations 
into reality.  The current debate, in essence, reflects this Indian paradox:  of 
loving and hating the U.S. simultaneously.42 
 
By attributing weight and influence to the United States, Professor Mattoo placed the 
United States in the position of a deliverer.  Because India depended on a rapprochement 
with the United States to achieve great power status, Professor Mattoo placed India in a 
role in which it was no longer in control of its own destiny.   
 Professor Mattoo captured the resulting tension between Indian autonomy and 
dependency in describing the love-hate relationship that India had with the United States 
during the earliest phase of the two nations’ courtship, when the transition from estranged 
to engaged was more possibility than certainty.  As the deliverance narrative progressed, 
U.S. and Indian proponents of the 123 Agreement found a way out of their rhetorical 
conundrum.  Proponents assigned agency to the Agreement itself, achieving India’s 
deliverance absent a deliverer.   
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 To make India’s move from outside to inside explicit—a de facto rather than de 
jure change in position—Under Secretary Burns crafted exceptionalist rhetoric to 
function as a double entendre.  Because India is unique, so the logic went, it was worthy 
of an exception from the path taken by other countries who signed the Nonproliferation 
Treaty:  
India is unique.  It is soon to be the largest country in the world by population.  It 
is a country now where the United States is the largest investor and the largest 
trade partner.  It has a growing interest in developing peaceful nuclear energy.  It 
had developed its entire nuclear program over 30 years alone because it had been 
isolated.  So the question that we faced was the following:  is it better to maintain 
India in isolation, or is it better to try to bring it into the international 
mainstream?43 
   
The construction of this statement belies a U.S.-centric perspective and a rationale based 
in U.S. rather than joint interests.  Whereas Under Secretary Burns could have praised 
India’s ability to attract international investors, the statement mentions only U.S. 
investment.  Furthermore, Under Secretary Burns could have cited the success of the 
U.S.-India trade relationship, but instead formulated his words in a way that reinforced 
India’s dependence on the United States to maintain its economic growth.  The United 
States had the capacity to either “maintain” or to “bring” India out of isolation, robbing 
India of its own volition. 
 Under Secretary Burns’ claim to India’s uniqueness served a practical purpose, to 
inoculate against nuclear nonproliferation advocates’ opposition to a single country 
exemption for nuclear cooperation with India.  Statements made by nonproliferation 
advocates in response reinforced the United States’ position as deliverer.  The Carnegie 
Endowment’s Miriam Rajkumar, speaking to India Abroad in reaction to the July 2005 
Joint Statement, said that “the Administration policy seems to be that the good guys can 
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have nuclear weapons but not the bad guys.”44  Arms Control Association Executive 
Director Daryl Kimball repeated this argument in an essay published in India’s Economic 
and Political Weekly, arguing that by advocating a special exemption, the United States 
was saying “we’ll decide who is good and who is part of the ‘axis of evil’ and we will 
relax the rules when they are inconvenient for our friend and our business dealings.”45   
 The binary of “good guys” and “bad guys” presumed that the United States had 
passed a favorable judgment on India.  If the United States determined that India was a 
friend today, it could easily reverse itself and determine that India was a foe, should 
circumstances or U.S. interests change in the future. These accounts thus contravened the 
overarching effort to transform the bilateral relationship into an enduring partnership that 
could withstand the vagaries of circumstance.     
  The Administration and non-proliferation advocates’ accounts subjugated India to 
the actions of others.  These discourses therefore demanded a reassertion of Indian 
independence. Prime Minister Singh accomplished this by constructing the outside-to-
inside move as two independent and sequential steps:  
There is I believe a large measure of support within the country in favour of 
breaking out of our isolation, and in joining the international mainstream in a 
manner that secures for India full civil nuclear cooperation with the international 
community while protecting our strategic programme and maintaining the 
integrity of our three-stage programme and indigenous R&D.  This is the 
objective set out as far as the bilateral nuclear agreement is concerned.46 
 
Prime Minister Singh’s statement divided India’s isolation and India’s belongingness into 
two distinct acts.  To “break out” relayed India’s sense of false imprisonment; a willful 
act would be necessary to give India the freedom to exercise its sovereignty.  India’s 
freedom would be unconditional.  Joining the international mainstream was an 
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independent aim that needed additional supports (i.e., conditionalities) to stand on its 
own.  
In contrast to Prime Minister Singh’s hyphenated movement, Under Secretary 
Burns drew the outside-to-inside move in one steady arc:   
We’re quite confident that this is a good agreement both for India and the United 
States, and we think it’s good for the world because it will bring India into the 
nonproliferation system at long last.  It will relieve India of its isolation that it’s 
had to live in for 30-odd years, and it’s going to strengthen our international 
efforts because India has been a country that has respected its nuclear 
technology.47 
 
In this iteration the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, not a state actor, would free India from its 
isolation.  By joining the Agreement, India could maintain its freedom of choice absent 
dependence on the United States.  And yet, Under Secretary Burns implied that the 
Agreement may be good for India and good for the United States in different ways, based 
in each nation’s severable interests.  Even while lauding India for respecting 
nonproliferation norms, Under Secretary Burns spoke to, rather than through, the Indian 
perspective. Under Secretary Burns’s accounts addressed India as an object of action. 
 Over the course of the debate, the source of India’s deliverance migrated toward 
an organic force within the international scene and the 123 Agreement itself.  The 
following statement, through which the deliverance narrative first emerged, highlights the 
degree to which perspectives needed to change in order to shift the locus from agent-
centric to scene-based accounts:   
We sought the agreement because India’s nuclear weapons program and its status 
outside the nonproliferation regime has proven to be a longstanding stumbling 
block to enhance U.S.-India relations.  It is now time to end the isolation of India 




The United States would take action on India’s behalf.  The United States controlled not 
only the action, but also the time at which the action would take place.  The subtext gave 
the United States a place of privilege in defining and stewarding international norms.  By 
bending the forces driving the nonproliferation regime to its will, the United States 
demonstrated mastery over diplomacy and time itself. 
 Placing the United States in the role of deliverer was an affront to India’s strategic 
autonomy.  On the other hand, assigning India this role could unbalance the reciprocity 
initiated through the July 2005 joint statement. Rejecting both the United States and India 
as “deliverers,” Prime Minister Singh made an asymmetrical discursive move, placing the 
locus of action in the agreement itself:  “I believe that this agreement provides a way 
forward for India to break out of its present isolation and expand international 
cooperation, enabling us to enhance the contribution of nuclear energy in meeting our 
future energy needs.”49  Under Secretary Burns’s statement bounded time to the present; 
India’s isolation would end in one decisive action. Prime Minister Singh’s construction 
was future focused; the Agreement provided “a way forward” that neither demanded nor 
negated direct or independent action.   
 Congressman Henry Hyde enjoined the Prime Minister’s construction of the 
deliverance narrative with a locus of action in the Agreement.  Congressman Hyde kept 
the future focus and added a patina of idealism:  
The measure is an important step in transforming the strategic alliance of two of 
the oldest and largest democracies, while strengthening international security.  
While the world has known that India possesses nuclear weapons, India has not 
had a seat at the table of nuclear stakeholders.  This brings India into the 
mainstream with other accountable countries, giving rise to the same benefits and 




We hear in Congressman Hyde’s remarks consonance with India’s position that the 
nonproliferation regime had unfairly denied the country’s recognition as a nuclear 
weapons state.  India’s claiming its “seat at the table” gave a nod to India’s move from 
observer to participant in dialogue and decision-making.  Congressman Hyde’s 
construction connoted an equitable Agreement that respected Indian equities.  
As debate progressed, Under Secretary Burns attempted to repair his construction 
of the deliverance narrative to synchronize his perspective with that of Prime Minister 
Singh and influencers such as Congressman Hyde.  Under Secretary Burns placed both 
the United States and India within a scene that possessed a controlling influence on their 
behavior: 
People on both sides of the equation in India and the Department of Atomic 
Energy as well as my own government and other governments need to adjust to 
this new world—that means compromise.  It means to understand that maybe 
what you did in isolation will not be the same as what you would do in a more 
integrated world where India is working with the rest of the international 
community to provide for civilian nuclear power.51 
 
In this revised construction, the scene is an integrated world. Filling out this perspective, 
actions were interdependent, and actors achieved their purposes through cooperation.  
The entailment of interdependence and cooperation within a multilateral and 
multinational system adhered to a soft power frame.  The tone, however, was persuasive. 
The phrase “what you did in isolation” emphasized India; the effects remained 
unidirectional.  Under Secretary Burns’s statement lacked sensitivity to the influence of 
the scene on the United States.   
In a subsequent statement, Under Secretary Burns assigned greater agency to 
India, describing the country as a rising power in the world, which the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement signified and symbolized.  As a proponent of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, 
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the United States demonstrated its intent to treat India “with greater respect and 
equality,”52 a theme that Under Secretary Burns incorporated in discourse in the last 
phases of the Agreement’s negotiation and ratification:   
This agreement is indisputably in India’s national interest from our perspective.  It 
will deliver India from over 30 years of international isolation.  It will allow the 
country to be treated in a fair and egalitarian way.  It will allow the country to 
be—to take its place among the leaders of the civil nuclear community and the 
world today as a responsible state.53 
 
By the end of the debate, Under Secretary Burns had reconciled Prime Minister Singh’s 
perspective in his own account, placing agency in the Agreement rather than either of 
their two nations.  The Agreement and the Agreement alone would deliver India from its 
isolation.  Yet Under Secretary Burns remained steadfast in speaking from a U.S. rather 
than a joint perspective.  In addition to the explicit phrase “from our perspective,” to say 
that the Agreement would allow India to be treated in a fair and egalitarian way negated 
the belief that India was deserving of fair and equal treatment on its own merits.  As an 
architect of the Agreement, the United States would afford to India the respect that 
Indians believed to be their natural right. 
The deliverance narrative concluded once it became clear to all parties that the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement would be signed into law, followed by the signing of bilateral 
treaty instruments. Its final resolution occurred absent a deepened sense of identification.  
Even after adopting Prime Minister Singh’s account, which imbued the Agreement with 
agency, Under Secretary Burns could never fully grasp the Indian perspective.  
Accordingly, his U.S.-centric narrative kept the two nations estranged.    
Through the hail and response of courtship, the exceptionalism narrative 
transcended division by establishing common ground and shared identifications among 
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Americans and Indians.  The synchronicity achieved in the rhetoric of exceptionalism 
gave America and India a shared status as models of democracy, global economies, and 
leaders in science and technology.  Mutual recognition of exceptionalism provided the 
means to reconstruct and recontextualize India’s strategic autonomy, establishing a new 
default position that favored engagement over isolation.  Rhetors refocused attention 
away from India’s status vis-à-vis the Nonproliferation Treaty and toward India’s status 
vis-à-vis the United States.  Assertions of equality and India’s belongingness among 
responsible nuclear actors departed from the hard power, competitive frame associated 
with the Nonproliferation Treaty, and instead adopted a soft power, cooperative frame 
that emphasized shared democratic and nonproliferation norms.  
Despite the difficulties arising in the exchanges between Under Secretary Burns 
and Prime Minister Singh, the deliverance narrative conditioned the rhetorical act of 
courtship; its positive effect was subtle, changing perspectives on India’s past behavior 
and its attractiveness as a partner.  Functioning at this deeper level, the compression of 
“out of isolation” with “inside the mainstream” fused the temporal and spatial dimensions 
of India’s position.  This linkage between India’s past, present, and future made visible 
India’s incongruous relationship to the nonproliferation regime.  U.S. proponents of the 
123 Agreement identified with India’s claim of discriminatory treatment.  
The dissonance associated with India’s placement outside the nuclear regime 
prompted a rhetorical shift in perspective about India, from a nation-state that had 
obstinately refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty, to a responsible nation-state 
unfairly constrained by a punitive and discriminatory system.  India’s isolation was a 
result of human foible.54  Those who had isolated India denied themselves the long-term 
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security that they had hoped to achieve when denying India’s entry into the nuclear club 
in the first place.  The intertwining of the exceptionalism and deliverance narratives 
reframed both countries’ past and present actions.  Because India’s placement outside the 
nonproliferation regime was due to a mistake, and not an act of malevolence, India could 
make the move from outside to inside while preserving its pride, and the United States 
could make a conciliatory move toward India while saving face. 
 
Kinship Narrative 
Both the exceptionalism narrative and the deliverance narrative were grounded in 
position—the move from outside to inside the regime, or from isolation into the 
mainstream.  The exceptionalism narrative placed India and the United States in the same 
class, as models of democracy, and by extension, responsible actors.  The deliverance 
narrative allowed participants to perform India’s movement from outside to inside the 
nonproliferation regime, but the United States’ performance was flawed.     
The exceptionalism and deliverance narratives needed to be rounded out with an 
additional narrative that would dissolve the focus on nation-states as actors and reconcile 
India’s strategic autonomy with its desire to belong.  The kinship narrative resolved the 
tension between autonomy and community by promoting familial bonds.  Substances of 
identification play a correlative role in rhetoric; discourse beads together a material 
reality or event, its socially constructed meaning, and its symbolic representation.  
Familial substance works in this way, creating a sense of belonging through a common 
lineage that substantiates discourse.   
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Secretary of State John Kerry has said that India and the United States share a 
“common DNA” of ingenuity and initiative that compels both countries to create a better 
future for their successor generations.55 Secretary Kerry’s DNA metaphor encompassed 
the breadth of familial substance.  The literal meaning of DNA as a biological connection 
extended to a constructed meaning of characteristics that are part of a people’s genetic 
make-up.  
A biological relationship offers a direct correlation between physical and socially 
constructed familial substance.  Familial substance may also engender a “spiritualized” 
sense of belonging, in which identification achieves a connection among individuals with 
a shared nationality or ideology.  Functioning between the material and the symbolic, 
participants in discourse construct a memory of a shared founder, covenant, constitution, 
act, or experience.56 
Through the process of co-constructing cultural memory, individuals form a 
rhetorical community whose members recognize in each other the “rightness” of how 
they interpret external events and explain their own actions in response.  This degree of 
correspondence reaches further into constructed meanings and symbolic representations 
to promote a vicarious sense of kinship.57  At the highest degree of symbolic 
representation, discourse takes place completely in the symbolic realm, with expressions 
such as “we are brothers in the cause of human liberty.”58  U.S. and Indian proponents of 
the 123 Agreement wove together threads of parentage to construct a kinship narrative 
that achieved a high degree of correspondence between the material and symbolic. This 
accomplishment may be attributed to the unique rhetorical resources available to one 
proponent in particular.  
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Congressman Joe Wilson was a vocal proponent of the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement.  During World War II, Congressman Wilson’s father served in India as a 
member of the Flying Tigers, which allowed the Congressman to construct a uniquely 
personal tie between himself and the Indian people.  Congressman Wilson introduced this 
connection so frequently during interviews and congressional hearings that it became his 
rhetorical signature in the debate, typified in the following interjection in a September 
2005 House International Relations Committee hearing:  “My dad served in India during 
World War II and so I grew up with an appreciation of the people of India.  He told me 
how hard working they were, entrepreneurial, and now we see that coming to fruition.”59   
Congressman Wilson expanded on this connection during his participation in a 
Congressional Delegation (CODEL) visit to India in January 2006:  
What was very meaningful to me is that I had a picture of my father standing in 
front of the Taj Mahal, in March 1944, and I stood on the exact same sandstone 
location and had my picture taken, with the Taj Mahal in the background.  It was 
so emotional to me, so heart-warming, to visit the country that he had told me all 
about – its very confident people, its very capable people, people who worked 
hard, and I saw it all first hand.60 
 
This is a thick expression of familial substance:  an iconic image that harkens India’s 
cultural soft power resources and gives permanence and intergenerational reach to the 
scene; a parental bond; and a personal and emotive statement about the experience. 
Drawing on this thick expression, Congressman Wilson expanded the circumference of 
U.S.-Indian familial ties from his own, deeply personal account.  The emotional charge of 
Congressman Wilson’s words promoted a vicarious joining in the familial bond.   
When Congressman Wilson gave Diasporans living in the United States a place in 
his story, he converted the personal into a universal experience: 
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The most important thing I got out of it was an extraordinary realization that there 
are 300 million, maybe more, Indians who have a direct family relationship with 
someone back in the U.S.  Everywhere I went, I would run into people who would 
warmly greet us and point out that they have a cousin, a son, a daughter, an 
immediate relative, living somewhere in the U.S.  It just really brought home to 
me that the close relationship that we have is going to become ever close and it 
just seemed like one happy family.61 
 
Those hearing or reading Congressman Wilson’s words could immediately place 
themselves in the narrative, whether as one of the Indians whom Congressman Wilson 
greeted during his travels, or as American neighbors, classmates, or coworkers to a son or 
a daughter of India.  The breadth of community, from 300 million people to one family 
member, gave listeners multiple ways to belong and find acceptance in this one happy 
family.  
 Other rhetors were partially successful in inviting vicarious identification through 
personal contact and lived experience.  Speaking to television talk show host Charlie 
Rose during the week prior to President Bush’s state visit, the Prime Minister Singh 
observed: 
There is hardly any middle class family in India who doesn’t have a son, a 
daughter, a son-in-law, a brother-in-law in the United States.  That is a very 
powerful new bond.  I should like to express our profound gratitude to the 
Americans of Indian origin. The way that they have conducted themselves, the 
way they have worked hard to carve out a niche for themselves in the Silicon 
Valley, I think this has also given American(s) a new idea about what India is 
capable of.62 
 
Both Congressman Wilson and Prime Minister Singh constructed an image of the Indian 
people that privileged their industriousness.  Congressman Wilson characterized the 
Indian people as confident, capable, and hard-working; Prime Minister Singh drew on the 
popular image of the Indian entrepreneur.  In contrast to Congressman Wilson’s common 
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vernacular as a “man of the people,” Prime Minister Singh spoke magnanimously in the 
voice of an authority figure.  
Drawing on familial substance as a source for rhetorical invention absent a 
genealogical or Diasporic tie, rhetors fell back to familiarity in its broadest (and most 
shallow) sense, as we hear in this statement from Secretary Rice:  
The need for democracies to have a strong realization of the concept of upward 
mobility is absolutely fundamental.  And so, education is more a key in a 
democracy than in any kind of system.  And one of the things I have been very 
proud of is we do have students going back and forth and some of the brightest 
students of India came to the United States.  Indeed, some of the brightest 
students in the United States—I taught some of them at Stanford—go to India.63 
 
Secretary Rice placed herself in the role of observer rather than a member of the 
binational community.  Her constructed role as faculty member widened physical and 
emotional distance. In fairness, the familial reference in this passage is a contextual 
element that buttresses the Secretary’s larger point on education.  As such, the statement 
solicits an interpretation in which Secretary Rice’s affinity for the Indian people is 
presumed.  A more personalized telling of her experience at Stanford, conveying her 
connection to her students rather than the educational system, would have opened the 
possibility of response instead of repose.      
 Familial substance cues us to the depth of identification.  In his exploration of 
language and identity, Gary Woodward wrote that “it is surprising we have so few 
constructs that allow us to characterize levels of intensity for identifications.”64  Gerald 
Hauser’s work with human rights rhetoric offers a rejoinder to Woodward, distinguishing 
between “thin” expressions that are abstract, offered in a third-person voice on victims’ 
behalf, and “thick” expressions in which survivors of human rights abuses speak for 
themselves.65  A “thick” vernacular is value-laden, culturally translated and situated, and 
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particularized as opposed to universal.  It lauds ordinary rather than heroic virtues and 
renders judgment in response to ordinary vices.66  
My critique suggests that individuals engaging in diplomatic discourse will be 
better able to initiate and manage soft power processes of attraction by adopting Hauser’s 
thick vocabulary, or by cultivating support from surrogates who are personally or 
culturally attuned.  The thin versus thick distinction is helpful in critiquing a rhetor’s 
incorporation of familial substance to create identification.  Familial substance is thin 
when the connection asserted is to a representative of a collective, absent an affective 
subtext.  Familial substance is thick when the connection is expressed through talk that is 
personalized, individualized, and emotive.  A thin discourse places the rhetor in the role 
of observer or commentator.  A thick discourse places the rhetor in the narrative of 
experience.  
Comparing accounts, Congressman Wilson’s narrative was personalized and 
thick; Prime Minister Singh’s was depersonalized and thin.  Congressman Wilson could 
make present the familial ties forged in a time of war; his father, and the fathers of those 
to whom he spoke, were brothers in arms, fighting for the same cause.  His story tightly 
wound past, present, and future.  Owing to his Office, the Prime Minister constructed the 
familial as a symbolic rather than a biological tie.  Prime Minister Singh assumed a 
paternal role, and spoke as head of a national family.  The abstraction does not negate a 
vicarious association; it is only in contrast to Congressman Wilson’s unique rhetorical 
resources that we may appreciate the distinction.   
The kinship narrative promoted identification through a vicarious sense of 
belonging.  Rhetoric pulled the familial substance of identification into accounts of U.S.-
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Indian affinity, involving the audience as active participants who assumed the obligation 
to realize India’s move from outside to inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The 
emotional pull of the kinship narrative added texture to the logic-based narratives of why 
India should move from outside to inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  When 
rhetors braided together the exceptionalism, deliverance, and kinship narratives, they 
constructed a new meaning for the nonproliferation regime itself, from a class of nation-
states based on legal standing, to a community of nations committed to combatting the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons while sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
cooperation. 
 
Augmenting Soft Power Theory and Practice through Identification 
In this chapter and the next, I set out to answer the question of how the U.S.-India 
123 Agreement evolved from an idea about nuclear cooperation into a discourse that 
transformed the U.S.-India strategic partnership.  Rhetoric-as-persuasion does not 
satisfactorily explain the power of discourse to transform the context, social order, and 
substance of the U.S.-India relationship.  Transformation became possible only when 
leaders of both the United States and India explored new ways of defining themselves 
and their interests, their partners in discourse, and the global context in which they 
conducted diplomacy.     
Kenneth Burke’s theorizing on the process of identification grounds my 
understanding of the transformative power of discourse in the diplomatic arena.  
Identification is the constitutive process through which U.S. and Indian leaders overcame 
their estrangement and poised themselves for concerted action.  In this chapter, I explored 
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the rhetorical act of courtship as an initial deepening of identification.  By performing the 
rhetorical act of courtship, U.S. and Indian leaders compensated for the artificial division 
imposed by the opposing placements of India and the United States outside and inside the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime.  
The rhetorical act of courtship reduced recalcitrance emanating from India’s 
doctrine of strategic autonomy.  Participating in the hail and response of courtship, the 
United States and India validated their respective assessments of the other as an attractive 
and worthy partner.  An exceptionalism narrative co-constructed by U.S. and Indian 
rhetors celebrated both nations’ character and accomplishments.  By making the United 
States and India consubstantial in their obligations to stand as models of democracy, 
discourse established a consonance of place and people that transformed India’s position.  
This discourse changed the perspective on India’s relationship to the nonproliferation 
regime and with the United States. No longer would India’s position define the 
correctness of its actions; rather, India’s actions would determine its correct position, 
meaning its belonging within the community of responsible, cooperating nation-states. 
The hail and response of courtship allowed participants to rhetorically perform the 
movement that the 123 Agreement would achieve by incorporating India’s strategic 
autonomy as a fundamental rationale.  The deliverance narrative emanated from India’s 
sense of isolation and desire to join the mainstream of international nuclear cooperation.  
As an act of rhetorical courtship, the deliverance narrative failed to deepen identification 
between the United States and India.  Nonetheless, the narrative worked as subtext to 
frame India’s isolation as an outcome of an injustice imposed by the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty at its inception. India’s isolation was not due to the overt actions 
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of previous leaders of India or the United States.  Rather, India’s placement was a 
mistake of history that required a corrective.  India’s actions as a responsible nuclear 
weapons state were incongruous with its isolation. The deliverance narrative thus 
predisposed rhetors to privilege India’s record of upholding nonproliferation norms.   
The deliverance narrative evolved to locate action in the 123 Agreement itself.  
Although the deliverance narrative per se came to a natural end before U.S. and Indian 
perspectives fully meshed, discourses assigned agency to the Agreement.  The text would 
embody a reciprocal, resilient, and comprehensive strategic partnership.  Synecdoche of 
the Agreement and bilateral partnership is more apparent in an additional narrative—
which I call the convergence narrative—that unified American and Indian national 
interests.  I will explore the convergence narrative in depth in the next chapter.        
Lastly, the rhetorical act of courtship resolved the ambiguity between autonomy 
and belongingness, weighing in favor of the latter in a compensatory move.  Rhetors 
fulfilled this need with a narrative of kinship and the construction of familial ties. 
Benefitting from personalized and thick accounts of familial ties, the kinship narrative 
fulfilled the rhetorical act of courtship by promoting a sense of belongingness.  The 
kinship narrative pulled familial substances of identification into the American-Indian 
experience, drawing more participants into the hail and response of courtship with their 
vicarious support.  The kinship narrative possessed an emotive pull and magnetism that 
carried parties across the threshold, taking the step from courtship to union.   
The hail and response of courtship is a “testing out” of partners’ suitability and 
affinity that allows either or both partners to call the whole thing off.  Indeed, there were 
inflection points in the course of the debate and bilateral negotiations on the 123 
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Agreement that could have led one or both sides to abandon their cooperative efforts.  
Courtship put the United States and India on a path toward a permanent and resilient 
strategic partnership.  To complete the act of courtship, rhetors would need to achieve 
unity of purpose and action, which Burke called “consubstantiation.”   
 In the next chapter, I likewise take the step across the threshold, using my 
understanding of courtship to critique the narratives that made the United States and India 
consubstantial in their values, purposes, and actions.  This chapter and next work together 
to offer an alternative telos for soft power.  For consubstantiation is a transcendence of held 
identities, and transcendence is a type of convergence that is fulfilled in the formation of a 
union.  And it is the unity of action, purposes, and principles that best captures the 
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Rhetorical Enactments:  From Estranged to Engaged 
  
This chapter concerns the United States’ and India’s bilateral diplomatic move 
from estranged to engaged.  I explain this move as an achievement that began with the 
rhetorical act of courtship.  Courtship is an ever-deepening form of identification that is 
contingent in the future.  As courtship progresses, uncertainty is wrung out of the 
relationship and replaced with a sense of optimism.  If the diplomatic move is a 
transformation of relations from estranged to engaged, the companion rhetorical move is 
a transformation of relations from contingent to permanent.  Those courting intuit and 
express the “rightness” and inevitability of their union.  Working through my critique of 
soft power diplomacy, I wanted to understand how participants in discourse embraced 
and enacted this idea of permanent union.   
In the previous chapter I captured how discourse effectuated India’s move from 
outside to inside the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  Further, I explored how discourse 
established India’s place and belongingness in the community of cooperating nuclear 
states.  When the United States and India were estranged, nuclear diplomacy relied on 
coercive tactics such as sanctions and export controls.  Discourse rested in persuasive 
strategies to justify U.S. and international policies that kept India in isolation until it 
changed its ways.  I touch on these coercive tactics very briefly to sharpen the distinction 
between hard and soft power approaches.  My critique centers on a period of engagement 
when discourse promoted cooperation to achieve mutual aims and benefits in political, 
economic, and social development.    
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Rhetoric needed to reshape the conditions and material facts upon which nuclear 
diplomacy was based.  Even if India were inside the nuclear club, that change of status 
alone would have been insufficient for the United States and India to share an orientation 
toward the global order, global threats, and global possibilities.  Once accepted within the 
system of cooperating nuclear states, India could have pursued bilateral ties with 
countries other than the United States.  Not to be discounted, nation-states inside the 
nuclear club—including India—maintained their prerogative to exercise power in all its 
forms, including the projection of military force and punitive measures.  U.S. and Indian 
leaders chose to stake their interests in strategic partnership—achieving mutually 
beneficial ends through joint action.  
The United States and India activated a shared world view.  Their world view 
emanated from a set of assumptions and conditions for making sense of world events, and 
promoted a shared interpretation of actions taken by themselves, by each other, and by 
third-party actors in the international scene.  Diplomacy presumes the necessity of an 
acting-together of nation-states.  When two nation-states approach the world and each 
other with shared interpretative frames and purposes, strategic cooperation naturally 
follows.   
Burke observed that “a way of life is an acting-together; and in acting together, 
men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that make them 
consubstantial.”1  Consubstantiation is the deepening of identification that gives the act 
of courtship momentum toward and proximity to unification.  My reading of Burke tells 
me that unification occurs in moments, but can never be total or unending.  Unification—
to communicate naturally, spontaneously, and totally as part of our very essence—is an 
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ideal.  Soft power diplomacy does rhetorical work by holding open these moments of 
unification. When appreciated as a mode of constitutive rhetoric, soft power discourses 
make participants consubstantial in a human endeavor.2  My overarching argument is that 
these rhetorically constructed moments of unification transformed the U.S.-India bilateral 
relationship into strategic partnership.   
 
The Hard Power Cycle 
The hard power cycle aptly describes the broad patterns of bilateral nuclear 
diplomacy prior to the U.S.-India 123 Agreement.  The pattern entailed an external event 
that spurred India to take unilateral action in its nuclear program, which in turn resulted 
in coercive measures such as sanctions imposed by the United States and other members 
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, followed by a thaw and efforts at comprise, but 
eventually leading back to unilateral action and punishment.  In this section, I condense 
40 years of nuclear diplomacy to a few emblems around which the hard power cycle 
revolved.  These examples capture in microcosm the freezing and thawing of the U.S.-
India relationship prior to the U.S.-India 123 Agreement.   
In chapter 2, I explained India’s adherence to its foreign policy doctrine of 
strategic autonomy.  Strategic autonomy seeded India’s world view and diplomatic 
discourse in a way that for many years justified India’s unilateralism.  Strategic autonomy 
also had a kinetic consequence, catalyzing and recharging cycles of hard power 
diplomacy.  Strategic autonomy was not only an irritant that called forth a rhetorical 
response, but also a barrier to long-term engagement.  If the relationship were to be 
transformed into strategic partnership, persuasive appeals to justify actions and defend 
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policies could not be countenanced; rhetors would need to break the hard power cycle 
and replace it with a more virtuous circle of reciprocity.   
 
Sanctions 
Two types of hard power tactics, sanctions and export controls, drove this hard 
power cycle.  India’s underground nuclear tests spurred the first tactic.  India conducted 
the nuclear tests to signal its capacity to develop nuclear weapons independently.  In 
response, America and the international community imposed sanctions to check the 
militarization of India’s nuclear program.   
On May 18, 1974, India successfully conducted a test explosion of an 
underground nuclear device at Pokharan, in the deserts of Rajasthan; the test is referred to 
as Pokharan I.3  The official reaction from the State Department framed the issue as a 
matter of global security, stating that “The United States has always been against nuclear 
proliferation because of the adverse impact it will have on world stability.”4  In Pokharan 
I’s wake, the United States created the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), composed of 
most of the countries capable of making equipment necessary to the research and 
development and operation of peaceful nuclear technology.5  The NSG added a 
multilateral dimension to U.S.-led efforts to entice nuclear weapons states to sign the 
Nonproliferation Treaty, or to isolate those who refused.   
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi argued steadfastly that Pokharan I advanced India’s 
pursuit of peaceful uses of nuclear technology; to claim that India wanted to produce 
nuclear weapons was a non sequitur.  This argument lacked convincingness, given the 
era’s tautology of nuclear programs for nuclear weapons, in which multiple meanings of 
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nuclear power collapsed into one register.6  Analysts reduced India’s history with a 
variety of nuclear programs to a pre-determined path with weapons development as a 
singular outcome.7   
Pokharan I made an indelible impression on public discourses regarding nuclear 
weapons, demanding repeated assurances from the Government of India that it was 
committed to nonproliferation.  During President Carter’s January 1978 state visit to 
India, President Reddy made clear that the Government of India shared the world’s 
abhorrence at the prospect of nuclear war: 
In the final instance, peace will remain fragile if nuclear weapons, capable of such 
annihilative destruction, are kept and multiplied.  We appreciate the concern and 
sincerity which you have expressed at these dangers and the efforts you are 
making to arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 8   
 
President Reddy also used the occasion to frame the Government of India’s stance on the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime and India’s right to pursue nuclear development for 
peaceful purposes without sanction:  
For our part, we have unilaterally abjured the development of such means of mass 
destruction.  But, Mr. President, we hope that you will agree with the dangers of 
nuclear war, by accident or design, will remain, until such time as all nations, 
without arbitrary distinctions, join in a firm commitment for the progressive 
reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons from all parts of the world.  
The challenge demands not just restraints from nuclear weapons but pledges by 
the nuclear “haves” to turn away from the use of this instrument of modern 
science for military purposes.  But, in the meanwhile, must countries who have no 
nuclear weapons be inhibited from using nuclear science as an instrument for 
economic transformation?  I would like to emphasize with a full sense of 
responsibility that India, for her part, will not indulge in the perverse use of 
nuclear science.9 
 
This statement holds traces of the narratives that would be recast through discourses on 
the U.S.-India 123 Agreement.  We hear in President Reddy’s remarks the belief that the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime was a discriminatory system that divided nation-states 
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into nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” based on accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty.  The question regarding the benefits of nuclear science for economic development 
savored of indignation.  This plaint notwithstanding, the Government of India’s pledge to 
refrain from nuclear weapons development (but reserving the right to continue nuclear 
tests) helped return the bilateral relationship to a state of normalcy.  
The Government’s commitment would be codified in the U.S.-India Delhi 
Declaration, signed on January 3, 1978.  Marking the occasion, President Carter 
proclaimed “our belief that each individual has inalienable rights, our commitment to 
justice among nations and within societies, and our determination that disputes must be 
resolved without violence, especially in this age when nuclear weapons threaten the total 
destruction of humankind.”10  During Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai’s state visit to 
Washington in June 1978, he spoke of “a similar vision of building a world free from 
strife and tension.”11  President Carter stated that India had “reaffirmed its commitment 
not acquire nuclear weapons and to refrain from the explosion of peaceful nuclear 
devices.”12 
Nearly two decades passed before the prospect of India’s renewal of nuclear 
testing rose to the level that warranted a stronger deterrent.  In December 1995, Indian 
Prime Minister Vajpayee halted plans for a second nuclear weapons test when the United 
States threatened additional sanctions.  The Prime Minister reversed himself in May 
1998, with two tests conducted on the 11th and the 13th of that month, referred to as 
Pokharan II.  President Clinton, who “was personally irked,” issued the following 




They’re a very great country.  … But to think that you have to manifest your 
greatness by behavior that recalls the very worst events of the 20th century on the 
edge of the 21st century, when everybody else is trying to leave the nuclear age 
behind, is just wrong.  It is just wrong.  And they clearly don’t need to maintain 
their security, vis-à-vis China, Pakistan, or anybody else.13 
 
American and international reaction was swift.  The Clinton Administration imposed 
economic sanctions.  Additionally, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172, 
passed unanimously on June 11, 1998, put in place a full set of markers for international 
acceptance of India’s nuclear program, including India’s signing the Nonproliferation 
Treaty.14   
Circumstances varied between Pokharan I and Pokharan II.  Each test took place 
against a complicated economic, security, and political backdrop, and generated nuclear 
rhetorics and arguments particular to its bilateral and regional diplomatic context.  For 
my purposes, I subsume the particulars to hit home a different point.  To break the cycle, 
India would need to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty—the very thing that had catalyzed 
the process of unilateral action and punitive reaction. 
 
Export Controls 
Sanctions were not the only coercive measure used in the attempt to gain India’s 
compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime.  Shipments of enriched uranium 
necessary to run India’s civilian nuclear power plants gave the United States bargaining 
power.  In order to receive enriched uranium, India would have to open its nuclear 
facilities to inspection in order to verify that its safeguards were sufficient to prevent the 
diversion of fuel for weapons production.  The Tarapur nuclear power plant was 
132 
  
emblematic of this hard-edged bargaining tactic that held sway over nuclear cooperation 
from the mid-1950s through the 1990s.  
Tarapur had its beginnings in President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program, 
under which India and the United States began a bilateral conversation on civilian nuclear 
cooperation.  India’s Atomic Energy Chairman Homi Bhabha argued that building a 
nuclear power plant in India would demonstrate dramatically U.S. support for peaceful 
uses of atomic energy in the Third World.  American Ambassador to India Ellsworth 
Bunker added his own argument in support, that India would build the plant with Soviet 
assistance if the United States refused.15  Following feasibility studies and negotiations 
over nuclear safeguards including India’s exclusive use of U.S.-supplied enriched 
uranium, the United States and India signed the Tarapur agreement in May 1963.16 
The exclusivity of supply was intended as a safeguard.  Prior to Pokharan I, the 
United States routinely exported enriched uranium to India for Tarapur’s starter or feeder 
fuel.  After Pokharan I, the export of enriched uranium became a bargaining chip. The 
1974 shipment was delayed pending receipt of India’s written assurances that special 
nuclear material would not be diverted from Tarapur for other uses.17   
Tarapur remained in limbo through America’s elections in 1976, and President 
Carter—who ran on a nuclear nonproliferation campaign plank—not only continued the 
quid pro quo but also upped the ante.  In remarks with reporters on a formal review of 
U.S. nuclear policy, President Carter acknowledged concern about the precedent of 




I think it’s obvious that some of the countries about whom we are concerned have 
used their domestic nuclear power plants to develop explosive capability … India, 
which is basically a peaceful nation, at least as far as worldwide connotations are 
concerned, did evolve an explosive capability from supplies that were given to 
them by the Canadians and by us.  And we feel that there are other nations that 
have potential capacity already for the evolution of explosives.  But we are trying 
to make sure that from this point on that the increasing number of nations that 
might have joined the nuclear nations is attenuated drastically.18 
 
To paraphrase the President’s stance colloquially:  fool us once, shame on you, fool us 
twice, shame on us.  This excerpt hints at why the Government of India would perceive 
the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a system of denial rather than cooperation. We 
also hear an early vestige of the “slippery slope” argument favored by opponents of the 
U.S-India 123 Agreement.  In an exchange with reporters during a May 1977 
international economic summit, President Carter said: 
The nations who do produce large amounts of enriched fuel like ourselves, have a 
great deal of influence on the others.  And, of course, we want to be fair to them 
because it’s a very divisive political issue in some of the countries.  They want to 
retain their legitimate independence and autonomy.  They don’t want other 
nations like ourselves telling them how to act.  And still, I think, there was a 
unanimous belief that unless we do take action, that there will be a lot of other of 
the so-called threshold nations who will produce explosives in the future, as India 
did a few years ago.  And all of us want to prevent that.19 
 
In his remarks, President Carter acknowledged but dismissed India’s doctrine of strategic 
autonomy.  It was outweighed by the U.S. responsibility to prevent nuclear proliferation 
and the precedent that India created when it conducted underground nuclear tests.   
 The U.S policy review established the justification for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, a cornerstone of the Carter Administration’s nuclear policy.20  
The Act mandated that a country’s eligibility for civilian nuclear cooperation included 
consent to place all nuclear facilities under international safeguards (i.e., full scope 
safeguards).21 On the one hand, President Carter committed to Indian Prime Minister 
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Desai that shipments of nuclear fuel would be made available for Tarapur,22 On the other 
hand, and under the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act, India’s continued 
ability to generate power at Tarapur became hostage to U.S. demands that India allow 
inspectors inside all of its nuclear facilities.   
 President Carter put political capital behind continued fuel exports for Tarapur 
only to maintain the dialogue on bringing all of India’s nuclear facilities under 
international safeguards.23  President Carter made explicit reference to this quid-pro-quo 
when transmitting an executive order to Congress requesting export of special nuclear 
material to India: 
The Government of India has given us its commitments to use our exports only at 
the Tarapur Atomic Power Station and not for any explosive or military purpose, 
and I have the highest confidence that it will honor these commitments.  I am 
convinced that denial of this export would seriously undermine our efforts to 
persuade India to accept full-scope safeguards, and would seriously prejudice the 
achievement of other U.S. non-proliferation goals.24 
 
And reiterated in a June 1980 message to Congress:   
India’s failure to accept international safeguards on all its peaceful nuclear 
activities and its failure to commit itself not to conduct further nuclear explosions 
are of serious concern to me.  These exports will help us to maintain a dialogue 
with India in which we try to narrow our differences on these issues.  The exports 
will avoid the risk of a claim by India that the United States has broken an 
existing agreement between the two governments and has thereby relieved India 
of its obligation to refrain from reprocessing the fuel previously supplied by the 
United States.25 
 
The quid-pro-quo was clear, but even more significant was the lack of trust revealed in 
President Carter’s remarks. The President implied that India was waiting for an excuse to 
militarize its nuclear program.  Absent the carrot-and-stick of continued fuel exports and 
sanctions, India would pursue its own interests, to include nuclear weapons development.  
The Government of India responded to President Carter’s bargaining with a move of its 
135 
  
own, reiterating its view that safeguards must apply equally to all countries engaged in 
civilian nuclear development and calling for the creation of an international panel of 
experts who would examine the question of safeguarding nuclear installations around the 
world.26 
 As President Reagan took office, U.S.-India nuclear cooperation and fuel supplies 
to Tarapur remained unresolved.  Indira Gandhi flirted with the idea of denouncing the 
Tarapur agreement, which would have required India to either produce an indigenous 
feeder fuel or obtain enriched uranium from the Soviet Union.27  Instead, the Prime 
Minister publicly ruled out unilateral action on Tarapur, informing her parliamentary 
advisers that any decision to terminate the fuel supply agreement would be taken in the 
context of India’s national interest and overall bilateral relations with the United States.28  
The end result was a settlement on Tarapur, under which India agreed to maintain nuclear 
safeguards on the plant in exchange for enriched uranium fuel from France.29   
Like the Pokharan underground nuclear tests, negotiations over Tarapur and fuel 
exports were conducted against an evolving scene of international and domestic politics 
and influenced by differing degrees of personal affinity between the heads of state.  My 
more narrow interest in Tarapur relates to its role in perpetuating the hard-power cycle.  
Prime Minister Gandhi’s stance on Tarapur was a decisive gesture from Indian 
independence toward a recognition of mutual interests. In this regard, Tarapur made a 
distinction in how India promoted its strategic autonomy, taking unilateral action in its 
nuclear weapons program and cooperative action in its civil nuclear program.   
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made a pragmatic decision to achieve a settlement 
amidst the hard bargaining tactics employed by both sides.  A period of U.S.-Indian 
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bonhomie followed.  When her successor Rajiv Gandhi met with President Reagan in 
October 1987, he sought recognition as America’s partner in technological progress and 
congratulated President Reagan on the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement.  President 
Reagan attributed concrete bilateral achievements to the two nation-states’ dedication to 
democracy, and expressed his renewed confidence to set ambitious new goals.30  
 
Breaking Free 
Balancing the 1998 sanctions imposed after Pokharan II with Administration 
policies for international development, the Clinton Administration introduced a new 
negotiation tactic.  The nuclear “carve out” simultaneously advanced bilateral interests 
where consensus allowed without ceding ground on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear 
safeguards.31  The negotiating tactic essentially bracketed nuclear cooperation to allow 
progress on bilateral objectives including global health, global economic growth, 
democracy, and human rights and labor.32  As explained by President Clinton, the 
Nonproliferation Treaty “should be seen in the context of the whole relationship. … the 
differences remain, but in the context of our common interests and our common values, 
we believe they can be managed in a very constructive way and still allow this 
relationship to grow and strengthen.”33   
The carve out created a manageable and acceptable co-existence of cooperation in 
areas of mutual interest, and sanctions and hard bargaining deemed necessary to gain 
India’s accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty.  It also allowed President Clinton to 
express empathy for India’s security concerns:  “Any dialog (sic) we have with India on 
this would be in the context of what is pivotal for India’s security:  How can we enhance 
your security, not diminish it?  It would be wrong for the United States to tell your great 
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nation, or the smallest nation on the face of the Earth, that we recommend a course of 
action for them that would reduce security.”34  
At the start of the new millennium, bilateral progress in science and technology 
cooperation outpaced and became stymied by export controls on dual-use, high 
technology.  In the words of Indian Prime Minister Rao, during his state visit in May 
1994, “the President and I agreed that we have an unprecedented opportunity to free 
India-U.S. relations from the distortions induced by the Cold War, to look for areas of 
converging interest in the changed international situation, and work together for our 
mutual benefit.”35  The nuclear carve out made the disconnect between civil nuclear 
cooperation and other aspects of the relationship more apparent.  Nonetheless, neither 
country felt a sense of urgency to change the status quo. The 9/11 attacks would 
introduce that urgency.  
The 9/11 attacks refocused nonproliferation experts’ attention toward non-state 
actors’ proclivity to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. This counter-terrorism 
frame connected nuclear nonproliferation with global security, creating an impetus to 
revisit diplomatic tactics. Perhaps aided by the ability to cross-fertilize terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation, two transnational threats whose amelioration depended on nation-
states working together, both sides began to reassess their quid-pro-quo bargaining 
behavior.   
The exigence of the 9/11 attacks led to concrete, if incremental, confidence-
building steps including structured bilateral dialogues and cooperative agreements that 
generated greater latitude for rhetorical work. The U.S. Government lifted the 1998 
sanctions on India. The lifting of sanctions permitted the two governments to form the 
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U.S.-India High Technology Cooperation Group, which led in turn to increased dual use 
technology exports. India consented to a U.S. export control attaché to monitor end-use 
of U.S. technology transfers, in exchange for the United States’ removing the Indian 
Space Research Organization from the Entity List, thus repealing extraordinary licensing 
and regulatory requirements for technology exports.   
In 2004, the United States and India formally launched a strategic dialogue with 
reciprocal steps for civilian nuclear regulatory and safety issues, space cooperation, and 
expansion of high-tech commerce.  In July 2005, on the eve of a state visit by Prime 
Minister Singh, the Indian Parliament passed a bill titled “WMD and Their Delivery 
Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities).”  The legislation brought India’s export 
control regime in conformity with U.S. and international export controls.36 
When President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Singh embarked on the path 
toward strategic partnership, they tacitly repudiated the past decades’ hard power tactics 
as a means to gain India’s accession to the international nonproliferation regime.  The 
joint declaration and subsequent debate on a U.S.-India 123 Agreement broke the hard 
power cycle of sanctions and coercive bargaining.  This qualitative change in approach 
defined a watershed moment that would make bilateral diplomatic engagement durable 
and resilient. 
 
Soft Power Diplomacy:  Rhetorical Strategies to Achieve Bilateral Unity  
Breaking free of the hard power cycle was a precursor to the hard work of 
building a bilateral partnership.  I began my inquiry with the premise that discourses 
constructed a mutually desirable future state of relations that the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement would fulfill.  My critique explores how discourse created and held open 
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moments when the United States and India could imagine and enact a permanent union, 
achieved through shared ideological commitments.  My critique also alights on 
discourses that constituted community, paying particular attention to the transformation 
of political identity experienced by the Diaspora community.  Lastly, my critique 
introduces “convergence” as a discursive frame through which participants in the debate 
reinterpreted the post-Cold War scene and strategic interests, establishing a synecdochic 
relationship between the U.S.-India 123 Agreement and strategic partnership.    
 
Unity of Ideals:  A Shared Commitment to Democracy  
In this section, I explore how U.S. and Indian rhetors created and held open 
moments of unification.  Specifically, I critique their successful co-construction of 
ideologically-charged terms of commitment, called ideographs.37  Ideographs chart 
changes in perspective and orientation that underlie identification and prompt concerted 
action.  “Freedom,” “liberty,” and “equality” are examples of words that have the 
potential to function ideographically.1 These words possess the potential to call disparate 
individuals into a community to take collective action based on the gestalt of the word’s 
historical and contemporaneous meaning and nuance.38     
Given my overarching aim to understand how the United States and India remade 
their relationship in the form of a permanent union, my rhetorical critique explores how 
ideographs generated a sense of bilateral unity in a specific moment. This form of 
ideographic critique, called synchronic critique, focuses on a clustering of terms within 
                                                 
1 In the presentation of rhetorical critique, quote marks indicate a referential use of a common now, i.e., 
“democracy.”  When a word is placed between carrots, this indicates that the term is functioning 
ideographically in its rhetorical context, i.e., <democracy>. 
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the same time period.  Synchronic critique generates insight from terms’ 
interconnectedness, and charts the coherence of meaning created by and for participants 
in discourse at that moment of inflection.  Synchronic usage unifies a community in their 
co-construction of an ideograph’s meaning, or in the generation of transformed 
ideographs that transcend differences of meaning rooted in lived experience.   
When individuals invoke an ideograph in discourse, they open the possibility of 
changing its meaning.  Rhetorically, this occurs in the back-and-forth of striving toward 
an ideal and assigning meaning to concrete experience. As an ideal, “democracy” 
contains the full potentiality of meaning—how things ought to be—of which only a sliver 
can be represented in discourse.  As part of everyday experience, “democracy” entails a 
set of expectations for how things are done. Electing a group leader, blogging on current 
events, and avoiding or patronizing restaurants in a show of protest or support (to vote 
with one’s feet) represent the familiar rituals and habits that keep democracy’s 
ideographic potential at the ready. The interplay between ideals and experience 
introduces fresh nuance that in turn refocuses an ideograph’s interpretative lens that frees 
participants in discourse to imagine alternative futures and paths forward.    
 
Co-constructing <Democracy>  
“Democracy” is a long-standing trope of U.S.-Indian relations premised on the 
joining of the world’s oldest and largest democracies.  When President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh announced their intent to pursue full civilian nuclear cooperation, they 
opened <democracy> to new meanings and interpretations.  My critique describes how 
U.S. and Indian rhetors transcended their division by reaching toward the same 
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idealization of <democracy>, celebrated in discourse and lauded in lived experience as 
pluralism.  When textured with pluralism, <democracy> became a universal value that 
transcended the divide of geography, history, and national experience. 
Prime Minister Singh’s July 2005 state visit presented an opportunity to achieve 
consubstantiation, effectuated through the hail and response of courtship.  President 
Bush’s welcoming remarks, however, failed to tap into the potency of the moment.  Note 
the partitioning of nations, and issues, in President Bush’s welcome to Prime Minister 
Singh: 
We meet as leaders of two great democracies committed to working together for a 
better and safer world.  Your visit reflects the growing bonds of cooperation 
between your nation and mine. … Our nations believe in freedom, and our nations 
are confronting global terrorism.  As diplomatic partners, we’re meeting this 
threat in our own nations and abroad.  And as economic partners, we’re working 
around the world to displace hatred and violence with prosperity, hope, and 
optimism.  India’s embrace of democracy and human rights has ensured that its 
great diversity will remain a national strength.39   
 
Whereas President Bush drew upon a shared belief in freedom, independent action 
remained uppermost in the constitution of the moment.  The two nations were 
confronting terrorism in their particular spheres of influence.  In the President’s world 
view, democracy inoculated a society against the global threat of terrorism.  Believing in 
freedom and confronting global terrorism were distinct actions.   
In the President’s world view, the partnership between the United States and India 
was additive of economic and diplomatic gains.  The two countries’ independent actions 
happened to place them on the same trajectory, with an overlap of mutual aims that was 
more coincidental than deliberate. The President’s formulation placed a premium on past 
demonstrations of partnership in the diplomatic and economic arenas. The grammar 
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revealed an inductive logic:  if India were a good economic partner, and if India were a 
good diplomatic partner, then it followed that India would be a good security partner.   
President Bush made pluralism instrumental to the global war on terrorism, as a 
means to ameliorate grievances and to provide a bulwark against violent extremism. 
India’s diversity was instrumental to the country’s ability to act.  Whereas President Bush 
made democracy and human rights the simultaneous genesis and product of diversity, 
diversity remained bound to the nation-state.  The United States and India did not yet 
possess a holistic or total understanding of each other or the world they jointly inhabited.  
The President’s discourse established a pragmatic frame through which to 
interpret the means and ends cooperative action.  This sense of pragmatism worked with 
soft power discourse, offering an enlightened view of compromise that did not require 
naming of winners and losers.  Nations acting together could achieve much in the world 
without diminishing their position or jeopardizing their interests.  Compromise no longer 
implied the loss of advantage.  The President’s work with pluralism was pragmatic 
because it framed values-in-action as a way of doing.   
A more idealistic frame emerged in Prime Minister Singh’s discourse, in which 
values were both embodied and enacted—a way of being from which action naturally 
sprung. Prime Minister Singh asserted that the two nations’ ideological commitments 
were integral to their relationship and an impetus for acting together:    
We share a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, 
pluralism and rule of law.  We face common challenges that threaten our way of 
life and values that both our countries hold dear.  We share a common resolve and 
a common responsibility to meet those challenges.  Mr. President, your personal 
commitment to our relations is widely appreciated in India.  I am confident that 
from our talks today will emerge an agenda of cooperation that reflects a real 




Prime Minister Singh changed the locus of action from “our two” to “we.”  The change 
of locus indicated that the courtship between India and the United States was developing 
a sense of mutual obligation, the type of obligation that emerges freely from deepening 
identification.  By pairing “we” with “our relationship,” Prime Minister Singh blended 
the personal and representational roles that characterize gatherings of heads of state.  The 
progression translated personal admiration into national affinity.  In place of President 
Bush’s partitioning of economic and political aims, Prime Minister Singh constructed a 
holistic frame for partnership.  In contrast to President Bush’s pragmatic view of 
pluralism and partnership, Prime Minister Singh spoke idealistically of a common resolve 
and common challenges, an acting together.  
Prime Minister Singh’s choice of pluralism, rather than diversity, and the addition 
of rule of law in the cluster of <democracy>’s related terms, moved the dialogue toward 
governance. Governance can be interpreted as an instrumental term, the means by which 
public and private codes of conduct produce societal benefit.  Governance can also be 
contextualized as an idealistic term, as good governance implies a set of core values such 
as fairness, stewardship, and human rights and dignity.  In this regard, the idealism that 
seeped through Prime Minister Singh’s statement was empowering, turning means into 
the combination of capacity and will, which we call agency.   
The next interlude occurred during the exchange of toasts at a state dinner in 
honor of Prime Minister Singh.  President Bush’s welcoming remarks opened the 
conversation in a pragmatic tone.  Now, having heard Prime Minister Singh’s own 




Above all, India and the United States are bound together by common values.  As 
two strong, diverse democracies, we share a commitment to the success of multi-
ethnic democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.  And we believe that by 
spreading the blessings of democracy and freedom, we will ensure lasting peace 
for our own citizens and for the world.41 
 
I categorize this excerpt as having a pragmatic frame because the primary action is one of 
means and ends.  We spread democracy because it will lead to lasting peace.  The tone 
begins to change, however, as President Bush ascribed to India and United States the 
same underlying quality of democracy, naming both as “diverse democracies.”  As a 
quality, diversity was no longer instrumental, but integral, to their relationship.  President 
Bush took a step back from “what we do” to valorize “what we are.”   
 This integrity carried through to the outcomes of shared commitments, the 
“success of multi-ethnic democracy.”  In this regard, the President’s statement 
harmonized well with Prime Minister Singh’s holistic construction.  The President’s 
statement echoed Prime Minister Singh’s “we,” but only within the realm of beliefs and 
commitments.  Whereas President Bush’s rhetoric drew him closer to a unified stance, he 
stopped short of unified action.   
 “Lasting peace” was too ambiguous and broadly scoped to envision the 
possibilities for joint action. An equally desirable but more tangible aim was required.  
Prime Minister Singh recast pragmatism as joint action.  His narrative drew the United 
States and India into the action as protectors against a global threat:      
India and the United States are great nations and great democracies.  We cherish 
the openness of our societies and of our economies.  We value our pluralism, our 
diversity, and our freedoms.  These shared values that bring us together must be 
more visible not only in how we deal with each other, but also in our approach to 
the world at large.  We must strengthen democratic capacities jointly.  We must 
oppose the evil of terrorism together.  To meet such vital challenges, we must be 




In the Prime Minister’s construction, pluralism determined the quality of the act, i.e., to 
build capacity and to counter terrorism.  In turn, the quality of the act reflected upon the 
quality of national character.  Pluralism, as a quality of a society and its governance, 
provided a common characteristic in which to consubstantiate the United States and India 
in <democracy>.  Pluralism made Americans and Indians consubstantial in how they 
enacted democracy in public life and civil society.  
 
Introducing <Creativity>   
Pluralism did additional rhetorical work by cross-pollinating the political and 
economic arenas of the bilateral relationship.  In the political arena, pluralism fostered 
consubstantiality in a democratic way of life. In the economic arena, pluralism likewise 
implied diversity of thought and freedom of movement.  President Bush made the linkage 
explicit during his state visit to India in March 2006, offering reassurance that:  
The partnership between the United States and India begins with democracy and it 
does not end there. Our people share a devotion to family, a passion for learning, 
a love of the arts, and much more.  India’s innovative people have begun to look 
outward and connect to the global economy as never before.”43   
 
Through the hail and response of courtship, President Bush, Prime Minister Singh, and 
their surrogates translated pluralism into a new ideograph, <creativity>, which celebrated 
both countries’ success in unleashing the forces of global prosperity.   
By attuning pluralism to globalization, <creativity> consubstantiated the United 
States and India as builders and inaugural members of the new economy.  The new 
economy is defined as the aggregate of economic sectors that are the leading edges of 
growth and innovation, such as high technology, media, and other cultural products 
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industries.  The new economy is composed of extended networks of firms that are served 
by an extremely mobile, dynamic, and competitive workforce.44   
“Creativity” was a term in vogue prior to Prime Minister Singh’s July 2005 state 
visit.  In 2002, Tyler Cowen’s Creative Destruction:  How Globalization Is Changing the 
World’s Cultures45 landed in the bookstores.  Among Cowen’s key findings was that 
cross-cultural exchange not only alters and disrupts each society it touches, it also 
supports innovation and creative human energies.46 Technological innovation is a 
touchstone in Cowen’s book, in which he describes the adoption of technological 
innovation to enhance the character and quality of cultural products, and the role of 
technological innovation in aiding the emergence and sustenance of niche interests that 
increase the variety and diversity of cultural products.47   
Richard Florida’s essay, “The Rise of the Creative Class,”48 published in May 
2002, and his subsequently published book The Rise of the Creative Class and How It’s 
Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life,  sparked discussion among 
academics, policy planners, and business leaders.  Florida defined the creative class as “a 
fast-growing, highly educated, and well educated workforce” whose members worked in 
a wide variety of industries including technology, entertainment, journalism, finance, 
high-end manufacturing, and the arts.49 
At the “supercreative core” were scientists and engineers, university professors, 
poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects, as well as the 
“thought leadership” of modern society.  Like Cowen, Florida allied creativity and 
innovation.  Reprising his argument in the Atlantic Monthly’s October 2005 “World in 
Numbers” column, Florida wrote that creative people form and cluster around hubs of 
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innovation where “ideas flow more freely, are honed more sharply, and can be put into 
practice more quickly.”50 
By Florida’s definition, many of the individuals who stood to benefit from the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement were members of the creative class, especially those working 
in scientific and high technology fields who would be allowed to pursue collaborative, 
applied research and to initiate joint economic ventures.  The creative class also resonated 
with members of the Indian Diaspora who were making their mark in Silicon Valley and 
other top-tier creative cities such as Boston and Washington-Baltimore.51 More broadly, 
Indians who had not ventured beyond their provincial or national boundaries were 
bolstered by the belief that the new economy and its creative class of knowledge workers 
would transform the lives of ordinary people, both socially and economically—spurring 
India’s own industrial revolution.52    
The shared values that defined the creative class—creativity, individuality, 
difference, and merit53—were bound up in <creativity> in U.S.-India bilateral discourse.  
These qualities of the growing, transnational creative class provided a ready resource for 
Prime Minister Singh and President Bush to transcend individual identities.  In their 
narrative construction, <creativity> shed its material competitiveness to represent a joint 
endeavor to provide a better life for all people regardless of their national allegiance.  If 
<democracy> was a way of doing, <creativity> fully embraced idealism as a way of 
being.  <Creativity>’s achievements belonged not to a national claimant, but to all 
humanity.  
<Creativity> established Americans and Indians as innovators. This identification 
provided a sturdy foundation upon which to build consensus.  <Creativity> did rhetorical 
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work in predisposing Members of Congress toward writing and voting on legislation 
authorizing the Bush Administration to conduct negotiations on a U.S.-India 123 
Agreement. On the day after his arrival in Washington, Prime Minister Singh had the 
rhetorical task of reintroducing India and promoting the perception that the United States 
and India were indeed engaged democracies. In the bi-cameral and bi-partisan setting of a 
Joint Session of Congress, <creativity> had the benefit of nonpartisanship:  
We admire the creativity and enterprise of the American people, the excellence of 
your institutions of learning, the openness of the economy, and your ready 
embrace of diversity. … The field of civil nuclear energy is a vital area for 
cooperation between our two countries.  As a consequence of our collective 
efforts, our relationship in this sector is being transformed.54   
 
Prime Minister Singh recognized that creativity and enterprise are qualities of the 
American character.  Further, he called attention to the United States’ centers of 
innovation, namely universities, and open economic policies that allowed members of the 
creative class to turn their ideas and designs into goods and services.   
 As stewards of these centers, the U.S.-Indian business community believed that 
the Agreement’s promise, and their nations’ partnership, extended far beyond their 
corporate balance sheets.  Remarking on President Bush’s March 2006 state visit to India, 
U.S.-India Business Council President Ron Somers told India Abroad that the Agreement 
was “much more important than can be quantified by near-term trade and investment.  
This initiative is about strengthening our partnership with the world’s largest free-market 
democracy which, once completed, will change history.”55 The encompassing nature and 
impact of the Agreement and all it symbolized would become a consistent theme in the 
business community’s discourse.  Following passage of authorizing legislation in 
December 2006, the U.S.-India Business Council issued a statement, claiming: 
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What is accomplished today—given India’s wealth of human resources, its 
superior educational institutions, and its embrace of free-market democracy—
goes far beyond the sale of nuclear reactors and atomic fuel, but is the beginning 
of an equal partnership based on trust and mutual respect that will change the 
economic and geopolitical destiny of the 21st century.56 
 
The embrace of “free-market democracy” connoted a belief that pluralism not only 
crossed but also integrated the political and economic spheres.  Progress was undeniable.  
In the old industrial economy, progress would be achieved when competition spurred 
businesses to innovate, in order to stay one step ahead and dominate their respective 
markets.  In the new economy, progress would be achieved through openness, 
transparency, and collaboration among the creators of knowledge and technology whose 
destinies were tied.  The transnational business community conveyed the limitlessness of 
what they could accomplish together.   
 The Indian government and its people believed that the new economy would 
reduce the divide between India’s haves and have-nots.57 In the words of Prime Minister 
Singh: 
I am confident that from our talks today will emerge an agenda of cooperation 
that reflects a real transformation of our relationship.  Its realization would help 
India meet the expectations of its people for a better quality of life, a more secure 
future, and a greater ability to participate in global creativity.  I also believe that 
working together, our two countries can make a significant contribution to global 
peace, security and development. 58 
 
As a bridge between domestic and global security, <creativity> signified far more than 
the continued growth of India’s gross domestic product.  Prime Minister Singh’s 
invocation of <creativity> emitted idealism, with the responsibility to generate both 
economic and societal benefit, not only for their own countries, but for every country 
across the globe.  Idealism is therefore an appropriate frame through which to interpret 
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Prime Minister Singh’s welcoming remarks for President Bush, on the occasion of the 
President’s March 2006 state visit to India:  
Today, in India, we are engaged in a Himalayan adventure of pursuing 
development, improving the quality of life and modernizing one of the world’s 
oldest civilizations.  We seek to provide a social and economic environment at 
home that will unleash the creativity and enterprise of every Indian, thus enabling 
our people to live a life of dignity, fulfillment and self-respect.  The United States 
has long been a partner in our journey of progress.59 
 
In this statement, Prime Minister Singh affirmed <creativity> as a source of inspiration 
common to all people.  Progress, here denoted as development, quality of life, and 
modernization, possessed a self-actualizing telos.  By describing creativity and enterprise 
as inherent to every Indian, these qualities represented ideals of being and living.  The 
Prime Minister included the expression of creativity and personal industriousness within 
the protection of human rights and human dignity, elevating creativity to a universal 
value. The United States’ example and the Indian peoples’ own inclinations generated a 
magnetism between the two nations that was stronger than their individual differences.   
 The Indian and American people were one in spirit.  U.S. Ambassador to India 
David Mulford, in an essay titled “The Promise of India” published in India Abroad, 
validated this proposition: 
It is clear beyond all doubt that our countries are linked by a deep commitment to 
freedom and democracy.  We recognize, indeed, we celebrate national diversity, 
human creativity and innovation; a quest to expand prosperity and economic 
opportunity worldwide; and a desire to increase mutual security against the 
common threats posed by intolerance, terrorism and the spread of weapons of 
mass destruction.60 
 
Ambassador Mulford moved from “our countries” to “we,” in quick succession, closing 
any lingering sense of separation.  Similarly, Ambassador Mulford transitioned quickly 
from commitment to values to committed action.  The range of action is expanded, 
151 
  
however.  Prosperity and economic opportunity, the benefits of creativity and innovation, 
are felt worldwide. Ambassador Mulford’s care in using a shared vocabulary aided this 
progression.  Prime Minister Singh spoke of a Himalayan adventure and a journey of 
progress.  Ambassador Mulford spoke of a quest to expand prosperity and opportunity.  
Neither India nor America could afford to stand still.  The United States and India 
achieved consubstantiality in their movement toward an idealistic future, propelled by 
their shared belief that diversity, creativity, and innovation are the primogenitors of 
freedom and democracy.   
 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice affirmed this proposition in remarks to the 
U.S.-India Business Council, on the occasion of its 32nd anniversary in June 2007:     
We know that democratic societies are those that tend to unleash the creativity of 
their people in order to be able to help meet these challenges.  … Sooner or later, 
if you want them to be creative at work and think freely and have ideas and 
communicate them freely, they’re going to do it in the political sphere too.  The 
fact that India, even though it is still a developing country, has, in a sense, a 
political system that has all of the accordion-like character of a democracy, where 
differences and interests can be represented, I think puts India ahead of many 
countries where growth is very rapid but where the political system isn’t yet in 
place to accommodate some of those rising interests.61 
 
In Secretary Rice’s world view, the quality of a society is defined by the degree of 
freedom it affords to its people.  Creativity is a societal force-multiplier that fosters a 
plurality of ideas and interests.  Moreover, as a force for political and economic change, 
creativity cannot be contained.  Rather, once it achieves its full expression, it infuses all 
aspects of society.  A dynamic phenomenon, creativity can both channel and propagate a 
people’s differences and interests.  Accordingly, creativity introduces elasticity into 
political and civic life, and makes societal structures resilient to internal and external 
pressures.    
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 U.S. and Indian rhetors reached into their own experience to give democracy a 
shared meaning that brought diversity and pluralism to the forefront.  The 
recontextualization of democracy into pluralist societies and institutions provided the 
foundation for a common understanding of values and experiences that established U.S.-
Indian engagement as the natural and expected condition of the bilateral relationship. The 
hail and response of courtship captured the energy generated when pragmatism and 
idealism become fused in in discourse.  Democracy provided a foundation that made the 
United States and India consubstantial in a way of life.  Creativity made the United States 
and India consubstantial in the exercise of an intrinsic, universal, human impulse. 
Creativity realized future promise, and celebrated what the United States and India could 
contribute to the world.    
 
Unity in Community:  A Sojourning  
Discourse engendered a sense of American-Indian unity in values shared and put 
into practice in public life. “Pluralism” and “creativity” worked as translational terms 
because they allowed Americans and Indians to celebrate and reify their shared 
experiences.  Ideographs unify by reaffirming “who we are,” filtered through the lens of 
historical and cultural memory. They fix character. As motivators for unified action, they 
translate character into commitments and turn commitments into action.  But they must 
be dynamic.  Past and present temporal constraints on ideographs truncate their staying 
power.  Ideographs need to be periodically rejuvenated through public remembrances, 
celebrations, and traditions to reaffirm their power to unify.     
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When rhetoric holds open a unifying moment that spools together the past, 
present, and future, that moment becomes transformative.  Participants jointly 
constructing a narrative reach toward their envisioned future; simultaneously, the 
rhetorically constructed future state pulls them forward.  Consubstantiation is more than 
an acting together.  It is a sojourning together, and its narrative is self-propelling.  Burke 
called the rhetorical resources of the sojourner “directional substance.”62  Directional 
substance privileges a present and future state of being, and externalizes an internal 
purpose.63  When a rhetor uses metaphors for “the way” or advocates “a way forward,” 
he or she invokes directional substance.64  Identification deepens in the reaching for a 
communal endeavor.   
“Sojourning” is qualitatively different from journeying.  Journey is a purposeful 
activity that involves movement in physical space from a starting point to an end point or 
destination that is pre-defined. In short, journey is goal-oriented.65  The journey metaphor 
emphasizes the change in material conditions that will result from achieving the end goal, 
taking a predetermined path towards a socially valued destination.66  One who is 
sojourning is seeking identity and belongingness; the sense of arrival—to have arrived—
emerges from discourse that makes meaning of the experience.  Arrival itself is a 
vicarious rather than physical experience; discourse reconstitutes a shared natal 
experience into collective consciousness.67  The act of sojourning gives substance to this 
symbolic process.  The experience is never fully cemented, however68; the point of 




Sojourning emphasizes the change in character that comes from breaking with 
one’s previous identity to assume a new identity.  It is thus a transformational experience 
of being and becoming that rhetoric makes tangible and communal.  The sojourner’s 
narrative was expressed most clearly in the discourses of the Indian Diaspora community 
in the United States.69  For this group, the U.S.-India 123 Agreement engendered a sense 
of cohesion and unity of purpose that would reconstitute Diasporans’ political identity.  
Attainment of an agreement for full civil nuclear cooperation, with its 
implications for science and technology and commerce, was a conduit for the Diaspora 
community to engage in all of the pillars of the U.S.-India strategic dialogue, including 
security cooperation.  Debate expanded the range of Diasporans’ socially acceptable 
activism, to include international development, environmental conservation, free trade, 
and Indian domestic security policies.70  The range of what became permissible 
transformed both individual and collective identity, as the U.S.-India Political Action 
Committee’s Sanjay Puri discussed in an interview with National Public Radio: 
It used to be that you had two professions when you were growing up as an 
Indian-American, you know, you’ll be a doctor or an engineer.  I was the black 
sheep.  I couldn’t be either one of them.  But now there are many, many more 
choices for young people.  And they are figuring out that maybe entering into the 
public policy dialogue is important.71 
 
Puri’s reflection helps us appreciate the degree to which personal and professional 
identity overlapped within the Indian Diaspora in the United States.  The younger 
generation of Diasporans—not coincidentally, those joining the transnational creative 




Diasporans drew on a range of cultural and social resources to bolster the 
argument of their arrival.72  No longer mere accompaniment, geopolitical visions and 
discourses interlaced transnational commerce to boost Diaspora community pride and 
influence,73 displaying a wide spectrum of the Diasporic experience74 to promote India’s 
role as a “stable democracy in an unstable world.”75  California high-tech executive Arjun 
Bhugat, in an editorial roundtable with the Washington Times in the month following 
President Bush’s state visit to India, described how a moment can unify a community: 
This issue has galvanized our community like nothing we’ve seen in the past.  If 
this deal does not pass, we fear those in India who never wanted a closer 
relationship with the United States will have all the ammunition they need to turn 
against us. … Our Diaspora was always much more divided, but now we have the 
nuclear deal to unite us.”76 
 
Bhugat exposed the divide between the Diaspora community and their brethren at home 
who had remained beholden to the Cold War paradigm. Implied in Bhugat’s statement is 
the transformational power of the Diasporic experience to change perspectives and 
attitudes.77  The debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement called the Diasporans to 
community.  As a community, they were unified not only in their advocacy for the 
specific cause of civil nuclear cooperation, but also in their desire for closer relations 
between their home and adopted countries.   
Sanjay Puri connected the moment to the Diaspora community’s maturity as 
political actors: 
The modest political power of Indian-Americans reflected the priorities of the 
first generation of immigrants—business and education.  With so many doctors, 
entrepreneurs and managers in its ranks, the community targeted issues such as 
malpractice reform and visa policy instead of grand foreign policy issues.  That’s 




Puri attributed the transformation of the Indian Diaspora to generational change.  The 
generational divide separated who Diasporans were and who they were becoming.  More 
than the passing of a baton from one generation to the next, the up-and-coming 
generation possessed a wider view that informed their political aspirations.  The 
generational theme textured the meaning of the moment.  The Diaspora community’s 
engagement in the public policy domain became integrated and holistic. Advocacy for the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement transformed a fragmented group of individuals with a 
parochial outlook into a holistic community with a forward-looking purpose.  
Within the U.S.-based Indian Diaspora, Congressman Bobby Jindal held a unique 
position, speaking simultaneously on behalf of the Diaspora and as a legislator who 
needed to weigh benefits and consequences for a range of constituents and advocates:   
We are at an historic era where the relationship is finally going to be allowed to 
develop on its own.  The U.S.-India relationship is no longer dominated by the 
Cold War.  It is no longer dominated by other countries.  You no longer have to 
say in the same breath Russia or Pakistan or China, but rather, the India-American 
relationship stands on its own.79 
 
The emphasis here is on the relationship, which Congressman Jindal turns into a living, 
breathing thing, with an inherent capacity to grow and mature, just as the Diaspora 
community itself had matured into political actors.  Congressman Jindal removed 
contingencies that had prevented the United States and India from realizing the complete 
identification of courtship in a permanent union.  The American Indian Diaspora 
represented in microcosm the hybridity and intersubjective understanding of being both 
Indian and American.  Congressman Jindal directed energy from the external 
environment toward the bilateral relationship, in a manner that empowered the Diaspora 
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to act as integral members in that relationship.  Only when the Indian Diaspora stood 
together could the Indian-American relationship stand on its own.   
As debate progressed, voices within the Indian Diaspora expanded the scope of 
their influence.  Robinder Sachdev, founder of the U.S.-India Political Action Committee, 
drew Indians on both continents into the moment:   
India is today faced with an Excaliber moment in its young history as a nation 
state.  The Excaliber was smelted in elements of supreme powers.  Quite 
similarly, your farsighted vision and the conduct of the committee will smelt the 
Excaliber of India.80   
 
Excaliber represented a dawn of new potential; it was not about a purpose or a country, 
but a transcendent power. With this analogy, Sachdev constructed an entirely new 
meaning for the moment, now imbued with both urgency and purpose.  By one 
interpretation, the moment would be a renewal and re-legitimation of India’s sovereignty.  
Taking the Arthurian legend a step further, acting on the moment would ensure India’s 
place at the (nuclear) table, as an equal, giving and receiving mutual aid (full civilian 
nuclear cooperation) and protection (maintaining its purview over its nuclear program).   
 The word “smelt” is itself a metaphor for the rhetorical act of consubstantiation,81 
and thus provides a convenient coda to this section. In the smelting process, an object is 
returned to its base elements, and reforged in combination with new elements. The object 
that emerges from the smelter retains the essence of the former, with new qualities of the 
latter. And so it is with consubstantiation, when participants in discourse draw from 
unique and shared rhetorical resources and substances of identification to become 
“substantially one.”82  The rhetorical act of consubstantiation generated a shared set of 
principles and desired outcomes that would allow the United States and India to act as 
one entity in global affairs.    
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Unity of Strategic Interests:  A Convergence 
Narratives that incorporate ideographs turn shared beliefs, values, and world 
views into unity. Narratives that incorporate directional substance create unity through a 
communal experience of identity-seeking and action.  Diasporans’ sojourner narrative 
overcame fragmentation to establish a new political identity that unified the community.  
Nonetheless, the transformative potential of the sojourner remained limited to this 
singular, albeit transnational, community.    
The convergence narrative performed the additional rhetorical work required to 
unify the United States and India.  Both Indians and Americans spoke of the passage 
from the Cold War into the post-Cold War era, implying a common definition of scene.  
The Post-Cold War period made the two countries open to change and movement, first to 
orient toward one another, and then to orient themselves toward their responsibilities as 
global actors.  The convergence narrative made sense of the post-Cold War environment.   
As the House of Representatives began to craft the Agreement’s authorizing 
legislation—and proving that the golden age of oratory remained alive in the halls of 
Congress—Representative Henry Hyde put the future import of the changing scene on 
full display:       
History is pockmarked with rising powers aggressively seeking their place in the 
sun, their singular purpose resulting in a challenge to and not an enhancement of 
the international order.  At best, this has proved a needless drain on resources for 
others without any real advantage accruing to the guilty country.  At worst, 
mindless disaster has resulted.  There is no evidence that this is even a remote 
possibility, but the permanent anarchy of the world allows for many things once 
believed to be unimaginable.  We have no other course but to consider such things 






But I would not want my remarks to be viewed through a distorting prism for my 
forecast is a sunny one.  India is at a formative moment and facing profound 
decisions for her billion people, all of this occurring in a world which is quickly 
evolving into unfamiliar patterns, the old and familiar giving way to the unformed 
and new.  My hope is she will join us in shaping this new era and take possession 
of the limitless possibilities that are hers to possess.83 
 
Congressman Hyde created a synchronic moment in which the new beginning for the 
international order, made possible by the dissolving of Cold War hierarchies, behaviors, 
and alliances, aligned with a new beginning in U.S.-India relations. The world was fluid, 
formless, indeterminate, and thus ready for making.  Anarchy called forth a new order.  
External and unpredictable forces acting on the international system—not an individual 
nation-state—posed the threat that responsible states were obligated to mitigate. The 
challenge line of nation-states outside and inside the nuclear regime itself dissolved.   
In Congressman Hyde’s statement, identification worked as a transformative 
rather than a compensatory process.  The expression of hope, that India “will join in 
shaping this new era” (emphasis added), was invitational, and thus affirmed India’s 
freedom of choice to exercise sovereignty in ways deemed best for the Indian people.  
Congressman Hyde converted an “either/or” hard-power grammar that distinguished 
means and ends (“you’re with us or against us”) to a soft-power grammar (“we’re all in 
this together”) that reframed goals in terms of mutual stakes and shared responsibilities. 
The U.S.-India relationship of the past was built on contingencies and circumstances.  
The U.S.-India relationship of the future would combine pragmatism and principle.  
The change in scene effectuated by the end of the Cold War restored to India its 
full volition and freedom to exercise its sovereignty. In the month following 
Congressional passage of authorizing legislation, as bilateral negotiations began in 
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earnest, Indian Minister of External Affairs Mukherjee attributed improvement in 
bilateral relations almost entirely to the end of the Cold War:     
The end of the Cold War has liberated India to simultaneously deepen our 
relations with all the major power centres. We are no longer bound by the Cold 
War paradigm where good relations with one power automatically entailed 
negative consequences with its rivals.  No great power today pursues exclusive 
cooperation with others.  Nor is any one great power asking us to limit ties with 
others.  India has learned that increased cooperation with one power opens the 
doors further with others.84 
 
The end of the Cold War, placed in the subject position, drove the action.  The end of the 
Cold War opened a new period of time in which perspectives changed and relations were 
reformed.  Zero-sum thinking was counter-productive. It was, as the Minister states, a 
learning opportunity, in which nation-states tested the trust of potential new partners (i.e., 
courtship) and adopted new, cooperative frameworks through which to act (i.e., 
consubstantiation).  Minister Mukherjee presented a scene in which neighborhoods 
formerly separated by walls and fences gave way to a global ecosystem.  Power was no 
longer husbanded, wielded, or contained; it circulated. 
The convergence narrative performed an additional task.  The convergence 
narrative reinterpreted the visible and kinetic effects of strategic interests and actions in a 
way that changed the frame for bilateral diplomacy from competition to cooperation, and 
from unilateralism to interdependence.  Specifically, the convergence narrative removed 
“nonproliferation” from its controlling position in defining U.S.-India relations.  The 
convergence narrative conjoined nonproliferation with other strategic interests such as 
energy independence, economic prosperity, and democratic governance.   
This reinterpretation of strategic interests can be heard in Congressman Wilson’s 
reaction to the announcement of a major milestone in negotiations toward a 123 
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Agreement.  Congressman Wilson established energy security and global 
nonproliferation as consonant and interchangeable goals that would be achieved through 
strategic partnership:  
Today, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh made a decision to unite our 
common goals in an agreement which will advance our strategic partnership, 
enhance our energy security, and strengthen our global nonproliferation efforts.  
This positive development is another symbol of the strong bond that exists 
between our two nations.85 
   
Congressman Wilson employed a both/and grammar to put nonproliferation and energy 
security goals on the same plane.  Initiatives and actions that enhanced energy security 
could lead to strengthened nonproliferation policies and norms just as easily as the 
Nonproliferation Treaty strengthened energy security.  This both/and grammar shifted the 
definition of desirable behavior from compliance to cooperation. 
 The convergence narrative adopted a tone of neutrality toward strategic interests, 
a tacit acknowledgment of the circulatory nature in which issues and interests would 
ascend to the top of the agenda.  As suggested in Congressman Neil Joeck’s judgment of 
the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, advancements toward one objective would generate 
cascading benefits for other issues and interests of concern:        
Nonproliferation has historically adapted to new conditions and new 
opportunities.  We should continue to adapt in order to achieve the overall goal of 
nonproliferation policy, a more secure world.  The new agreement with India 
recognizes that international security is achieved through a layered approach. 86 
 
If the Nonproliferation Treaty represented the views of the ecclesiastical, then the U.S.-
India 123 Agreement represented the belief of evolutionists. The “layered approach” 
implied that one element of international security comes before another, such that any 
element is subject to being “overwritten” or covered by a subsequent element. However, 
“layering” denied any single issue a permanent, elevated position of dominance to frame 
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policy and action.  Each issue is equally subject to being layered on, or layered over.  The 
underlying layer will either recede or continue to express itself.   An issue’s place on the 
international agenda was contingent on the international scene from which it emerged.    
 As the pinnacle of nonproliferation at the center of the bilateral relationship 
collapsed, its energy radiated from the center outward, pushing the boundaries of 
strategic partnership. No longer limited to the terms and expectations of the 
nonproliferation regime, rhetors were free to frame partnership as a convergence of 
strategic interests.  Burke gave license to this rhetorical move in “The Relation between 
Literature and Science,” published in 1936 as a contributed essay to The Writer in a 
Changing World: 
Imagine a circle—outside of it, imagine a series of dots—and outside these dots, 
imagine another circle.  The inner circle represents an established structure of 
meanings, the familiar meanings with which one has grown up.  They are 
“intimate.”  They name the important factors and relationships of one’s 
experience, and they shape attitudes toward these factors.  But in time, outside 
this circle of meanings, new material accumulates.  This new material is not 
adequately handled by the smaller circle of meanings. … People then must strive 
to draw a wider circle that will encompass this new matter, left inadequately 
charted or located by the smaller circle.87  
 
This passage describes the rhetorical movement that allowed rhetors to equate full 
civilian nuclear cooperation with the quality of the U.S.-India strategic partnership as a 
whole. 
 If nonproliferation had remained predominant, rhetors would have responded by 
connecting the dots radially from the center, as if drawing a line from zero to infinity,88 
interpreting strategic interests narrowly, according to a single, dominant frame. Instead, 
rhetors connected the outer ring of dots, defining a new, more expansive circumference 
for the issues and interests held in common.  This robust interpretation of dramatistic 
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motive put strategic partnership at the generative center of the bilateral relationship. The 
issues and interests that composed the outer ring could interchangeably represent the 
strategic partnership, just as the strategic partnership enveloped each of the issues and 
interests upon which the United States and India might converge at any point in time.   
Following the success of President Bush’s state visit to India in March 2006, 
Indian Foreign Secretary Saran tightly wound change in the external environment and 
interdependence into the convergence narrative:   
India perceives the world today as one where the global agenda is being set by a 
constellation of nations including the United States, the EU, Russia, China, Japan 
and India.  The United States is, and for the foreseeable future, will remain a pre-
eminent power.  However, no single nation can bear global burdens alone and the 
current international situation is characterised by the willingness of major nations 
to work together on issues and challenges where they perceive strong 
convergence.  The era when global politics was a zero-sum game is now 
decisively behind us.  Leading nations, even when they compete, have inter-
dependencies and linkages amongst themselves that they ignore at their own 
peril.89 
 
The convergence narrative placed India within the constellation of other signatories to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty and related agreements.  India no longer acted in isolation. The 
narrative established a center of gravity for convergence, acknowledging the pre-
eminence of the United States.  As a nation-state within the constellation, the United 
States could not act unilaterally.  Rather, the United States exercised power by 
conditioning the system through which other nation-states navigated their own orbits.  An 
action that strengthened one nation could benefit all the nations within the constellation; 
an action that weakened a nation could sap the strength of all.  Convergence described the 
movement of the system as a whole. 
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In an interview with the Indian Diaspora weekly India Abroad in June 2006, 
Senator Richard Lugar amplified the idea of an interdependent constellation of nations, 
absent the specific metaphor:   
By concluding this pact and the far-reaching set of cooperative agreements that 
accompany it, President Bush has embraced a long-term outlook that seeks to 
enhance the core strength of our foreign policy in a way that will give us new 
diplomatic options and improve global stability.  With this agreement, the 
President and Secretary Rice are asking Congress to see the opportunities that lie 
beyond the horizon of the current presidential term.  A congressional rejection of 
the agreement—or an open-ended delay—risks wasting a critical opportunity to 
begin to expand beyond our Cold War alliance structure to include dynamic 
nations with whom our interests are converging.90 
 
The expansion of the Cold War alliance structure accommodated nation-states such as 
India that had their own gravitational pull.  Convergence was the magnetism of two 
members within the constellation coming into the same orbit.  When the United States 
and India achieved their permanent alignment, the resulting energy would stabilize the 
system as a whole.  
 By the same token, failure to finalize an Agreement would place the United States 
and India on different trajectories.  As explained by Robinder Sachdev, founder of the 
U.S.-India Political Action Committee, if the Agreement failed, U.S. and Indian interests 
might occasionally intersect, but would never fully converge: 
Relations between the United States and India are truly on an inflexion point—a 
good deal between the two nations has a plethora of dividends for both, though 
there may be some interests being compromised by both countries.  However, a 
non-deal will lead to an altogether different orbit for India in international affairs.  
Not to say that that orbit will be good or bad for U.S. relations, but it certainly 
will be a different path.91 
 
We hear in Sachdev’s statement a sense of urgency attached to the convergence narrative.  
Bilateral dialogue leading up to the U.S.-India 123 Agreement represented a slow and 
steady pace in which to expand the scope of issues and interests in common.  The U.S.-
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India 123 Agreement, by contrast, was a “big bang” that would birth an entirely new 
relationship.   
Whereas Foreign Secretary Saran’s formulation presented an anodyne perspective 
on nation-state relations, Senator Lugar’s discourse invited participation in the narrative.  
Participants could foretell the promise of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, envisioning or 
“reading in” to the statement the benefits they most desired. Armed with this subjective 
foresight, participants had confidence in reciprocity as a mode of diplomatic engagement.   
Indian Foreign Secretary Menon constructed convergence as a phenomenon that 
enveloped the United States and India, as well as the bilateral relationship as its own 
entity: 
We have leaders with a vision of what we should be doing together, of our place 
in the world, what we want to be and a vision of how important India-US relations 
are.  But it also is more—I think it reflects the fact that India has changed, the 
world has changed.  Wherever I look, whether it’s in our immediate 
neighborhood—subcontinent Asia or in the bigger global issues—I see 
convergence.92 
 
The act of seeing was a common aspect of how Senator Lugar and Secretary Menon 
framed their narratives around convergence.  Secretary Menon alluded to India’s 
experience of having passed through the Cold War period with a changed perspective of 
itself, of America, and the global order.  This changed perspective enabled India to see 
converging interests where they previously did not exist, and to redefine its interests as 
converging rather than competing with the United States.    
Among the rhetors who constructed the convergence narrative, Under Secretary 




I think this partnership rests on a very solid foundation, not just of democratic 
values, but of converging geopolitical interests between the two countries.  I 
believe that this partnership will be for the twenty-first century one of the most 
important partnerships that our country, the United States, has with any country 
around the world.  I would argue that in 20 or 30 years’ time most Americans will 
say that India is one of our two or three most important partners worldwide.93 
 
The United States and India managed spheres of influence that previously clashed but 
now overlapped.  In Secretary Saran’s constellation metaphor, spheres of influence are 
more integrated than overlapping.  Cooperation allowed nation-states to pursue the same 
goal in their own way.  Integration entailed co-dependence among nation-states, requiring 
each to account for and motivate the other’s position and action, to put oneself in the 
other’s place, and to see oneself through the eyes of the other.   
With a future-focused and expansive temporal reach, the convergence narrative 
effectively reframed the bilateral relationship.  At the conclusion of the debate in October 
2008, Minister of External Affairs Mukherjee turned the convergence narrative into an 
all-encompassing vision:      
We are both very satisfied with the status of our bilateral relationship and are 
convinced of the future potential.  Today India and the U.S. engage as partners 
across the entire range of human endeavour.  … As we look back with satisfaction 
at the transformation of India-US relations, we are convinced of the future 
prospects of this relationship.  The vision for this relationship laid down by Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh and President Bush is one that serves the interests of 
our peoples, and those of the region and the world.  India and the United States, as 
two democracies with shared values, look forward to building this partnership 
based on principle and pragmatism in the years to come.94 
 
Minister Mukherjee left the future state to the imagination.  The potentiality of the future 
bade the partners to prospect together and to share in the rewards of their joint labor.  
Minister Mukherjee’s vision of the future thus encircled a transnational, regional, and 
global citizenry who continually strive to achieve their full—but unspecified and perhaps 
as yet unseen—potential.  Minister Mukherjee framed cooperation around the actors 
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whose discourses and values would animate the partnership.  Framing the partnership 
according to its potential agency, as a pragmatic instrument for change, helped rhetors 
manage away uncertainty about either partner’s future intent. 
  The narrative pulled the United States and India from a period of estrangement 
through a period of engagement and into a strategic partnership.  Over the course of the 
three-year debate, the convergence narrative acquired at first a refined range of political, 
economic, and security issues in which U.S. and Indian interests converged.  At the end 
of the debate, the convergence narrative and the bilateral partnership had acquired an 
equally expansive and self-perpetuating quality. 
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issued the consummate statement on the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement: 
And so today, we look to the future, a shared future in which both our nations 
together rise to our global responsibilities and our global challenges as partners.  
Let us use this partnership to shape an international order in which all states can 
exercise their sovereignty securely, responsibly, and in peace. Let us use this 
partnership to tackle the great global challenges of our time:  energy security and 
climate change, terrorism and violent extremism, transnational crime and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.  Let us use this partnership to 
protect and promote our common values:  human rights and human dignity, 
democracy, liberty, and the rule of law for people who are diverse in background 
but joined together in spirit and aspirations.  And let us use our partnership to 
drive a new social justice agenda for the 21st century by promoting good and 
uncorrupt governance, by expanding free and fair global trade, by advancing 
health and education, and supporting the millions and millions of people who are 
striving to lift themselves out of poverty.95 
 
Read holistically, Secretary Rice met the expectations of an epideictic moment in U.S.-
India bilateral diplomacy.  Certain that the U.S.-India 123 Agreement would come into 
force, Secretary Rice’s “let us use this partnership” litany framed the United States and 
India not as co-arguers, but as joint actors.  
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The synecdoche of Agreement and partnership allowed Secretary Rice the latitude 
to bind the United States and India as co-creators of both.  The Agreement therefore 
contained the motivations of both nations’ leaders.  Because the leaders acted in their 
official and representative capacities, the Agreement expressed the aspirations and will of 
their people.96  As Secretary Rice’s litany progressed from material interests to global 
benefits and universal goods, she elevated the frame of the partnership from a vehicle to 
achieve pragmatic change to a character-driven relationship that channeled shared 
motivations into symbolic action.97   
 Convergence performed rhetorical work as a transcendental term.  The word itself 
possesses a forward-driving energy.  Of the three strategies of unification discussed—
shared ideals and the commitment to democracy; the sojourner narrative and commitment 
to community; and the convergence of pragmatism and principle in shared strategic 
interests—the convergence narrative offered the strongest confirmation to participants in 
discourse that their movement toward a permanent union was both right and inevitable.  
In comparison to shared values, the convergence narrative was less beholden to present 
space and time, creating a shared orientation, trajectory, and momentum to reach out and 
seize the future.  In comparison to the sojourner narrative, the convergence narrative 
encompassed the entirety of the United States and India, as opposed to the Diaspora with 
its unique transnational identity.  
 The convergence narrative left open-ended the possibilities for where and when 
convergence would be complete.  Participants in discourse channeled this energy toward 
resolution of the 123 Agreement.  Because the 123 Agreement symbolized the 
relationship as a whole, its resolution filled out the vision of a shared destiny and the 
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promise of a strategic partnership that would endure through inevitable changes in 
circumstances and their contingencies.   
Convergence rejected binary divisions, reinterpreted the relationships among 
issues that  defined the quality of relations, and affirmed the Nonproliferation Treaty’s 
norms while resisting the legalistic and punitive means by which those norms are 
typically enforced.  Convergence became the synoptic frame that turned bilateral 
dialogue into comprehensive strategic partnership.  Rhetors effectuated convergence by 
adapting their discourse to a dynamic ordering of issues, giving strategic partnership an 
agency of its own that surpassed the actions of any single party to it.  The qualities of the 
partnership conditioned the qualities of the acts that would be performed under its 
auspices, and the quality of the acts in turn reflected on the national character of the 
actors who performed those acts. 
 
A Relationship Transformed 
The rhetorical work of soft power converted the contingency of courtship into the 
rightness and inevitability of a permanent union.  U. S. Assistant Secretary of State for 
Public Affairs Richard Boucher made adroit use of this second technique in remarks to 
the Confederation of Indian Industry:  “Years from now, when people gather to discuss 
our relationship, they will remark upon the across-the-board transformation of U.S.-India 
relations that took place in the first decades of the 21st century.”98 Assistant Secretary 
Boucher posited a people looking back upon the present, as if the action had already 
occurred and borne its benefits. 
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Soft power discourses replaced the hard power cycle of sanctions and export 
controls with a virtuous circle of reciprocity. Rhetoric-as-persuasive gave way to 
rhetoric-as-constitutive approaches. The soft power discourses generated during the 
debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement fostered attraction through rhetoric that 
constituted grounds for action, identifications, and relationships.   
More specifically, soft power discourses deepened identification, 
consubstantiating the United States and India as pluralist societies committed to 
democracy and as innovators and builders of the new economy.  The recontextualization 
of democracy into pluralist societies and institutions provided the foundation for a 
common understanding of values and experiences that established U.S.-Indian 
engagement as the natural and expected condition of the bilateral relationship.  
<Pluralism> and <creativity> were the conduits through which <democracy> could be 
mutually understood and jointly enacted.   
 Soft power discourses constituted the U.S. Indian Diaspora as a community with a 
cohesive political identity. The sojourner narrative incorporated directional substance to 
unify individuals in a shared experience and interpretation of the moment that became a 
call to community.  The sojourner narrative condensed past-present-future, rallying the 
Diaspora community in the belief that the U.S.-India 123 Agreement was their moment to 
come into their own as political actors.  
 Soft power discourses reinterpreted the post-Cold War scene and established a 
new, cooperative frame for advancing strategic interests, consubstantiating the United 
States and India as strategic partners.  The convergence narrative propelled the 
relationship forward, affirming participants’ sense that their union would generate 
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positive changes for themselves and the global community.  Through the convergence 
narrative, the U.S.-India 123 Agreement came to symbolize the quality of the U.S.-India 
partnership in its entirety.  Because the 123 Agreement symbolized the relationship as a 
whole, its resolution constituted the United States and India in a permanent union based 
in shared principles and purposes.  The quality of the partnership, the quality of the 
bilateral achievements made in its name, and the qualities of character ascribed to the 
partners were indelibly the same, constituting a bilateral partnership of high integrity and 
authenticity.    
Discourse transformed the context, social order, and substance of the U.S.-India 
relationship, effectuating India’s movement from outside to inside the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and moving the state of relations from estranged to engaged.  In 
their deepening identification from courtship to consubstantiation, rhetors were co-
arguers and co-creators of strategic partnership.  Because courtship and consubstantiation 
have explanatory and probative force for Nye’s soft power processes of attraction, and 
because these processes achieve unity in purposes and action—a rhetorical and material 
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My dissertation project broadens and deepens our understanding of soft power 
diplomacy.  My critique demonstrates the suitability and benefit of adopting dramatism 
as a theoretical underpinning for soft power processes of attraction.  Further, I establish a 
constitutive role for rhetoric in the conduct of soft power diplomacy, and find that 
diplomatic discourse has the capacity to transform two nation-states’ strained relationship 
into an enduring and resilient bilateral partnership.   
The question of how this transformation occurs drives my rhetorical critique. 
Selecting discourses generated by the U.S.-India 123 Agreement has proven to be a 
sound choice to help answer this question.  Described as a watershed moment in U.S.-
India relations, the 123 Agreement is a unique and novel element of the bilateral 
partnership.  After decades of coercive tactics such as sanctions and export controls failed 
to convince India to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement—with its reciprocal commitments, joint obligations, and mutual benefits—
ushered India into the community of cooperating nuclear states.  Thus, my dissertation 
project opens a window on how soft power discourse catalyzes and capitalizes on 
moments that portend a transformation in bilateral relations.   
Three key words make up the above statement of benefits:  discourse, 
transformation, and relations. For rhetorical critics, I place an emphasis on discourse.  My 
dissertation research demonstrates the potential to enrich our limited study of diplomatic 
discourse. Further, my critique generates insight into dramatistic theory and criticism, 
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including the development of ideographs in diplomatic discourse; the importance of 
Kenneth Burke’s substances of identification to the joint construction of narratives; and 
the rhetorical enactment of courtship and consubstantiation. 
For soft power theorists, I place an emphasis on transformation.  This term 
encapsulates the rhetorical work of soft power discourse.  However, acceptance of this 
claim requires a reinterpretation of soft power from the rhetoric-as-persuasive to the 
rhetoric-as-constitutive perspective.  When understood as a creation of constitutive 
rhetoric, the telos, processes, and resources of soft power become more transparent.  That 
is, we gain insight into how soft power actually works in and through discourse.  
Additionally, the rhetorical perspective on soft power diplomacy increases the ease with 
which soft power theory can be contextualized and integrated with diplomatic tradecraft. 
For the diplomatic corps, I place an emphasis on the relationship between two 
nation-states. This emphasis also requires reflection on how we talk about diplomatic 
aims and achievements.  The discourses generated by the U.S.-India 123 Agreement offer 
a counter-point to accounts that are centered around a nation-state or another entity as an 
actor on the international stage.  There is value in emphasizing the relationship, along 
with the texts and discourses that symbolize the relationship, over and above the nation-
states themselves.   
Of interest to the diplomatic corps, I asked how the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
evolved from an idea about nuclear cooperation into a symbol of bilateral partnership.  
The answer I offer is that this change occurred through soft power diplomacy, understood 
as a discursive process that reconstituted identities and relationships.  Along with this 
180 
  
answer are practical steps that members of the diplomatic corps can take to recognize and 
act on transformative moments.        
In sum, my dissertation examines a key moment when diplomatic discourse 
transformed a bilateral relationship.  Accordingly, my research offers something of value 
to rhetorical theorists and critics, soft power proponents, and practitioners of diplomacy. 
In the pages that follow, I elaborate the findings and conclusions of my dissertation 
research for each of these three communities in turn.   
 
Endorsing the Rhetoric of Diplomacy 
 In this section, I address the community of rhetorical theorists and scholars, 
opening with the proposal to treat the rhetoric of diplomacy as a distinct genre that sits at 
the intersection of rhetorical criticism and diplomacy studies.  I summarize the benefits 
that a rhetorical perspective brings to diplomacy studies, highlighting examples from my 
dissertation in which an understanding of discourse generated insight that would not have 
been possible otherwise.  I then discuss specific insights from my rhetorical critique that 
deepen our understanding of dramatistic theory and criticism, including ideographic 
criticism, narrative, and core elements of Kenneth Burke’s dramatism. 
 
The Rhetoric of Diplomacy     
The rhetoric of diplomacy is closely related to foreign policy rhetoric, but with 
two important distinctions.  Criticism in foreign policy rhetoric is heavily influenced by 
presidential rhetoric and public address scholarship, and the desire to interrogate the 
relationship between a president and the people.  Critique is most often attuned to one 
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rhetor’s words and their resonance. By contrast, the rhetoric of diplomacy necessarily 
entails the effect of discourse on participants’ respective constituencies as well as 
diplomatic relations.  The rhetoric of diplomacy therefore focuses a critical lens on 
dialogue, engagement, or negotiation involving two or more nation-states or other foreign 
policy actors. This genre of discourse requires critical methods that heighten attention to 
the intersubjectivity that is characteristic of dialogue and negotiation.  Critics working 
within the rhetoric of diplomacy listen for the harmonics created when two speakers 
address each other.   
 I base my call for a rhetoric of diplomacy in the juxtaposition of the published 
literature with the subject matter of my dissertation research.  At the conclusion of the 
literature review, I highlighted Martín Carcasson’s essay.  Carcasson performed a 
narrative analysis of the discourses generated by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators on the 
occasion of the September 13, 1993, signing ceremony of the Oslo Accord. Pulling both 
verbal and visual messages into his analysis, Carcasson discovered that the leaders’ 
discourse symbolically transformed long-standing animosities of conflict by reframing 
protagonists and antagonists.  Within this alternative narrative, the Oslo Accord was a 
victory for peacemakers on both sides.1  In my judgment, this essay exemplifies 
rhetorical critique of diplomatic engagement, which I believe deserves attention 
independent of foreign policy rhetoric.   
 A concerted effort to generate a literature in the rhetoric of diplomacy possesses 
fresh opportunity and hard challenges.  The opportunities come from the increased 
availability of texts and articles.  Many texts are available through official sources, such 
as free subscriptions to news feeds, and articles and speeches e-published daily by the 
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State Department’s Bureau of International Information Programs.  News organizations 
now routinely cover happenings at Foggy Bottom, including “insider” information 
available through The Cable, a Foreign Policy magazine blog. In addition to host 
governments and foreign Embassies making texts and articles available online, the move 
toward digital diplomacy and e-diplomacy has increased opportunities to witness if not 
participate in government-to-people and people-to-people diplomacy.  As more students 
with native or second language skills pursue rhetoric, the opportunities to explore 
diplomatic discourse increases exponentially. 
 The hard challenge comes from the realization that an episodic approach to 
diplomatic discourse will yield limited insight, even with a complete accounting of the 
context for the discursive exchange.  The narratives that emerged in the discourses that I 
collected and critiqued unfolded over three years, punctuated by three diplomatic events 
of milestones:  Prime Minister Singh’s July 2005 state visit; President Bush’s reciprocal 
state visit to New Delhi in March 2006; and statements issued by officials of both 
countries in the fall of 2008 when the Agreement’s ratification became assured.  These 
events included welcoming remarks and responses, joint press events, formal remarks or 
public address, and exchanges of toasts through which the heads of state and their 
surrogates initiated and furthered their courtship.  Looking at one event in isolation would 
have told only part of the story; only by exploring multiple inflection points throughout 
the entirety of the debate do we gain full appreciation of the transformative power of 
discourse.   
 The rhetorical critic has a wide array of relationships available for study. The 
United States is engaged in bilateral dialogue and partnership building with countries too 
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numerous to mention, each of which offers the potential to bind rhetorical critique to the 
evolution of consequential and transformative issues. An interdisciplinary team approach 
can help increase the feasibility of longitudinal study.  As students of rhetoric look for 
professional opportunities outside the Academy, they will discover opportunities to 
embed with organizations conducting bilateral strategic dialogues or implementing 
bilateral advocacy strategies.  
 More important than practicalities of access, language skills, and feasibility, 
rhetoricians possess the materials and methods to discover new things about discursive 
exchange in a diplomatic context.  Rhetoricians understand how words-as-symbols 
function in the context of social relations.  Words-as-symbols unify people into a 
community and direct concerted action.  When words-as-symbols are working within 
diplomatic discourse, a text or an Agreement has the potential to become this symbol.   
 In my own study, a rhetorical perspective gave me the unique ability to explain 
how the U.S.-India 123 Agreement came to symbolize the entirety of the bilateral 
partnership.  Discourse placed the locus of action in the agreement, imbuing the text with 
its own source of agency. As rhetors performed the rhetorical act of courtship, discourse 
made inseparable the qualities of the Agreement, national character, and the acts taken 
under the Agreement’s auspices.    
Rhetoricians have a unique perspective on new and non-traditional actors’ entry 
into international affairs.  Rhetoricians possess a unique vantage point on how new and 
non-traditional actors in diplomacy construct and express their identity, form a 
community, and exercise their voice and social agency.  The debate on the U.S.-India 123 
Agreement invited the participation of Indian Diasporans in the United States. Arjun 
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Bhugat described how the progress toward the 123 Agreement “galvanized our 
community.”2  Robinder Sachdev likened to the 123 Agreement to India’s “Excaliber 
moment.”3  From a rhetorical perspective, the Diasporans were more than constituents or 
advocates in a political process; rhetorical critique uncovered the subtext of Diasporans’ 
influence.  The sojourner narrative gave meaning and energy to a community in the 
process of constituting itself.  Rhetorical-critical theory and methods can identify the 
ways in which these voices enrich the texture of bilateral diplomacy and constitute new 
relationships between governments, their peoples, and transnational communities. 
 Lastly, the study of diplomatic discourse can generate new insights into the 
activation of a transnational shared orientation or world view.  With these insights, 
rhetoricians can shed insight into nation-states’ movement toward consensus and 
concerted action.  Turning again to the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, discourse shaped the 
meaning of the end of the Cold War for the U.S.-India alliance, thereby changing some of 
the fundamental assumptions that guided how both the United States and India made 
sense of world events.  The convergence narrative drew energy from this change of 
scene.   
 Recall Congressman Hyde’s soliloquy on the post-Cold War era as a formative 
moment, for India and the world; as nation-states freed themselves from old patterns, 
they entered a future of limitless possibilities.4  Interpreting the words of Shri Pranab 
Mukherjee, India’s Minister of External Affairs, the change of scene reduced zero-sum 
thinking and welcomed international cooperation.5  Rhetorical critique brought forward 
the concept maps that established “convergence” as a shared lens through which the 
United States and India interpreted actions taken by themselves, by the other, and by 
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those apart from the bilateral relationship.  Convergence changed the orientational 
metaphor6 guiding U.S.-Indian relations from non-alignment to cooperation, and from 
competitive advantage to mutual gain. 
 By expanding the corpus of rhetorical critique of diplomatic discourse, we 
establish new foci for rhetorical study.  These include the potential of diplomatic texts to 
reconstitute nation-state relations, as the U.S.-India 123 Agreement reconstituted the 
bilateral partnership; appreciation of the complexity of rhetorical resources that call a 
transnational community into being and empower its members to act; and the power of 
discourse to open liminal moments in which nation-states and their peoples may 
reconfigure their perceptions of their place in world affairs and their role as change 
agents.  Discourse brings about a change in scene, and with it, a change in perspective.       
 
Deepening Our Knowledge of Dramatism   
  As my critique demonstrates, scholarly attention to diplomatic discourse can 
generate new knowledge for rhetorical criticism and theory building. In this section, I 
delve into three inter-related aspects of dramatistic theory and critique.  In turn, I discuss 
the work of ideographs in bilateral diplomatic discourse, the ways in which narrative can 
deepen identification, and the rhetorical moves that participants in discourse perform to 
overcome their sense of estrangement and achieve a sense of unity.   
 
Ideographic Criticism 
 The benefits of ideographic critique can be traced to Michael Calvin McGee’s 
seminal works, “In Search of “The People”:  A Rhetorical Alternative,”7 and “The 
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‘Ideograph’:  A Link Between Rhetoric and Ideology,”8 in which he provided a method 
to deconstruct political language that dictates decisions and controls public belief and 
behavior.  An ideograph is representative but not entirely reductive of a political 
philosophy or orientation; ideographs both constrain and produce discourse, and are 
therefore malleable substances for narrative construction.  As super-charged words-as-
symbols, ideographs unify individuals in a common interpretation of their collective 
history, culture, and political belief, marshalling and channeling political will to 
effectuate societal change.9 
 My critique opens a new dimension for the study of ideographs.  The hail and 
response of courtship performed by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh re-
animated two ideographs, <democracy> and <creativity>, rooted in the two nations’ 
experience. My critique therefore charts the synchronic development of ideographs in a 
symbolic exchange, and allows me to assert that ideographic criticism is a key contributor 
to a rhetoric of diplomacy.  
When President Bush and Prime Minister Singh announced their intent to pursue 
full civilian nuclear cooperation, they opened <democracy> to new meanings and 
interpretations.  My critique describes how U.S. and Indian rhetors transcended their 
division by reaching toward the same idealization of <democracy>, celebrated in 
discourse and lauded in lived experience as pluralism.  When textured with pluralism, 
<democracy> became a universal value that transcended the divide of geography, history, 
and national experience. 
 Discourse consubstantiated the United States and India in <democracy> and its 
spiral development.  The exchange between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh 
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during the Prime Minister’s July 2005 state visit illustrated this pattern.  Discourse began 
and ended with the premise that <democracy> ensured collective security.  As discourse 
progressed through this cycle, the locus of action shifted.  The narrative opened with a 
focus on external threats that necessitated democracy in self-defense.  It closed by 
exclaiming the chosen, if not ordained, role to protect others, necessitated by the fact that 
the United States and India were democracies.  In this regard, <democracy> carried with 
it an obligation to serve as the world’s protectors. 
 Beginning with President Bush’s welcoming remarks, the pair met “as leaders of 
two great democracies committed to working together for a better and safer world,”10 
each acting independently, overseeing his own realm.  President Bush conjoined two 
premises, that “our nations believe in freedom, and our nations are confronting global 
terrorism.” 11  <Democracy> would win the global war on terrorism.  In response, Prime 
Minister Singh added texture to the meaning of democracy, with the following litany:  
“We share a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, pluralism and 
rule of law.  We face common challenges that threaten our way of life and values that 
both our countries hold dear.  We share a common resolve and a common responsibility 
to meet those challenges.”12  Pluralism was the fiber of the two nations’ being.   
 Taking this cue, President Bush offered an uplifting account of the two nations’ 
relationship, naming both countries as diverse democracies.13  This move displaced the 
original construction of <democracy> as “what we do” with Prime Minister Singh’s 
meaning of “who we are” as democratic nations.  Having achieved consonance in 
framing democracy as an intrinsic quality, Prime Minister Singh affirmed that “we value 
our pluralism, our diversity, and our freedoms … We must strengthen democratic 
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capacities jointly.  We must oppose the evil of terrorism together.”14  With this statement, 
Prime Minister Singh adopted President Bush’s originating premise that pluralism was a 
force of moderation and a bulwark against terrorism.  Thus, Prime Minister Singh 
literally circled back to the meaning that President Bush had given to <democracy> from 
the outset, but with a deepened sense of identification.  <Democracy> infused their 
relationship and motivated their joint action.     
 In contrast to the spiral development of <democracy>, <creativity> matured in a 
more diffuse and open-ended manner, absent a terminus in the discursive exchange.  
Prime Minister Singh enjoined the United States in a “Himalayan Adventure” that would 
“unleash the creativity and enterprise of every Indian, thus enabling our people to live a 
life of dignity, fulfillment and self-respect.”15  U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford 
enjoined India in a celebration of “national diversity, human creativity and innovation” 
and a “quest to expand prosperity and economic opportunity worldwide.”16  <Creativity> 
thus transcended claims of national character and accomplishments.  <Creativity” was a 
universal human quality that inspired joint action. 
 Through their repartee, President Bush and Prime Minister Singh recognized and 
admired the creativity of each other’s nations and peoples.  Beginning with this initial 
sense of identification, discourse gave <creativity> a transcendent, universalizing role.  
The United States and India became consubstantial in idealistic purposes, including 
nurturing in every society freedom of expression and human dignity.  Throughout the 
discursive exchange, the invocation of <creativity> maintained an open-ended and 
forward reaching meaning.   
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 The way in which <democracy> and <creativity> evolved in the act of courtship 
suggests that the meaning ascribed to a word in its everyday usage affects its ideographic 
development in symbolic exchange.  Quoting Burke, “words communicate to things the 
spirit that the society imposes upon the words which have come to be the ‘names’ for 
them.  The things are in effect the visible tangible material embodiments of the spirit that 
infuses them through the medium of words.”17  We think of democracy as a system of 
values and governance, and its development was likewise subject to a systems structure 
of spiral development.  We think of creativity as an open-ended, unbounded force for 
change, and its development was likewise unbounded.   
As the courtship progressed, rhetors affirmed and extended the scope of what 
<creativity> could achieve.  The narrative that invoked <creativity> promoted an esprit 
des corps that transcended national identities.  My critique therefore illustrates how 
narrative can convey a sense of limitlessness.  Further, the analysis of discourse suggests 
that deepening identification relies on a narrative that is not only open-ended and 
limitless, but also possesses a self-actualizing telos.  Ideographs work through 
interpretative frames of being—to be a protector, or to be a nurturer.  Functioning as an 
ideograph, <democracy> connected these cherished qualities of national character and 
identity to the underlying values of pluralism and creativity.  Having picked up a positive 
charge, <pluralism> and <creativity> then patterned actions in public life.   
 
Narrative Criticism 
 My critique underscores the importance of open-ended narratives to the process of 
deepening identification.  As previously discussed, diplomatic discourse is 
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intersubjective.  That is, diplomatic discourse seeks to achieve more than implanting an 
image or a semantic meaning in the minds audience members.  Intersubjectivity 
undergirds the rhetoric of diplomacy in all its myriad aims and purposes.  When 
contextualized as bilateral engagement, an open-ended and participatory narrative 
exploits the ambiguity of the situation, which contains many possible futures and 
relations.  This ambiguity allows participants to try out different ways of placing 
themselves, their interlocutors, and prominent elements of the scene in a story or 
narrative account.  As participants gravitate toward and build on a particular account, 
they make themselves consubstantial in the values and purposes that the account conveys. 
The exceptionalism narrative was both open-ended and jointly constructed; U.S. 
and Indian rhetors celebrated both nations’ character and accomplishments as models of 
democracy.  The narrative played out in exchanges among President Bush, Prime 
Minister Singh, and U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford.  At the beginning of the 
narrative, the obligations of partnering the oldest and largest democracies were 
ambiguous.  President Bush’s inclination was toward an interventionist mode of 
behavior, in which democratic nation-states propagate and aid other societies’ adoption of 
democratic principles and systems.  Prime Minister Singh’s inclination was toward an 
exemplarist mode of behavior, in which the benefits of democracy were self-evident and 
willingly emulated.   
As the narrative progressed, President Bush’s construction drew in Prime Minister 
Singh’s vocabulary and idealistic frame, which Ambassador Mulford affirmed in his own 
extension of this narrative thread.  The joint construction of exceptionalism 
consubstantiated the United States and India in their obligations to stand as models of 
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democracy and defenders of international norms.  Their joint perspective established 
consonance between India’s character and its place inside the nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. No longer would India’s position define the correctness of its actions; rather, 
India’s actions would determine its correct position, meaning its belonging within the 
community of responsible, cooperating nation-states.   
A narrative that is open-ended and participatory diffuses in discourse, pulling in 
myriad experiences and substances of identification as it progresses. Identification 
springs from the connection between character and action, rather than the satisfaction of 
having achieved an explicitly defined outcome.18  Operating from these premises, my 
critique suggests that an open-ended and participatory narrative will be more likely to 
deepen identification.  This is especially true in diplomacy or other contexts in which 
narrative is generated through an intersubjective process, such as the hail and response of 
courtship.   
Through my research, I discovered a connection to the literature on identification 
that has broad application to the study of narrative.  Specifically, I contrasted how 
individuals drew familial substance into the kinship narrative, with varying degrees of 
thickness.  Gary Hauser made the distinction between thick and thin accounts in his work 
with human rights rhetoric.  “Thin” expressions are abstract, offered in a third-person 
voice on victims’ behalf; accounts relayed in the voice of victims are “thick” expressions 
that are value-laden, culturally translated and situated, and particularized.19  
Congressman Joe Wilson and Prime Minister Singh were among the rhetors who 
constructed the kinship narrative that emerged from the discourses I studied.  Comparing 
accounts, Congressman Wilson’s narrative drew on his father’s World War II experience 
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as a member of the Flying Tigers.  Reflecting on his visit to India in January 2006, 
Congressman Wilson said: 
What was very meaningful to me is that I had a picture of my father standing in 
front of the Taj Mahal, in March 1944, and I stood on the exact same sandstone 
location and had my picture taken, with the Taj Mahal in the background.  It was 
so emotional to me, so heart-warming, to visit the country that he had told me all 
about – its very confident people, its very capable people, people who worked 
hard, and I saw it all first hand.20 
 
Speaking through his father’s memory, Congressman Wilson’s narrative was highly 
personalized and thick.  His story tightly wound past, present, and future, connecting 
himself to the Indian people through the actions of his father and their fathers who were 
brothers in arms.  In contrast, Prime Minister Singh spoke as the symbolic father of the 
Indian people:     
There is hardly any middle class family in India who doesn’t have a son, a 
daughter, a son-in-law, a brother-in-law in the United States.  That is a very 
powerful new bond.  I should like to express our profound gratitude to the 
Americans of Indian origin.  The way that they have conducted themselves, the 
way they have worked hard to carve out a niche for themselves in the Silicon 
Valley, I think this has also given American(s) a new idea about what India is 
capable of. 21 
 
Prime Minister Singh distanced himself from the Indian people, whom he addresses as a 
group apart from himself.  The Prime Minister’s familial relationship was not biological, 
but symbolic, an artifact of his political and governing role.  The resulting discourse was 
depersonalized and thin.  A thin discourse places the rhetor in the role of observer or 
commentator.  A thick discourse places the rhetor in the narrative of experience.   
The variation within the kinship narrative indicates that the “thick” and “thin” 
vernaculars that Hauser found in human rights discourse have broader applicability for 
the relationship between familial substance and identification.  An open question for 
future scholarship is whether other substances of identification offer similar ways of 
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measuring intensity, thereby providing a more robust response to Woodward’s complaint 
that we lack the means to measure the depth of identification.22  For geometric substance, 
is the depth of identification measured by degrees of proximity?  For directional 
substance, is valence understood in terms of momentum?  My critique raises these 
questions as a point of curiosity and future discovery.  
My critique presents four narratives that involved the U.S.-based Indian Diaspora 
community directly, as participants, or indirectly, as rhetorical resources.  One is the 
introspective sojourner narrative that constituted the U.S.-Indian Diaspora in the context 
of a comprehensive bilateral partnership.  The sojourner narrative generated a sense of 
forward momentum.  In the convergence narrative, Diasporans combined their voice with 
other proponents of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement to put the United States and India on 
the same trajectory toward an envisioned future state.  The kinship narrative placed 
Diasporans within the gestalt of biological and symbolic relations that consubstantiated 
the United States and India in their collective and transnational achievements.  Lastly, 
discourses that invoked creativity as a rhetorical resource consubstantiated the United 
States and India in the pursuit of prosperity for all peoples.  The U.S.-based Diaspora 
community’s voice came through in the sojourner and convergence narratives only, 
suggesting that voice is also part of the spectrum by which we can assess the depth of 
identification.   
Beginning with the more oblique incorporations of Diasporans’ voice, it is 
broadly acknowledged that Indian Diasporans are members of the creative class that has 
contributed to the global success of the new economy.23  And yet, the Diasporans who 
added their voice to the debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement did not make an explicit 
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reference to their role as innovators; the creativity inherent in the Indian people, and by 
extension their Diasporans, was a trait cited by others.  When Diasporans incorporated 
intergenerational or familial references in their discourses, it was to establish a contrast, 
as in Sanjay Puri’s referring to himself as the “black sheep” of his family because he 
established a professional identity outside of the medical and engineering professions.24 
Certainly, the Diasporan community composed the gestalt of biological and symbolic 
relations that made the United States and India consubstantial, but this does not change 
the fact that Diasporans were placed in a narrative not of their own construction.   
The sojourner narrative was a full-throated expression of a dynamic Diasporan 
identity.  The introspective sojourner narrative reconstituted the Indian Diaspora identity 
in the context of the U.S.-India partnership.  The sojourner narrative made present a 
commitment to political activism, to effectuate political change in areas above and 
beyond parochial concerns, thus constituting Diasporans in a communal commitment.25  
This conceptualization of voice echoes Hall’s enunciation, the position from which one 
speaks in the practice of self-representation.26  Hall encouraged an understanding of 
identity informed and guided by subjectivity, “a ‘production’ which is never complete, 
always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation.”27  Hall’s 
perspective on voice-as-enunciation makes a critical distinction between being and 
becoming.   
I assert that the kinship narrative and discourses on creativity involved the 
Diaspora as “being.”  By contrast, the sojourner and convergence narratives constituted 
the Diaspora in a continual state of “becoming.”  In the sojourner narrative, the process of 
becoming was bounded to the Diasporans’ maturity as political actors and the 
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embodiment of the promise of bilateral partnership.  In the convergence narrative, the 
process of becoming drew in all the representations of the U.S.-India transnational 
community to constitute the two nation-states and their peoples in a bilateral partnership.   
I would not say that narratives of “being” are inherently weaker in their valence 
toward identification.  However, I do believe that when narratives are intertwined in the 
rhetorical act of courtship, one needs both sorts of narratives—of being and becoming—
to enact courtship and achieve consubstantiation.  Narratives of “being” establish a sense 
of otherness or estrangement, with its inherent potential for belongingness.  Narratives of 
“becoming” then realize the potentiality of belonging together in a newly constituted 
identity.    
 
Burkean Criticism 
My contribution to Burkean theory and criticism is a deeper understanding of the 
interdependencies between Burke’s substances of identification and the rhetorical acts of 
courtship and consubstantiation.  My critique identified the narratives that emerged from 
discourse throughout a three-year period of courtship, and grounds those narratives in 
substances of identification.  My critique also identified the narratives and foundational 
substances of identification that removed the contingency of courtship and motivated 
participants in discourse to act in unison.   
Expressed as a Burkean critique, the core argument of my dissertation can be 
abstracted as follows.  Performing the rhetorical acts of courtship and consubstantiation, 
the United States and India overcame their sense of estrangement, achieved unity in their 
beliefs and purposes, and took concerted action.  The rhetorical acts of courtship and 
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consubstantiation replaced a decades’ long hard power cycle of unilateral action and 
punishment with a virtuous soft power cycle that changed both the ends and means of the 
bilateral relationship.  Discourse transformed the relationship by framing India’s isolation 
as a mistake of history, corrected by restoring India to its rightful place within the 
community of responsible nuclear states.  More fundamentally, this discourse constituted 
a permanent union between the United States and India, forging a bilateral partnership 
characterized by reciprocity, mutuality, integration, joint commitments, and concerted 
action toward a shared purpose.     
Agreement proponents co-constructed a set of synthesized narratives that 
constituted a new U.S.-Indian bilateral partnership. The narrative of exceptionalism, 
grounded in geometric substance, constructed partnership out of America’s and India’s 
shared identification as models of democracy and defenders of international norms.  The 
kinship narrative, grounded in familial substance, reconciled India’s desire for autonomy 
with its desire to belong to the community of responsible nuclear states.  Participants in 
discourse transcended geographic, national, and cultural divisions, subject to the kinship 
narrative’s vicarious and emotive pull.  The sojourner narrative, grounded in directional 
substance, constituted the U.S.-based Indian Diaspora as a community that represented in 
microcosm the potential of a comprehensive bilateral partnership.  The convergence 
narrative, also grounded in directional substance, propelled the relationship forward and 
affirmed participants’ sense that their union would generate positive changes for 
themselves and the world.  
The convergence narrative established a synecdochic relationship between the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement and bilateral partnership.  More plainly, the U.S.-India 123 
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Agreement came to symbolize the quality of the U.S.-India partnership in its entirety. The 
quality of the partnership, the quality of the bilateral achievements made in its name, and 
the qualities of character ascribed to the partners were substantively and indelibly the 
same, constituting a bilateral partnership of high integrity, authenticity, and permanence.    
 Discourse transformed the context, social order, and substance of the U.S.-India 
relationship, facilitating India’s diplomatic move from outside to inside the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, and the bilateral diplomatic move from estranged to engaged.  In 
their deepening identification from courtship to consubstantiation, rhetors were co-
arguers and co-creators of strategic partnership.   
Having set forth the argument en toto, allow me to shine a light on those aspects 
with greatest potential to enhance our understanding of Burke.  My observations address 
substance, courtship, and consubstantiation.  Substance is a touchstone in Burke’s 
grammar, the notion that language simulates “what is really there.”28 Substance is central 
to the ways in which language and essence play out in everyday judgments.  It is the core 
meaning of an object, a person, or an idea that language can reshape, recast, reclaim, and 
represent.  In practice, “language used substantially” attributes motive, assigns value, and 
confers identity.29   
Burke’s borrowing from Spinoza interrogates “language used substantially.”  In 
Language as Symbolic Action, Burke cites Spinoza’s Ethics as a source for his own 
thought on the relationship between words and things.  A particular lesson Burke draws 
from his reading of Spinoza’s Ethics is that “concrete images can be instances of the 
abstract, insofar as they conceal our perception of essence by centering attention upon 
some partial aspect abstracted from the whole.”30  Participants in symbolic exchange 
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gravitate toward and express one aspect over another.  One’s choice of meaning lacks 
permanence.  In other words, the meaning of an object is inherently ambiguous.  Owing 
to this ambiguity, language has the power to transform the meaning of the object in 
relation to its context.  
Language wrapped around substance reduces ambiguity.  Substance affords the 
rhetor a range of rhetorical resources and accompanying choices to generate and sustain 
identification.31  Burkean criticism involves naming the substances that infuse a particular 
narrative.32  When I abstracted my Burkean argument, I described narratives grounded in 
substance:  the exceptionalism narrative, grounded in geometric substance; the kinship 
narrative, grounded in familial substance; and the sojourner and convergence narratives, 
grounded in directional substance.   
Substance interrelates a source of agency (i.e., the U.S.-India 123 Agreement), an 
act (i.e., bilateral partnership), and one or more actors (i.e., the United States and India).  
This function of substance as relating and structuring emanates from Burke’s search for a 
theory of social relations,33 and thus elucidates the rhetorical acts of courtship and 
consubstantiation through which participants in discourse deepen identification.  
Courtship is the process in which individuals or groups divided by hierarchy or social 
class overcome their sense of estrangement.  The communicative process of identification 
enables participants in discourse to transcend perceptions of “us” and “them” to become 
“we” and “our.”34  One’s membership in a class or one’s place in the social order is 
acceptable until successfully hailed by someone who until that point had been a stranger.  
The hail and response of courtship deepens identification by relating both parties to their 
common substance.  The momentum created by transcending a division generates a 
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countervailing desire to anchor participants in their unified stance, achieved through 
incorporation of one or more substances of identification.   
Substance reconciles Burke the critic and Burke the theorist.  With a deeper 
understanding of how narratives incorporate substances of identification, we can point to 
the underlying motivations that encourage rhetors in their performance of courtship.  We 
can also judge how the contextualization of a substance of identification reduces 
recalcitrance and overcomes estrangement.  A deeper understanding of substance also 
generates insight on social relations.  Language wrapped in substance establishes the 
imperative to act together and catalyzes concerted action toward a jointly envisioned 
future.   From my work with substances of identification, I conclude that the rhetorical 
acts of courtship and consubstantiation rely on multiple, complementary narratives, tiered 
throughout the life of a discourse, drawing in multiple substances of identification.     
 My critique of diplomatic discourse generated new knowledge for rhetorical 
criticism and theory-building, centered on substance and the rhetorical act of 
consubstantiation.  Ideographs, understood as words used substantially, develop in 
symbolic exchange in accordance with their nature.  Diplomatic discourse profits from 
open-ended and participatory narratives that convey a sense of limitless possibility.  
Participants ground their discourses in a range of substances.  In contrast to the 
discourses of a single rhetor, diplomatic discourse is intersubjective.  Accordingly, how 
participants braid their narrative from different substantive threads is significant.  In 
critiquing the rhetorical acts of courtship and consubstantiation, naming the substances of 
identification is less important than understanding how they function synergistically. 
Moreover, who incorporates which sort of substance differentiates processes of 
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identification into being and becoming, both of which are integral to the rhetorical acts of 
courtship and consubstantiation.  Lastly, future inquiry into rhetorical substances could 
generate a new schema in which to understand the depth or intensity of identification.   
 
Reinterpreting Soft Power 
 My dissertation seeks to develop the rhetorical dimension of soft power 
diplomacy, as introduced by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and elaborated in more recent public 
diplomacy scholarship that questions the biases, ethics, and perceptions of the theory and 
its practice.  The turn toward relational strategies of public diplomacy can be found in 
Brian Hocking’s network model of public diplomacy35; the collaboration among R. S. 
Zaharna, Ali Fisher and Amelia Arsenault to catalyze a “connective mindshift” that 
integrates public diplomacy with other forms of statecraft36;  Kathy Fitzpatrick’s attention 
to ethical concerns raised by asymmetrical power relationships37; and Craig Hayden’s 
reconceptualization of audience and interrogation of arguments that justify, elaborate, and 
constitute public diplomacy.38  Collectively, these authors suggest alternative ways to 
qualitatively assess soft power.   
 The relational turn in public diplomacy scholarship addresses soft power as a 
force for changing how countries and peoples interact with each other and how the 
international system itself is structured and managed.  Reconceptualized as a relational 
strategy of engagement, soft power has the potential to establish common values and 
understandings.  Rejecting the notion that culture, values, norms, institutions and policies 
are soft power resources to be exploited, the relational turn explores the creation of soft 
power resources and how discourse integrates them into statecraft.   
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 My dissertation research demonstrates soft power’s work as a relational strategy 
of engagement, grounding the questions and premises of current public diplomacy 
scholarship in a richly textured and prolonged diplomatic exchange.  A rich 
understanding of rhetoric illuminates soft power theory.  I provide an alternative, 
dramatistic interpretation of soft power attraction as a process of identification.  
Moreover, dramatistic theory provides both a vocabulary and methodology that allows us 
to explain how attraction happens through discourse, through the transformation of social 
relations that is not contingent on public opinion.  From my rhetorical critique of the 
discourses generated by the debate on the U.S.-India 123 Agreement, we learn two 
things:  soft power is a constitutive rather than a persuasive force for change, and as a 
constitutive process, the telos of soft power requires reinterpretation.  
 
Soft Power as a Constitutive Force  
 Identification occurs through discourses or narratives in which participants seek 
belongingness, to change their being apart from, to being a part of or party to a 
community.39  Moreover, identification achieves social cohesion through a transcendent 
move, in which narrative accounts of what has happened, is happening, or might happen 
in the future are rounded out.  Accounts are jointly constructed and placed in an open-
ended narrative.  The reasoning and supporting rationale for what one believes and how 
one acts emerges from discourse.  In brief, discourse that achieves belongingness in 
social relations, cohesion of perspectives, and completeness of accounts exemplifies the 
rhetoric-as-constitutive move.  Participants use language to navigate their way into and 
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through a discursive exchange, and discourse itself is the current that carries the 
participants along.    
 The distinction between rhetoric-as-persuasive and rhetoric-as-constitutive is 
more easily demonstrated than explained; you have to hear it to know it.  The forward-
looking commentaries of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns 
and India’s Ambassador to the United States Ronen Sen, presented below in turn, help 
attune us to the constitutive work of soft power diplomacy.  In remarks to the Asia 
Society in October 2005, Under Secretary Burns presented the future promise of the 
bilateral partnership:   
This new relationship rests on the solid foundation of shared values, shared 
interests and our increasingly shared view of how best to promote stability, 
security and peace worldwide in the 21st century. India will also be a natural 
partner to the United States as we confront what will be the central security 
challenge of the coming generation—the global threats that are flowing over, 
under and through our national borders. … 
 
The vision that I have outlined today is far from complete.  We must alter our 
respective mindsets so that our peoples can recognize the great potential that 
exists.  We must also shift certain ground realities to lay foundations for our long-
term partnership.  Just as we seek to shift perceptions of the possible in our 
bilateral relationship, we must also re-imagine India’s role in the international 
community, including in the context of the United Nations.40 
 
Contained in the opening sentence is the assertion that soft power resources generated a 
joint perspective toward the future; shared values, interests, and orientation possessed the 
capacity to forge a new bilateral relationship.  By describing India as a “natural” partner, 
Under Secretary Burns implied the existence of shared qualities intrinsic to both the 
United States and India that consubstantiated their relationship.  Further, “natural” also 
connotes “natal,” and thus signaled a new beginning to the partnership brought about by 
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President Bush’s and Prime Minister Singh’s joint commitment to pursue full civil 
nuclear cooperation.   
 Whereas Under Secretary Burns could have dwelled on past actions and 
justifications for India’s exclusion from the nuclear nonproliferation regime, he adopted 
instead a future focus, with an expansive temporal and geographical reach.  In contrast to 
the calculated interjection characteristic of rhetoric-as-persuasion, Under Secretary 
Burns’s narrative opened an extemporaneous exchange, in which an indeterminate future 
could be jointly created. Soft power discourse supported constitutive processes of being 
and becoming.   
 In the second excerpt from the same speech, Under Secretary Burns alluded to the 
power of a jointly constructed vision to change habits of thought and the underlying 
rationale that would support and sustain the bilateral partnership.  Whereas rhetoric-as-
persuasion is concerned with image, rhetoric-as-constitutive is concerned with imagining.  
Under Secretary Burns established a rhetorical spring board for India’s promise and all 
that the nation might accomplish, if the underlying rationale and structures could be 
extended from bilateral partnership into a multilateral context. As a constitutive process, 
soft power discourse transformed the context, social order, and substance of the bilateral 
relationship.   
  Indian Ambassador Ronen Sen, in remarks at the National Press Club in February 
2006, set the scene for President Bush’s state visit to India: 
We are confident that during the forthcoming visit of President Bush to India, and 
in the months and years to come, the close partnership between India and the 
United States will continue to intensify and strengthen.  This is not idle crystal-
ball gazing but an objective recognition of the inherent strength and resilience of 
the growing strategic ties between the world’s largest and fastest growing 
democracy and the world’s oldest and most powerful democracy.41  
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Ambassador Sen’s discourse possessed the same future focus as Under Secretary Burns’s 
remarks to the Asia Society.  Ambassador Sen incorporated the “largest” and “oldest” 
trope, but not as a persuasive justification for partnership building.  Because Ambassador 
Sen placed the partnership in the central role of his narrative, democracy was a unifying 
quality that simultaneously strengthens and grows stronger in the bilateral partnership. 
Democracy, as a soft power resource, possessed the capacity to transform the bilateral 
relationship. 
 Culture, values, and institutions are symbols that come to possess power within 
and through discourse.42  Discourse animates soft power resources.  Culture, taken as a 
soft power resource, attracts not as a stimulus for imitation, but in the hybridity created 
when two or more cultures meet. Values, taken as a soft power resource, attract not 
merely through their transmission but also by their discursive enactments. Institutions, 
taken as a soft power resource, attract not merely in their demonstrative existence, but in 
the rhetorical traditions and current-day vernacular that gives them meaning and 
relevance. As a constitutive process, soft power discourse consubstantiated the United 
States and India in bilateral partnership. 
  
Telos of Soft Power  
 According to Nye’s thesis, power is a commodity held by a nation state that may 
be arrayed linearly with hard, command power on one end and the soft power of 
attraction on the other.  The progression begins with coercion and ends with co-
optation.43  To my ears, the pairing of attraction as means and co-optation as ends strikes 
a dissonant chord.  Co-optation is an inferior and fleeting form of attraction that negates 
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deepening identifications and unity.  Co-optation yields from others acquiescence and 
non-interference; its accomplishment of goals and objectives remains a solitary and self-
directed exercise dependent on others’ perceptions.  
In Chapter 2, I introduced Wayne Brockriede’s attitudinal stances that I believe 
help distinguish persuasive and constitutive forms of rhetoric.44  The three stances are to 
coerce, to seduce, and to love.  By coercion, Brockriede meant overcoming opposition or 
getting one’s way by force of argument.  Seduction would achieve the same through 
charm or deceit.  Coercion and seduction are unilateral poses in which power is held, and 
held over, the co-arguer.  For arguers as lovers, the exchange is even; the relationship, 
mutual; acts, reciprocal.   
Paraphrasing Brockriede, when we participate in discourse, we express our 
humanness. This expression binds together the influences we hold over ourselves, the 
social influences of our co-arguers, and the relationship between the two.45  When we 
participate in discourse, we open ourselves to the possibility of changing our held notions 
of who we are, our perceptions of others, and our orientation to the world we inhabit. 
 Identification is the driving force for constitutive rhetoric.  It invites openness to 
self-transformation as well as the transformation of those whom we engage, to 
collaborate in the construction of the argument and its conclusion.46  Collaboration 
engenders a sense of ownership or investment in a successful exchange, a giving and 
returning of material and symbolic resources available to all parties as co-arguers.47 
 The muscularity behind democracy promotion was one example of the United 
States and India addressing each other as co-arguers.  Their interaction as co-arguers 
emerged within the exceptionalism narrative.  As the narrative opened, the United States 
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leaned toward an interventionist approach to democracy promotion, which would 
inculcate democratic principles and processes in other nation-states through capacity 
building and other direct action.  India remained steadfast in its tradition of being a model 
of democracy, enticing other nation-states to emulate its example.48   
During a joint news conference at which the two leaders announced their intent to 
pursue full civil nuclear cooperation, President Bush said:  
India and the United States share a commitment to freedom and a belief that 
democracy provides the best path to a more hopeful future for all people.  We also 
believe that the spread of liberty is the best alternative to hatred and violence.  
Because of our shared values, the relationship between our two countries has 
never been stronger.  We’re working together to make our nations more secure, 
deliver a better life to our citizens, and advance the cause of peace and freedom 
throughout the world. 49    
 
The gesture toward an interventionist approach to democracy promotion follows from 
democracy’s path-breaking action and the two nation’s advancing the cause of peace and 
freedom.   
 The word “path” and its context were sufficiently ambiguous to allow Prime 
Minister Singh to express his preference for an exemplarist approach, arguing that “we 
must work together to create a world in which democracies can flourish.”50 The Prime 
Minister’s “create a world” aligned well with President Bush’s “spread of liberty,” as 
both phrases implied a natural and unrehearsed movement to seed democracy throughout 
the world.  U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford would remove the ambiguity in 
President Bush’s and Prime Minister Singh’s exchange, incorporating India’s exemplarist 
frame in his own discourse and encouraging India in its pursuit of internal perfection.51 
 The discursive exchange on whether the United States and India would align in an 
interventionist or exemplarist approach to democracy promotion is an example of two 
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nation-states engaging each other as co-arguers.  The ambiguity present in the exchange 
enabled rhetorical work in reconciling potentially conflicting perspectives and aims.  
Neither side attempted to force the other to agree with their starting position.  Nor did 
Indian rhetors treat the United States’ adaptation as a “win.”  Consensus emerged from 
discourse. 
 Accepting that participants in discourse can engage each other as co-arguers is 
fundamental to working with soft power discourse as a constitutive process.  The 
rhetorical work of soft power is to dissolve the recalcitrance that prevents participants in 
discourse from overcoming their sense of estrangement, or conversely, from 
strengthening their sense of identification.  Recalcitrance and identification are inversely 
proportional; recalcitrance dissolves as identification deepens.52  
In the discursive exchange between the United States and India, the source of 
recalcitrance on both sides was pride.  India took pride in mastering the nuclear fuel cycle 
despite its isolation from nation-states who were allowed to help each other under the 
terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Prime Minister Singh referred to India’s 
nuclear program as its “precious heritage.”53  The exceptionalism narrative maintained 
India’s sense of pride in its accomplishments, but converted the source of pride from 
India’s isolation to India’s character and track record of upholding international norms. 
India joined in constructing the exceptionalism narrative in a way that would both enable 
cooperation in nuclear development and boost India’s national pride.   
The United States took pride in its role as an architect of the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime that had left India isolated; as an architect of the system, the 
United States also had the gravitas to deliver India from its isolation.  The contrast 
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between India’s character and track record with its position outside the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime created dissonance.  To reduce this dissonance, the deliverance 
narrative added a subtext that changed perspectives about India’s placement, re-
interpreted as a mistake of history.  Because India had delayed full militarization of its 
nuclear program, it fell on the wrong side of the time line to be grandfathered into the 
nuclear nonproliferation regime.   
India’s character and actions had proven the value of its membership in the 
community of cooperating nuclear states.  India’s isolation therefore contravened the 
long-term security goals that the architects of the regime meant to achieve.  This subtext 
of the deliverance narrative allowed the United States to refocus on the original goals of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.  Because India’s isolation resulted from human 
foible rather than malicious intent, both India and the United States could make 
conciliatory moves while preserving their respective sources of pride.   
As discussed in Chapter 3 and in the next section, the deliverance narrative 
succeeded in reducing recalcitrance, but did not deepen identification.  This is a useful 
reminder that soft power discourses are polysemic, relying on a synergy of narratives and 
resources with the potential to deepen identification.  The rhetorical work of soft power 
as a constitutive force for change occurred through a layering of the narratives that 
emerged during the debate.  Whereas the exceptionalism and deliverance narratives 
worked hardest to reduce a major source of recalcitrance on behalf of both the United 
States and India, other narratives present in discourse reduced recalcitrance by nurturing 
a sense of kinship and belongingness, transcending differences on how the two nation-
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states understood and practiced democracy, and shedding Cold War era perceptions and 
habits to imagine a future of unconstrained possibility.    
 My critique demonstrates that the integration of soft power diplomacy in bilateral 
engagement can achieve security goals.  Perceptions of India changed, from being 
obstinate to responsible.  India’s perception of the nuclear nonproliferation regime 
changed, from a discriminatory system to a framework for cooperation.  Perceptions of 
the bilateral relationship changed, from the oscillation between estrangement and 
engagement to an enduring bilateral partnership.  The United States and India achieved 
consonance of orientation and purpose, with interdependent roles and responsibilities, 
along with an energetic willingness to shape the future together. 
 
Enhancing Diplomatic Tradecraft 
 In this section, I describe for members of the diplomatic corps and other 
practitioners of diplomacy the possibilities that come from rhetoric's ability to constitute 
bilateral relationships.  Realizing these possibilities requires a change in perspective 
regarding the nature of power.  Additionally, I offer guidance on enhancements to 
diplomatic tradecraft suggested by a rhetorical perspective.  
 
The Nature of Power   
Power is ambivalent.  Like electricity, if properly grounded it brings us light and 
warmth; if left ungrounded, it can shock the system.54  Ambivalence mitigates tendencies 
toward absolutism when labeling a thing as good or bad according to the “essence” of its 
power.  An object’s ambiguity allows any member of this semantic cluster to “stand in” 
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for the type and nature of power one wishes to ascribe to the object.  Kenneth Burke 
commented in the Foreword to The Philosophy of Literary Form that Richard Wright’s 
Native Son had opened a new avenue in which to explore the ambiguities of power.  
Burke thought of a power “family” that encompassed, inter alia, the social, sexual, 
physical, political, military, commercial, monetary, mental, moral, stylistic, 
emancipatory, liberalizing, wise, and knowledgeable.55 
The source and the demonstration of power shifts according to situational and 
relational contexts.  Some shifts may be minor tremors; other shifts may be tectonic.  
Regardless of magnitude, the re-ordering of the members of Burke’s “power family” 
occurs through the performance of a motive.  Burke offers the example of monetary 
power compensating for deficiencies in other kinds of power; one’s focus on amassing 
personal fortune may emanate from a sense of social inferiority.  Wealth bestows 
immortality in both a material and symbolic sense.56  The motive suggested in discourse 
and action may be internal, the acquisition and use of power (both hard and soft) to 
compensate for a nation-state’s perceived deficiency in its standing and self-
determination.  Or motive may be externally driven, to steward the environment that 
regulates relations and behavior of nation-states within an international or global system. 
 The ambiguous and circulatory nature of power works in favor of bilateral 
engagement.   The image of diplomatic systems as hierarchical and neatly ordered has 
given way to a new understanding of a network model that better represents the 
circulatory nature of power.57  We hear an expression of power’s circulation in the 
discourses arising from the convergence narrative, in which the system of nation-states 
was described as a constellation. For example, in the words of Indian Foreign Secretary 
211 
  
Saran, forces external and intrinsic to nation-states and their relationships were tightly 
wound:     
India perceives the world today as one where the global agenda is being set by a 
constellation of nations including the United States, the EU, Russia, China, Japan 
and India. … The era when global politics was a zero-sum game is now decisively 
behind us.  Leading nations, even when they compete, have inter-dependencies 
and linkages amongst themselves that they ignore at their own peril.58 
 
Power not only circulates, it is a shared resource.  The ways in which nation-states 
interconnect may have an institutional framework, but linkages and the framework itself 
are rhetorically constructed.   
 Offering another example, Robinder Sachdev, founder of the U.S.-India Political 
Action Committee, argued that if the Agreement failed, U.S. and Indian interests might 
occasionally intersect but would never fully converge: 
Relations between the United States and India are truly on an inflexion point—a 
good deal between the two nations has a plethora of dividends for both, though 
there may be some interests being compromised by both countries.  However, a 
non-deal will lead to an altogether different orbit for India in international affairs.  
Not to say that that orbit will be good or bad for U.S. relations, but it certainly 
will be a different path.59 
 
The movements of the United States and India were governed in part by laws of the 
cosmos that they transited.  The opportunities promised by the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
exercised a gravitational pull in which the two nation-states’ trajectories would 
eventually converge.  If, however, the Agreement remained elusive, the two nation-states 
would lose both momentum and attraction, to again go their separate ways.  The United 
States and India could achieve more by acting in synchronicity.  Sachdev introduced an 
imperative to seize the moment, telling us something else.  Power is not only circulatory, 




Lessons in Diplomacy 
 The two prior sections of this chapter addressed scholars of rhetoric and soft 
power diplomacy, and offered lessons for practitioners of diplomacy as well.  As a 
relational strategy of engagement, soft power diplomacy relies on dual, not unilateral, 
movement.  As a discourse infused with intersubjectivity, bilateral diplomacy relies on 
both parties’ willingness to critically reflect upon their own actions and identities and to 
change held perceptions to achieve mutual benefits.60   
 Not wanting to retrace well-worn steps, I offer three specific lessons for 
practitioners of diplomacy.  The first lesson is that we promote democracy not by naming 
it, but by drawing into discourse the qualities and meanings of democracy as an ideal and 
as lived experience.  The second lesson is that future-focused and holistic accounts of the 
international scene give rhetoric room to work.  Thirdly, alternatives to an actor-centered 
discourse may be more conducive to bilateral engagement.   
 
Democracy is Constructed and Enacted 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the joint construction of democracy transcended 
diverse historical and socio-cultural contexts.  Discourse pulled from real-world 
experience and reached into the meanings of democracy as a universal value.  Working 
this dialectic, discourse recast democracy as pluralism.  Welcoming Prime Minister Singh 
to Washington in July 2005, President Bush’s remarks emphasized threats based on past 






Our nations believe in freedom, and our nations are confronting global terrorism.  
As diplomatic partners, we’re meeting this threat in our own nations and abroad.  
And as economic partners, we’re working around the world to displace hatred and 
violence with prosperity, hope, and optimism.  India’s embrace of democracy and 
human rights has ensured that its great diversity will remain a national strength.61   
 
President Bush’s discourse worked between the word-as-symbol and its tangible 
meanings, concluding by constructing a tautology between diversity and strength.  Prime 
Minister Singh’s response compensated with an upward conversion of democracy’s 
meaning:  
We share a common commitment to democracy, freedom, human rights, 
pluralism and rule of law.  We face common challenges that threaten our way of 
life and values that both our countries hold dear.  We share a common resolve and 
a common responsibility to meet those challenges. 62    
 
In “the common commitment to democracy,” we hear the upward reach to idealized 
forms, democracy’s qualities rounded out by other universal values and governing 
principles, including pluralism. The litany of common challenges, common resolve, and 
common responsibility drove energy into these universal values and shared principles, 
bringing the new cluster of meaning into a narrative that consubstantiated the United 
States and India in their idealistic purposes.   
 In another interlude during President Bush’s March 2006 state visit to India, the 
Prime Minister and the President again exchanged verses in universal values, 
constructing meaning in a dialectic of ideals and experience.  Prime Minister Singh 
initiated the exchange: 
Close to half a century ago President Eisenhower said on a visit to India:  “We 
who are free—and who prize our freedom above all other gifts of God and 
nature—must know each other better; trust each other more; support each other.”  




Your people and ours have come to regard democracy and peaceful political 
mobilization as legitimate and civilized instruments of social change.  Our 
passionate commitment to democracy and human rights, our respect for equality 
of all before the law and our regard for freedom of speech and faith place us on 
the same side of history.63 
 
Prime Minister Singh deftly worked back and forth from known experience and human 
ideals.  He began with a historical event that affirmed the bilateral relationship and ended 
with history of an epochal scale.  In between, he touched on the kinetic force of 
democracy in political mobilization for social change, but quickly pulled this common 
experience with civil disobedience into the realm of ideals, including equality for all 
before the law.  This quote is among the clearest examples the constitutive potential of 
soft power discourse to animate values. 
 President Bush’s remarks, offered the following day, reprised Prime Minister 
Singh’s remarks on equality:   
The partnership between the United States and India has deep and sturdy roots in 
the values we share.  Both our nations were founded on the conviction that all 
people are created equal and are endowed with certain fundamental rights, 
including freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion.  
Those freedoms are enshrined through law, through our written constitutions, and 
they are upheld daily by institutions common to both our democracies. In both our 
countries, democracy is more than a form of government, it is the central premise 
of our national character.  
 
Even though President Bush made note of the fact that freedoms are “upheld daily,” the 
energy within this discourse comes from the plane above.  Democracy, equality, and 
freedom are inseparable and foundational to American and Indian identity.    
 The dialectical construction of democracy is an observation in subtlety compared 
to my primary point.  In these exchanges, democracy was not a commodity to promote.  
Democracy was both constructed and enacted in discourse.  As discourse opened and 
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reconstituted the meaning of democracy, identifications deepened and joint ideological 
commitments grew stronger.   
 
Moments of Transformation 
 As previously described, a narrative that has indeterminate or ambiguous ends has 
the virtue of inviting participants in discourse to place themselves in the action and in 
relation to each other.  Narrative accounts that present binaries have the opposite effect, a 
forced choice more reminiscent of coercion or seduction than co-arguing.  To buttress 
this point, I offer here a statement from Congressman Dana Rohrabacher directed at 
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns, during a House 
International Relations Committee hearing in September 2005: 
The Indians need to know this is another time of choosing.  In the past, they chose 
to be in a closer relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and this 
is a time of realignment again and a period of choosing for them.  They can 
choose to be in a closer relationship with this outlaw Mula regime in Iran and 
radical Islam, or they can choose to be in a closer tie with the people in the United 
States of America.  That is their choice.  It is your job to make sure they are 
making that choice.  That they understand, as they move forward, they are the 
ones who are determining the policy of how the relationship will be with the 
United States.64    
 
As a contextual point, Congressman Rohrabacher was addressing the expectation that 
India would support the U.S. position on an International Atomic Energy Agency 
resolution to address Iran’s noncompliance with nuclear cooperation and safeguards 
agreements.  Statements specific to the Iran vote were an aberration within the discursive 
archive, as were the binary “with us or against” construction of the situation and India’s 
anticipated role.  
216 
  
 Congressman Henry Hyde’s account, though rare in its eloquence, typified 
accounts that re-formed U.S.-India relations: 
India is at a formative moment and facing profound decisions for her billion 
people, all of this occurring in a world which is quickly evolving into unfamiliar 
patterns, the old and familiar giving way to the unformed and new.  My hope is 
she will join us in shaping this new era and take possession of the limitless 
possibilities that are hers to possess.65 
 
The end of the Cold War began a new era for the international order, and for the United 
States and India especially.  Congressman Hyde constructed a future in which the United 
States and India had mutual stakes and shared responsibilities.  In contrast to 
Congressman Rohrabacher’s forced choice, Congressman Hyde preserved and widened 
India’s freedom of choice.  Speaking with Charlie Rose in February 2006, Prime Minister 
Singh echoed the idea of renewal while offering reassurance of India’s commitments:  
A new India which realizes its destiny in the framework of an open society, in the 
framework of an open economy, respecting all fundamental human freedoms—
great respect for pluralism, inclusive value system, I think that’s what unites India 
and the United States and I do hope that working together, our two countries can 
write a new chapter in the history of our relationship.66 
 
To write a new chapter in history is a quintessential metaphor for a new beginning that 
also acknowledges what came before.  In contrast to Congressman Hyde’s account, 
which presents a scene of disruptive change, Prime Minister Singh’s account moors the 
relationship to enduring values and political systems in the process of fomenting change.     
 The examples above contrasted accounts that contained a binary or forced-choice 
with accounts that were future-focused and open-ended.  Whereas the binary may have 
persuasive force, the pose is coercive and action is taken in compliance.  Narratives of 




Decentering the Diplomat  
 This section could have easily been titled “the pitfalls of agent-centric accounts.”  
I am referring to the deliverance narrative presented in Chapter 2, in which Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns tried to match Prime Minister 
Singh’s comfort level with an Agreement rather than a nation-state being the locus of 
action.  Under Secretary Burns began with an emphasis on “we,” interpreted as speaking 
for the Bush Administration rather than the two partner governments:  
We sought the agreement because India’s nuclear weapons program and its status 
outside the nonproliferation regime has proven to be a longstanding stumbling 
block to enhance U.S.-India relations.  It is now time to end the isolation of India 
and to integrate it into nonproliferation norms.67 
 
Under Secretary Burns continued to focus on nation-states as actors, keeping the two 
countries divided between two sides:   
People on both sides of the equation in India and the Department of Atomic 
Energy as well as my own government and other governments need to adjust to 
this new world—that means compromise.  It means to understand that maybe 
what you did in isolation will not be the same as what you would do in a more 
integrated world where India is working with the rest of the international 
community to provide for civilian nuclear power.68 
 
By the end of the debate, Under Secretary Burns had reconciled Prime Minister Singh’s 
perspective, which placed the locus of action in the Agreement itself:   
This agreement is indisputably in India’s national interest from our perspective.  It 
will deliver India from over 30 years of international isolation.  It will allow the 
country to be treated in a fair and egalitarian way.  It will allow the country to 
be—to take its place among the leaders of the civil nuclear community and the 
world today as a responsible state.69 
 
Under Secretary Burns traveled a great rhetorical distance in order to reconcile his own 
agent-centric perspective with Prime Minister Singh’s account that made the U.S.-India 
123 Agreement the source of its deliverance.  Nonetheless, Under Secretary Burns 
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remained steadfast in speaking from a U.S. rather than a joint perspective.  He lacked the 
rhetorical sensitivity to perceive and critically reflect on how India interpreted U.S. 
actions or how the Agreement would change the U.S. and the essence of its bilateral 
relationship.  
The Agreement embodied a reciprocal, resilient, and comprehensive strategic 
partnership.  The synecdoche of the Agreement and the bilateral partnership that emerged 
in the convergence narrative unified U.S. and Indian national interests.   Assured that 
the U.S.-India 123 Agreement would be ratified, Indian Minister of External Affairs 
Mukherjee turned the convergence narrative into an all-encompassing vision:     
Today India and the U.S. engage as partners across the entire range of human 
endeavour.  … As we look back with satisfaction at the transformation of India-
U.S. relations, we are convinced of the future prospects of this relationship.  The 
vision for this relationship laid down by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and 
President Bush is one that serves the interests of our peoples, and those of the 
region and the world.  India and the United States, as two democracies with 
shared values, look forward to building this partnership based on principle and 
pragmatism in the years to come.70 
 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, speaking contemporaneously with the signing of the 
U.S.-India 123 Agreement, constituted the bilateral partnership and gave it unending 
reach:  
And so today, we look to the future, a shared future in which both our nations 
together rise to our global responsibilities and our global challenges as partners.  
Let us use this partnership to shape an international order in which all states can 
exercise their sovereignty securely, responsibly, and in peace … to tackle the 
great global challenges of our time … to protect and promote our common values 
… to drive a new social justice agenda for the 21st century.71 
 
The synecdoche of Agreement and partnership allowed Secretary Rice the latitude to bind 
the United States and India as co-creators of both.  The Agreement therefore contained 
the motivations of both nations’ leaders.  Because the leaders acted in their official and 
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representative capacities, the Agreement expressed the aspirations and will of their 
people.72  As Secretary Rice’s litany progressed from material interests to global benefits 
and universal goods, she elevated the frame of the partnership from a vehicle to achieve 
pragmatic change to a character-driven relationship that channeled shared motivations 
into symbolic action.73   
 Three heuristics guide the integration of a rhetorical perspective in the practice of 
diplomacy. First, values are rhetorically constructed from every day experience and 
idealized notions of all that a specific value, such as democracy, can entail.   Second, 
future-focused and open-ended narratives have greater potential to constitute partnership 
than narratives constructed around binaries.  Third, discourse can place the locus of 
action in a text or an agreement, such that the text or agreement exercises agency and has 
the power to transform relations.  
 Reading my dissertation holistically, what emerges is a rhetorical frame for soft 
power—a rhetorically sensitive way of thinking about, talking point, and practicing soft 
power diplomacy.  Instead of the growing influence of new actors, there are new voices 
in international affairs.  Rather than measure how issues ascend the international affairs 
agenda, we should ask how transcendent issues, such as global citizenship, emerge.  
Whereas international relations theorists will chart the interdependence of geo-economics 
and geo-politics, rhetorical theorists will attend to narrative forms and constitutive 
moments heard in a community’s call into being and into action.  Instead of balancing 
national and particularized interests, we create a synecdoche of national and 
particularized interests.  We abandon the question of how to change others’ behavior, and 
ask instead how to transform relationships.  Having adopted the rhetorical elaboration of 
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soft power, we redefine influence as the shaping of world views through which nation-
states and peoples engage each other.  The signing of the U.S.-India 123 Agreement 
culminated a transformational moment in U.S.-India relations.   
 The transformation came about through a soft power approach that eschewed the 
previous decades’ hard power tactics of sanctions and export controls.  The 
transformation came about through soft power discourses that facilitated India’s 
diplomatic movement from outside to inside the nuclear regime, and that moved the 
bilateral relationship from estrangement to engagement, and into an enduring partnership. 
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